FOREWORD: A LONG AND PROUD TRADITION.

• Author: Reid, Ronald F.

This introduction to the following collection of essays about the AFA's fifty-year history is merely to remind us of a few points: Forensics has a long history which predates the AFA; forensic activities and terminology have changed as cultures, philosophies, and educational practices have changed; future changes are inevitable; and despite changes, we have a proud tradition. These points are so obvious that they are easily overlooked, especially since studies in rhetorical history tend to focus on theory rather than on speaking exercises. In this sketch of our pre-AFA tradition, theory will receive only incidental mention and forensic activities will be emphasized.

EARLY EUROPEAN TRADITIONS

The precise origins of our forensic traditions are lost in the mists of history, not only because historical data are in short supply, but also because of changing definitions. The word forensic originally had the restricted meaning of legal oratory rather than the broad range of speech exercises with which today's AFA members are familiar. However, we know that what we call forensic activities date back at least to the fifth century BCE, when sophists (a word that originally meant "teacher" but later was used pejoratively) devised speaking exercises for their students.

One of the earliest exercises was called dialegesthai. Although the word was sometimes used to label informal speech (like our word conversation), it was also used to designate a "definable, rule governed event" in which participants (as in modern group discussion) would discuss "various aspects of a topic or issue for the purpose of coming to a mutual agreement or answer" (Timmerman, 1993, p. 120). The types of questions varied. Some were philosophically abstract while others were practical political issues.

As time went by, teachers initiated various "spin-offs" of dialegesthai. Formats, educational goals, and theoretical underpinnings differed, but despite differences, these exercises were what today we call forensic activities. Protagoras (c. 485-4 15 BCE), often called "the father of debate," believed that absolute truth is unknowable. He developed the theoretical concept of dissoi logoi: two opposing views have equal validity, the "correct" one being that which is most persuasive. In keeping with his skepticism, he invented some debate exercises, the exact formats of which are unknown. However, we know that students argued a thesis pro and con. Some theses were abstract philosophical ones, but his primary educational goal was not to train philosophers. It was to train students to deliver argumentative speeches in law courts and political assemblies--a skill that would later be called rhetoric (for details on the origin of the word rhetoric, see Schiappa, 1990).

Socrates (469?-399 BCE), who converted dialegesthai into dialectic, had a passion for argumentation, but he stood in marked contrast to both Protagoras and earlier practitioners of dialegesthai. He had little use for popular opinion, whether it was the opinions of juries or group discussants or political assemblies. Although he left no writings, he "apparently taught that truth was absolute and knowable and that a clear distinction should be made between dialectic, the question and answer method of obtaining the one correct answer, and rhetoric, which does not seem interested in the universal validity of the answer but only in the persuasiveness for the moment" (Kennedy, 1963, p. 14).

His student, Plato (428-348 BCE), also believed that Absolute Truth could be discovered via dialectic. He composed his Dialogues in a question-answer format and used dialectic as a method of instruction in his school (the Academy). Question-answer formats were set up, not only between teacher and student, but also between students. The purpose was to bring students around to understanding Truth about some philosophical question and to develop the skills necessary to defend Truth.

Despite profound disagreements over (1) the nature of truth and popular opinion, (2) the importance of teaching philosophy vs. practical politics, and (3) the virtues of dialectic's question-answer format vs. rhetoric's full-scale speech, early Greek teachers agreed on the value of debate as an educational tool. One of the most influential enthusiasts for debate was Aristotle (384-322 BCE), whose surviving texts about dialectic and rhetoric are only notes, not full-scale books, but his extant works on dialectic contain hints that dialectic had become a widespread student exercise in the schools of his day, complete with time limits, rules, and awards to the winners, just as academic debate today has time limits, rules, and awards (Smith, 1997, pp. xx-xxi).

Aristotle's enthusiasm for contests in dialectic probably carried over to his teaching of rhetoric, although unfortunately his Rhetoric explains only his theory, not his pedagogy. However, comments such as the following show an eagerness for verbal competition: "Since winning is pleasurable, necessarily, games of physical combat and mental wit are pleasurable (winning often takes place in these)..." (Rhetoric, 1.13.1370b). Cicero reports that Aristotle had his students argue theses, and many commentators believe that as he grew older he tried to attract more students by adding a number of speech activities to prepare them for political and legal careers.

One of Aristotle's chief competitors for students was Isocrates (436-338 BCE), who concentrated on teaching students to write discourses on broad philosophical and political themes (for details on the Aristotle-Isocrates rivalry and Aristotle's curricular changes, see Freese's intro, to Aristotle, 1926, pp. xxiii-xxiv). Isocrates's approach, in which student orations had to be written in a carefully-polished style, was a precursor to our present-day contests in oratory, but it was criticized by many of his contemporaries. One of his harshest critics was Alcidamas (4th century BCE), who maintained that speechmaking was more difficult than writing and that anyone who learned to speak well would automatically be able to write well. Claiming that Isocrates failed to prepare students for debating in the real world, he said "the ability to speak on the spur of the moment is necessary in harangues, in the courtroom, and in private conversations." But he added an important qualification: "It must distinctly be under stood that I am not encouraging careless speaking when I say that I esteem the ability to speak extemporaneously more highly than the written word. My contention is that the orator must prepare himself in advance in ideas and their arrangement, but that the verbal elaboration should be extemporaneous..." (text in Van Hook, 1919, pp. 89-94). His qualification should be cherished by modem forensics directors as we conduct contests in debate and individual events such as extemporaneous speaking.

Aristotle did not share all of Alcidamas's ideas, but he agreed on the need to train students to speak extemporaneously. But perhaps Aristotle's greatest contribution to the history of forensics was his theoretical justification for argumentation and debate. He classified argumentation into three types: scientific demonstration, dialectic, and rhetoric. Only scientific demonstration was a form of reasoning and communication that dealt with certainties. Both dialectic and rhetoric dealt with probable truths rather than the absolute truths that were so dear to the hearts of Plato and Socrates. However, in Aristotle's scheme, dialectic and rhetoric differed in several respects. Dialectic was a type of discourse which "reputable men" used to debate abstract philosophical subjects through a series of questions and answers. Rhetoric involved full-length speeches about civic matters addressed to popular audiences. Whereas dialectic used only appeals to reason, rhetoric used both logical and non-logical appeals. In Zeno's famous metaphor, dialectic is the closed fist and rhetoric is the open hand. (For good discussions of the rhetoric-dialectic distinction, see Green, 1990, pp. 5-27; Moss, 1993, pp. 9-13; Smith's intro to Aristotle, 1997, pp. xiii-xv). This distinction is relevant to a question that frequently perplexes modern-day judges of academic debate: Should the decision be based strictly on evidence and reasoning or on overall...