Finding Immunity: Manders v. Lee and the Erosion of 1983 Liability - Thomas B. Ward

• Publication year: 2004

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Finding Immunity: Manders v. Lee and the Erosion of Sec. 1983 Liability

In Manders v. Lee,¹ the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a Georgia county sheriff is an arm of the state when acting in his official capacity in implementing and enforcing use-of-force guidelines and, thus, is immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment.² This decision creates considerable uncertainty in the area of government-entity liability under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983³ because of the potentially broad impact of this newly established analytical approach.

I. Factual Background

In May of 1997, Willie Santonio Manders was arrested by the City of Homerville Police for punching a police officer. While Sheriff Deputy Brown and a city police officer were leading Manders into his cell, a different police officer stated that Manders hit him earlier. Sheriff Deputy Brown and the city police officer assisting him then began hitting Manders, repeatedly striking him across the face, neck, and head, and ramming his head into the wall. Manders sustained physical injuries to his face and suffered emotional injuries that eventually resulted in a mental hospital stay.⁴

Manders filed his amended complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia on April 20, 1999, alleging numerous claims against several defendants.⁵ The majority of the claims against the numerous defendants were eventually dismissed; however, the district court denied Sheriff Peterson's⁶ motion for summary judgment with respect to Manders's "use-of-force policy claims⁷ under Sec. 1983 against . . . Sheriff Peterson in his official capacity."⁸ Sheriff Peterson then filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that he was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. After the district court denied his motion for reconsideration, Sheriff Peterson filed an interlocutory appeal with the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.⁹

Following circuit precedent that treated suits against Georgia sheriffs acting in their official capacity as suits against a county, instead of as suits against the state, the court of appeals reluctantly affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment.¹⁰ However, because the precedent decisions did not analyze whether a sheriff actually represents either the state or the county under Georgia law, the court questioned the correctness of those decisions.¹¹ Subsequently, the court of appeals voted to vacate the panel opinion affirming the denial of summary judgment and ordered the case reheard en banc.¹² On July 28, 2003, the Eleventh Circuit issued its decision in the case of Manders v. Lee,¹³ determining that Georgia sheriffs act as an arm of the state when establishing or implementing use-of-force policies generally, and, in particular, at a county-funded and county-managed jail.¹⁴

II. Legal Background

The central question addressed in Manders—when does a sub-state entity act on the state's behalf—occurs at the intersection of two legal doctrines: Eleventh Amendment immunity¹⁵ and claims based on 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.¹⁶ The Eleventh Amendment, in recognition that the states retain certain attributes of sovereignty, largely shields states from suits in federal court.¹⁷ It was passed after the Revolutionary War primarily out of concern that the heavily indebted states would be forced to answer for their debts in federal court, thus leading to their financial destruction.¹⁸

The Civil Rights Act of 1871 was introduced as a bill to "enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,"¹⁹ and to suppress "Ku Klux Klan violence in the Southern States."²⁰ The bill's first section, later codified as 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, secured federal rights by giving a broad remedy to any citizen subjected to violations of federally protected civil rights at the hands of officers of the state.²¹ Legislative history indicates that the Civil Rights Act of1871 was aimed at sheriffs whose active participation, tacit approval, or neglect of duty caused the violation of federally protected civil rights.²²

Although Sec. 1983 liability extends only to "persons,"²³ the Supreme Court in Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York²⁴ held that "persons" includes local governments and municipalities.²⁵ While expanding the definition of "persons" falling under the ambit of Sec. 1983, Monell also significantly narrowed the reach of Sec. 1983 liability against local governments and municipalities by holding that the constitutionally violative conduct must be carried out "pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature"²⁶ instead of by mere tortious activity of an employee acting contrary to official sanction.²⁷ The requisite policy can be made by its lawmakers or by one whose "edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy."²⁸ The Supreme Court, however, expressly chose to save for another day development of the full contours of municipal liability under Sec. 1983.²⁹

Ten years later, in City of St. Louis v. Propotnick,³⁰ the Supreme Court seized the opportunity to further clarify Sec. 1983 municipal, county, or other local-entity liability by elaborating on the method courts should follow in determining where policymaking authority lies. Recognizing that state law, including "custom or usage" having the force of law, governs this determination, the Court stated in Jett v. Dallas Independent School District³¹ that in deciding Sec. 1983 municipal liability claims, the trial court must first identify the official or government body that acts with final policymaking authority regarding the action alleged to have caused the constitutional violation. Once the final policymaking officials have been identified, the court must then determine whether the constitutional violation was caused directly by their decisions or by their acquiescence in a long standing practice or custom constituting "'standard operating procedure.'"³²

In the foregoing cases, it was uncontroverted that a city's or county's final policymaker was acting for the city or county who employed him. But in McMillian v. Monroe County,³³ the Supreme Court addressed which entity an Alabama sheriff (whom both parties agreed was the official policymaker for Sec. 1983 purposes) represented when inflicting the unconstitutional injury at issue.³⁴ The Court announced two principles that governed the decision of the preliminary question whether an injury inflictor was a "final policymaking official" at all.³⁵ The first principle is whether the government official has final policymaking authority for the local government in that "particular area of the government's business, or on that particular issue,"³⁶ as opposed to having final policymaking authority in an all-or-nothing categorical sense.³⁷ Second, the analysis of the official's function in a local government is dependent on how relevant state law defines the official's functions.³⁸

In McMillian the sheriff allegedly suppressed exculpatory evidence and testimony and coerced a codefendant to give inculpating evidence resulting in an alleged unconstitutional capital conviction against the defendant.³⁹ Accordingly, the Supreme Court identified the local-government function at issue in this case as law enforcement.⁴⁰ The Court then grappled with whether the sheriff exercised this law-enforcement function on behalf of the county or the State of Alabama.⁴¹ If the county sheriff was exercising law-enforcement authority on behalf of the county as the county's final policymaker, the county could be liable for its actions under Sec. 1983.⁴² If, on the other hand, the sheriff was acting on behalf of the state, the functional defendant would be the state itself; and because states sued in their own name are not "persons" capable of being sued under Sec. 1983, in state or federal court, no government would be liable for the sheriff's allegedly unconstitutional conduct.⁴³

To answer the question whether the sheriff in Alabama possessed final policymaking authority for the county or the state when acting in a law enforcement capacity, the Court first turned to the supreme law of the state, the Alabama Constitution.⁴⁴ Framed in its current form in 1901, the Alabama Constitution states that each county sheriff is an executive official who is impeachable by the Alabama Supreme Court for neglect of duty.⁴⁵ This fact weighed heavily in favor of classifying the sheriff as a state officer.⁴⁶ Turning to the Alabama Code, the Court found supportive, but less compelling, evidence tending toward classifying sheriffs as state officers.⁴⁷ First, the sheriff is charged with attending to the state courts in his county and must obey orders given by the judge, who is a state official.⁴⁸ Second, the sheriff must give to the county treasurer a written statement detailing the funds received for the county and must pay these to the treasurer, but the treasurer cannot direct the sheriff to take specific actions, thus showing a lack of control.⁴⁹ Third and most important, the sheriff is given complete authority to enforce Alabama state criminal law.⁵⁰ A county has no such power and may not instruct the sheriff in his duties.⁵¹ Whereas the county does not exercise control over the sheriff, the governor and attorney general can exercise control by directing the sheriff to investigate violations of state law in the sheriff's counties and report those findings to the charging officer.⁵²

Juxtaposed against the state constitutional findings and the three statutory provisions supporting the conclusion that sheriffs are state officials, the Court held four other provisions collectively insufficient to tip the balance in favor of the conclusion that Alabama sheriffs exercised law-enforcement functions on behalf of Alabama counties: (1) the sheriff's salary is paid out of the county treasury, (2) the county provides equipment and other necessities reasonably needed for the sheriff to...