Argument fields as arenas of discursive struggle: argument fields and Pierre Bourdieu's theory of social practice.

• Author: Prosise, Theodore O.

Argument theorists have long been concerned with the explanation of practical everyday argument. Since Stephen Toulmin's The Uses of Argument,(1) the study of argument fields has become a theme in argumentation theories that examine arguments in social space.(2) Responding to analytic philosophers, Toulmin posited that formal logic was an inadequate system for explaining engaged argumentative practices of social agents. Because claims of universal rationality inevitably fail to explain arguments in their real world context, Toulmin argued that different logical types of propositions correspond to different human arenas, metaphorically referred to as "fields." From this perspective argument theorists could delineate among fields by examining the systems of argumentative forms successfully employed in social fields. The study of argument fields, therefore, allowed for the systematic inquiry and consideration of argument without having to make universal claims. This view offered a practical step toward the recognition of the dynamics of social authority in particular social contexts.(3)

In Human Understanding, Toulmin recasted the discussion of fields to include a schemata more analogous to academic disciplines.(4) From this perspective, a field is defined as a more formal organization based on subject matter. The institutional or disciplinary framework is the arena in which the participants apply arguments. Both of these approaches to the study of practical argumentation have generated useful scholarly debates about the definition and purpose of argument fields and the goal of argumentation studies. While the assumption that arguments are based on fields seems to be accepted uniformly by argument scholars, this insight has yet to yield a coherent critical theory of everyday argumentative practices within fields.(5)

Despite the heuristic value, the argument field literature has not provided a concrete descriptive or critical method to guide inquiry. We have isolated three problems limiting the formulation of a critical theory of argument fields. First, argument theorists have not defined argument fields in a way in which both the internal logic of argumentative utterances and the external organization constraining those utterances are adequately taken into account. Second, the literature on fields has virtually ignored the dynamic discursive struggles for epistemic legitimacy in social fields in favor of a more evolutionary conception of epistemic development. Third, research into fields has failed to reconcile the riced for sociological description with its overarching disciplinary preference for normative criticism. The call to reconcile such problems in field theory is not unique to this essay. We agree with Pamela Benoit's claim that the conceptual confusion has contributed to a set of articles that construct "critical" appraisals lacking a central theoretical focus.(6) This lack of correspondence between theory and practice also caused Raymie McKerrow to question "whether the 'theory' undergirding field research has provided a sufficiently powerful critical vocabulary for the explication of arguments."(7) This essay argues that the integration of Pierre Bourdieu's theory of social practice to argument field theory provides an answer to the persistent problems confronting scholars interested in a critical social theory of argument.

LIMITATIONS OF ARGUMENT FIELD LITERATURE

The first practical obstacle to the formation of a coherent critical theory of argument fields is the lack of a theoretical consensus regarding the defining characteristics of an argument field. Examining the general characteristics of argument fields is useful and some degree of conceptual "fuzziness" is needed to allow argument fields to account for the diversity of argument types and settings.(8) However, current field definitions have failed to resolve adequately the tension between fields as "logical types" or as "disciplines," impeding the goal of explaining practical argumentative practices. The root of this definitional problem begins with the failure of argumentation scholars to come to an agreement about the primary characteristics of fields. Joseph Wenzel argues that Toulmin's original concept of fields has varied, so it is reasonable to suggest that the current debate about the fundamental nature of argument fields began with the ambiguities of Toulmin's work.(9) Two primary perspectives have risen regarding the definition of an argument field. The first is the orientation toward argument fields as characterized by forms of reasoning or logical type. The alternative is a view of fields as organized social arenas of discourse.

Fields as Logical Types

The notion that fields are defined primarily by similar types of reasoning has been the perspective employed by many argumentation researchers. James Hanson defends the use of logical types to define the boundaries of fields on the grounds that "fields of argument" should be thought of as distinct from disciplines.(10) Wenzel argues that fields should be conceptualized more narrowly, based on the "propositional contents of knowledge structures."(11) Here fields are conceptualized as some variant of Toulmin's original definition of argument fields as defined by logical types. This perspective is useful in that it encourages scholars to study patterns of linguistic forms of authority that agents employ in social fields.

While this emphasis on logical type allows scholars to focus on the internal logic of arguments, other theorists have charged that it degenerates into the same type of formalism that Toulmin rejects for being unable to explain everyday discourse.(12) The chief advantage of contemporary argument theory over formal logic is that it more closely mirrors the arguments used by ordinary people in real life settings; but relegating field research to cataloging argumentative strategies based on the type of informal reasoning employed neglects important components in people's daily argumentative practices. That is, elevating logical type as the primary characteristic of a field relegates everyday aspects of argument, (such as relational, historical, and contextual aspects of power) to the margins of the discussion of field theory. Hence, the perspective limits the ability to explain the social factors that give rise to arguments and the subsequent social affects of those arguments.

The study of argument fields would be richer if the social complexities of knowledge forms and expressions received greater attention. Wenzel argues that "the upshot of recognizing" the dynamics of social knowledge, in relation to the challenges of postmodernism, "is to call for amendments to our theory, practice and pedagogy of argumentation."(13) If diversity is the norm, a theory of argument fields must extend beyond the categorization of logical types and move toward understanding the dynamics of diversity of thought and experience throughout social space. Similarities among logical type, in fact suggest that many tacit forms of social authority are at work in fields. Without such inquiry the complexities of social struggles may be lost in the limited categorization of the dominant forms of logical types employed in social fields. In the end, the social aspects of argument are too dynamic to be explained adequately by defining fields primarily in terms of logical types.

Fields as Organized Discourse

The alternative to the definition of fields as logical types comes from theorists who contend that fields should be defined as formally organized systems of discourse. This perspective of fields has certainly been of heuristic value to argument scholars. Exploring the organizing properties at the base of forms of authority, Zarefsky has addressed the institutional characteristics of organized argument fields.(14) Furthermore, a significant proportion of the research on fields has examined the legal field of argumentation.(15) Religious and policy making systems have also been analyzed under the disciplinary rubric of argument fields.(16) These studies share a similar understanding of argument fields as organized areas of inquiry.

Many scholars have raised questions about this approach. The disciplinary metaphor may also be an inadequate framework to represent everyday social argument.(17) The characteristics of day-to-day interaction among people are not so easily divided as organized discussions in the academic fields of biology and geology. Furthermore, scholarly disciplines are hardly unified arenas. Bruce Gronbeck notes that a pan-disciplinary movement to blur lines of departmental distinction has rendered the disciplinary definition of fields problematic.(18) An approach that defines argument fields as organized disciplines, according to Zarefsky, must come to grips with the fact that "disciplines . . . may be so broad that the variance in approach among scholars within a discipline is greater than that among scholars between . . . disciplines."(19) In psychology, for example, there are ongoing disputes about both the methods and the general ends of scholarship.(20) Functionalist scholars studying organizational communication can share a disciplinary boundary with Marxist rhetoricians, without agreeing with them on the most basic uses and purposes of their disciplinary resources. In addition, Thomas Hollihan and Kevin Baaske claim that the scientific method is a guiding framework that applies across many disciplines as a larger social form of authority.(21) Toulmin further notes that the epistemological crisis of the late 20th century has implications across arenas of academic inquiry.(22) Also, disciplinary boundaries are created by political forces that have nothing to do with the objects of study or preferred forms of evidentiary proof.(23) For example, Philip Wander suggests that the reintroduction of rhetoric as a separate discipline from English was due to political movements...