FEIS, HERBERT. The Road to Pearl Harbor. Pp. xii, 356. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950

• Author: Frank M. Russell
• Published date: 01 March 1951
• Date: 01 March 1951
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/000271625127400141
• Subject Matter: Articles

217

tion

of

a

convoy

of

twenty-two

Japanese

ships

bound

for

Lae

with

reinforcements,

and

the

loss

of

approximately

12,000

enemy

naval

and

military

personnel.

In

spite

of

later

intelligence

reports

that

considerably

reduced

the

estimated

Japanese

losses,

Gen-

eral

MacArthur

has

steadfastly

maintained

the

accuracy

of

the

ofhcial

report.

The

true

account

of

the

battle

appears

for

the

first

time

in

print

on

pages

148-50.

It

is

based

upon

a

digest

of

a

detailed

report

written

for

General

Kenney

on

24

Septem-

ber

1945

which

contained

the

results

of

a

careful

intelligence

investigation

made

in

Japan

in

the

same

month.

This

showed

that

there

were

sixteen

ships

in

the

Lae

convoy,

and

of

these

eight

transports

and

four

destroyers

were

sunk,

while

four

destroyers

returned

to

Rabaul.

The

loss

in

Japanese

personnnel

amounted

to

less

than

3,000

men.

A

footnote

to

the

narrative

states

that

&dquo;attempts

to

locate

the

docu-

ment

have

been

unsuccessful&dquo;;

this

is

not

surprising,

for

on

the

afternoon

of

19

November

1945,

General

MacArthur’s

Command

ordered

that

the

report

to

Gen-

eral

Kenney

be

destroyed.

It

is

understood

that

at

the

present

time

the

supreme

commander

in

Japan

has

historians

still

trying

to

establish

the

truth

of

the

report

of

7

April

1943.

ARTHUR

P.

WATTS

Lt.

Col.

USAFR

Philadelphia,

Pennslyvania

FEIS,

HERBERT.

The

Road

to

Pearl

Harbor.

Pp.

xii,

356.

Princeton:

Princeton

Uni-

versity

Press,

1950.

This

book

is

the

end

product

of

an

enormous

amount

of

research.

Written

in

a

spritely,

colorful,

and

somewhat

journal-

istic

style,

it

is,

nevertheless,

a

careful,

searching,

well-documented

account

of

toil-

ing

diplomats

and

harried

statesmen

for

the

most

part

striving

to

prevent

war

or

at

least

to

postpone

it

until

it

could

be

fought

under

more

favorable

conditions

by

their

respective

countries.

That

such

a

work

could

be

produced

five

years

after

the

conclusion

of

the

most

bitter

and

titanic

struggle

in

all

history

is

to

be

attributed

partly

to

the

fact

that

in

a

democratic

age

in

democratic

countries

the

people

must

be

&dquo;told

all&dquo;-at

least

after

the

event-and

statesmen

and

diplomats

are

under

various

compulsions

to

do

just

that.

In

this

instance

the

author

could

draw

upon

a

number

of

private

diaries

and

memoirs,

including

those

of

Stimson,

Mor-

genthau,

Grew,

Kido,

and

Harada,

as

well

as

gain

from

private

conversations

with

officials

who

in

some

instances

were

close

to

the

heart

of

the

problem

and

who

could

tell

much.

Moreover,

victory

and

the

post-

war

trials

of

war

criminals

opened

the

rec-

ords

of

the

enemy

East

and

West

and

afforded

unique

opportunity

to

write

an

account

almost

clinical

in

its

probings.

The

author

in

a

few

pages

provides

a

setting

for

the

conflict,

including

the

basic

situation

of

the

Japanese

with

their

re-

dundant

population,

paucity

of

resources,

national

pride,

and

sensitiveness.

The

world

wide

depression

of

the

early

1930’s

aggravated

and

made

desperate

this

situa-

tion.

The

Greater

East

Asia

Co-Prosperity

Sphere

was

brought

forward

as

the

answer.

Its

realization,

of

course,

was

dependent

upon

the

use

of

force,

for

it

ran

afoul

of

British,

Dutch,

and

French

vested

interests,

and

American

Far

Eastern

policy

as

well.

In

the

diplomatic

struggle

which ended

with

Pearl

Harbor

the

United

States

was

somewhat

in

the

position

of

a

well-fed

and

righteous

judge

who

will

not

wink

at

law-

lessness

but

who

is

at

the

same

time

power-

less

to

remove

the

conditions

which

pro-

mote

it.

On

the

other

hand

we

certainly

tried

to

avoid

offending

the

sensitive

Jap-

anese.

The

record

as

here

revealed

acquits

President

Roosevelt

of

any

charge

of

pro-

voking

the

Japanese

attack

in

December,

1941,

unless

a

steady

insistence

that

Japan

should

live

up

to

her

treaty

obligations

and

refrain

from

acts

of

violence

is

regarded

as

provocative.

He

and

his

cautious

Sec-

retary

of

State,

Hull,

were

slow

and

hes-

itant

about

applying

economic

pressure

against

Japan,

and

firm

in

their

refusal

to

indicate

to

the

British

and

Dutch

that

the

latter

could

count

on

armed

assistance

should

Japan

thrust

southward

against

their

possessions.

Our

major

concern

all

along

was

with

the

war

in

the

Atlantic,

the

survival

of

Britain

being

regarded

as

intimately

related

to

our

defense.

The

chief

spokesmen

for