Feature Commentary: Elements of a Pragmatic Strategy to Counter Domestic Political Violence.

• Author: Jenkins, Brian Michael

"Violence in America has risen to alarmingly high levels ... This high level of violence is dangerous to our society. It is dividing our people into armed camps... jeopardizing our most precious institutions... poisoning the spirit of trust and cooperation essential to their functioning ... corroding the central political processes of our democratic society... substituting force and fear for argument and accommodation."

Many Americans in 2022 would agree with this sober assessment of the country's situation, but, in fact, these quotes appeared more than a half century ago in the 1968 "Report of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence." (1) The Commission had been created to address the situation during one of the most turbulent decades in modern American history. The United States in the 1960s was divided by race, cultural attitudes, ideology, politics, and growing opposition to the war in Vietnam.

The decade had witnessed the assassination of President John F. Kennedy; a violent reaction to the civil rights movement that included church burnings and the murder of civil rights workers; the assassination of civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. and of JFK's brother, senator and presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy; widespread race riots; growing anti-war protests, and street battles at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago.

In 1968, George Wallace, the governor of Alabama, launched a third-party presidential campaign aimed at denying both the Democratic and Republican candidates a majority of electoral votes, thereby throwing the election into the House of Representatives where he could broker his support to protect the segregationists' cause. The same year saw the Hong Kong flu pandemic, which killed between one and four million people worldwide and as many as 100,000 people in the United States. The decade closed with the beginning of the domestic terrorist campaigns that would increase in the 1970s.

The campaigns represented an array of causes. Some far-left groups like the Weather Underground opposed the war in Vietnam; others like the New World Liberation Front and United Freedom Front rejected capitalism or opposed U.S. policies in Central America. The Black Liberation Army took up arms against the government and capitalism, and for self-determination of Black people. The Fuerzas de Liberacion Nacional (FALN) sought independence for Puerto Rico. Far-right anti-Castro groups bombed countries and corporations doing business with Fidel Castro. Violent elements within the Ku Klux Klan and neo-Nazis attacked minorities and communists. The primary tactic was bombings, but the groups also carried out armed robberies and assassinations.

While it is perhaps comforting to be reminded that Americans have been here before and the republic survived, the current situation in the United States in some respects seems more worrisome. A half century after the tumultuous 1960s, Americans appear even more divided in their attitudes about race and racism, ideology, and federal authority. Americans increasingly reside in separate cultural and political camps, reflecting different perceptions of reality. The COVID-19 pandemic has further polarized society and contributed to greater radicalization. (2)

Increasing displays of public hostility have prompted fears of political violence. Public opinion polls indicate that a growing number of Americans believe political violence is justified under some circumstances. (3) But many are also alarmed by the appearance of heavily armed men at public protests; the assault on the U.S. Capitol by a violent mob; the increasingly bellicose language of national leaders and influencers on television, radio, the internet, and social media; the growing volume of threats against public officials at all levels of government; and the reported increase in hate crimes. Some even fear that the United States is heading toward another civil war. (4)

This article outlines the elements of a strategy--a determinedly pragmatic approach--to address the threat of political violence by domestic extremists, specifically how a country as divided as ours can prevent domestic political violence from spinning out of control. It is written from a personal perspective, expanding upon my 2021 testimony before Congress, essays written during the past two years, and briefings on domestic political violence. (5) It draws on decades of my own research on terrorism and that of my colleagues at the RAND Corporation and elsewhere. It is important, however, to emphasize that these are my own thoughts. They do not necessarily reflect those of the RAND Corporation, the U.S. government, the U.S Army, the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, the Combating Terrorism Center, or any other institution.

Part One of the article examines the evolution of the problem set when it comes to domestic political violence in the United States. This section begins by looking back at efforts since 9/11 to protect the country against attacks directed or inspired by foreign terrorist organizations. Although overshadowed by the cost in lives lost and trillions of dollars spent in what was initially called the "Global War on Terror" and came to be seen as "forever wars" abroad, efforts to prevent further jihadi attacks on U.S. soil--although marred by initial missteps and injustices--could be described as largely successful and a source of lessons to be learned. This section then outlines how dealing with domestic political violence will be different, why it is likely to be more difficult, and therefore, why we need to rethink strategy before implementing new laws and policies. The section then turns to a more detailed analysis of the political terrain in the United States and the current threat of domestic political violence. This section also speculates about why the country has not seen the escalation or surge of terrorist violence as many anticipated immediately after the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol.

Part Two reviews recent official documents and pronouncements that comprise the current U.S. strategy for dealing with domestic violent extremism. The multifaceted nature of what government is trying to achieve raises questions about definitions, vocabulary, roles, and missions.

Part Three then lays out the basic elements that I believe should guide U.S. strategy in dealing with U.S. domestic violent extremism. This is not a prescription, and it will certainly not be the last word. Its purpose is to provoke further comment and discussion.

Part One: The Evolving Problem Set of Domestic Violent Extremism

The Campaign against Homegrown Jihadis

For the past quarter century, U.S. authorities have focused on defending the country against the terrorist threat posed by a distant jihadi enterprise. In 1996, al-Qa'ida announced it was declaring war on the United States and launched an escalating global terrorist campaign, culminating in the 9/11 attacks. Fearing further, even worse terrorist actions, the U.S. government responded with an unprecedented international campaign directed against a non-state organization. Military operations abroad scattered al-Qa'ida's central command and cadre, and made it increasingly dangerous for them to travel or even communicate. Diplomatic efforts built a new international coalition to combat al-Qa'ida's global enterprise. Improved intelligence and increased international cooperation steadily degraded al-Qa'ida's operational capabilities. Unable to launch attacks on the United States from abroad, the group increasingly relied on its affiliates and appeals to homegrown jihadis to carry on its war.

Organizational and procedural changes in how intelligence was collected and shared, plus new counterterrorism legislation ultimately led to a better informed and more focused national effort that succeeded in containing the threat. Authorities did not prevent every attack in the United States, but they were able to uncover and thwart more than 80 percent of the homegrown jihadi plots. (6) This is not to say that every single plot, if not uncovered, would have led to an attack; some would have. In the more than 20 years since 9/11, homegrown jihadis by one count killed a total of 105 people in the United States--an average of approximately five deaths per year. (7) While every single death is tragic, it was a toll far less than feared in the immediate dark shadow of 9/11.

Perhaps the single most important reason why the United States did not suffer higher levels of jihadi terrorist activity was the fact that jihadi ideology gained little traction in America's Muslim communities, which had no tolerance for violent radicals and would report these people to the FBI. There was no jihadi underground, no jihadi terrorist groups, no continuing jihadi terrorist campaigns. Almost all attacks were carried out by lone attackers or, in a few cases, by tiny conspiracies. (8) The jihadi terror threat in the United States was mostly characterized by inexperienced operators, the absence of organization, limited resources, and one-off attacks. Some of the jihadis died in their attacks. The majority of the attackers along with almost all of the plotters were apprehended, convicted, and sentenced to long prison terms. Many of the American Islamist extremists who aspired to leave the United States to join jihadi fronts abroad were intercepted. Of those who managed to evade arrest and join a jihadi group, at least half subsequently died while carrying out terrorist operations abroad or were killed by U.S. military attacks or, in some cases, by their own comrades as a result of deadly quarrels within a group. (9)

While marred by initial missteps and blunders, the effort against homegrown jihadis can be judged a strategic 'success,' although jihadi armed struggles continue abroad and the danger of further jihadi attacks on American targets persists. Permanent improvements in U.S...