Family firm internationalization: Heritage assets and the impact of bifurcation bias

AuthorLiena Kano,Alain Verbeke
Date01 February 2018
Published date01 February 2018
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1002/gsj.1186
SPECIAL ISSUE ARTICLE
Family firm internationalization: Heritage assets
and the impact of bifurcation bias
Liena Kano
1
| Alain Verbeke
2,3,4
1
Strategy and International Business, Haskayne
School of Business, University of Calgary,
Calgary, Canada
2
International Business Strategy, McCaig Chair in
Management, Haskayne School of Business,
University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada
3
Solvay Business School, Vrije Universiteit
Brussel (VUB), Brussels, Belgium
4
Henley Business School, University of Reading,
U.K.
Correspondence
Liena Kano, Haskayne School of Business,
University of Calgary, Scurfield Hall 418, 2500
University Drive N.W., Calgary, Alberta T2N
1N4, Canada.
Email: liena.kano@haskayne.ucalgary.ca
Funding information
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
of Canada
Research Summary: We develop a new conceptual
framework to uncover governance-related determinants of
family firmsinternationalization, building upon internali-
zation theory. We assess how family firm governance fea-
tures determine internationalization patterns on two key
dimensions: location choice and operating mode. We focus
on family governance characteristics that might drive sub-
optimal internationalization patterns and on removing such
suboptimality. We conclude that bifurcation bias, defined
as the de facto differential treatment of family or heritage
assets versus nonfamily assets, represents a critical family
firm-specific barrier to achieving efficiency in international
operations. In the short run, the key difference in interna-
tional governance is between bifurcation-biased family
MNEs and all other types of MNEs. In the longer run, inef-
ficient, bifurcation-biased decision making will make place
for comparatively more efficient governance.
Managerial Summary: Family firms are susceptible to
bifurcation biasa default preferential treatment of fam-
ily members and resource bundles that hold positive emo-
tional meaning to the family, that is, heritage assets.
Such preferential treatment contrasts with that afforded to
professional, nonfamily managers and other resources,
with which the founding family does not entertain a posi-
tive emotional connection. If left unremedied, bifurcation
bias will lead to poor decisions in family-owned multina-
tionals that undertake international expansion, in terms of
the choices of which markets to enter and how to enter
these. These types of dysfunctional decisions will lead to
a decline in competitiveness as compared to nonfamily
multinationals. Family firms should, therefore, identify
And Inaugural Alan M. Rugman Memorial Fellow, Henley Business School, University of Reading, United Kingdom
Received: 1 February 2016 Revised: 16 December 2016 Accepted: 5 January 2017
DOI: 10.1002/gsj.1186
Copyright © 2017 Strategic Management Society
158 wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/gsj Global Strategy Journal. 2018;8:158183.
and actively prevent bifurcation bias by implementing the
specific safeguarding strategies suggested in this study.
KEYWORDS
bifurcation bias, family firm, heritage assets,
internalization theory, international governance,
location choice, operating mode
1|INTRODUCTION
Much empirical research on firm internationalization has focused either on publicly listed companies
with dispersed ownership and control or on international new ventures run by entrepreneurs. In con-
trast, family firm internationalization has attracted comparatively little attention, perhaps with the
exception of business groups from emerging economies. For example, from 1991 to 2008, only
17 studies analyzing internationalization of family firms were published in core journals in family
business and entrepreneurship (Kontinen & Ojala, 2010), which constitutes less than 1% of the con-
tent published in these journals.
The extant research on family firms, conducted mainly from agency and socioemotional wealth
(SEW) perspectives, has focused predominantly on determining whether family firms are more or
less internationalized than their nonfamily counterparts (Banalieva & Eddleston, 2011). This past
work can be broadly divided into two research streams (Arregle, Duran, Hitt, & Van Essen, 2017):
studies exploring family firmsreluctance to internationalize (Claver, Rienda, & Quer, 2009;
Gomez-Mejia, Makri, & Larraza-Kintana, 2010) and studies emphasizing features of family gover-
nance that facilitate internationalization (Gallo & Pont, 1996; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Scholnick,
2008; Nordqvist, 2005). Given this dichotomy in conceptual starting points, it is not surprising that
the overall empirical results of these studies are ambiguous. For example, several scholars
(e.g., Fernandez & Nieto, 2006; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010; Graves & Thomas, 2006) have shown
that the family firms in their samples were less internationalized than nonfamily ones. Others
(Hennart & Majocchi, 2013; Zahra, 2003) have reached the opposite conclusion. To further compli-
cate the matter, some studies found no substantive difference between internationalization levels of
family versus nonfamily firms (Cerrato & Piva, 2012; Pinho, 2007), and other ones observed a
nonlinear relationship between family ownership and internationalization (Sciascia, Mazzola,
Astrachan, & Pieper, 2012).
We argue that the issue of whether or not family firms in general are more or less internationa-
lized than nonfamily ones is an empirical and conceptual non-starter. Empirically, Arregle et al.s
(2017, p. 823) large-scale meta-analysis has convincingly demonstrated that the association
between a firms ownership (i.e., family vs. nonfamily) and internationalization is null.Differences
in how to operationalize both family firm governance and level of internationalization possibly
account for some of the discrepancies in the outcomes of past family firm internationalization
research. However, a more substantive reason for the lack of consensus, as suggested in a number
of recent studies (Arregle et al., 2017; Calabrò, Torchia, Pukall, & Mussolino, 2013; Pukall &
Calabrò, 2014; Sciascia et al., 2012; Sciascia, Mazzola, Astrachan, & Pieper, 2013), could be an
omitted variable bias (Bennedsen & Foss, 2015) or, specifically, a failure to account for the vast
KANO AND VERBEKE 159

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