Failing to Score: Clinton v. Jones and Claims of Presidential Immunity - Jennifer Motos

• Jurisdiction: United States,Federal
• Publication year: 1998
• Citation: Vol. 49 No. 2

Failing to Scores Clinton v. Jones and Claims of Presidential Immunity

In Clinton v. Jones,¹ the United States Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not afford the President temporary immunity from civil damages litigation arising out of events that occurred prior to his taking office absent the most unusual circumstances.²

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Paula Corbin Jones was employed by the Arkansas Industrial Development Commission during the time that William Jefferson Clinton served as Governor of the State of Arkansas. Jones claimed that on the afternoon of May 8, 1991, while she was staffing the registration desk at an official conference in Little Rock, Arkansas—in fulfillment of her duties as a state employee—she was summoned by Arkansas State Police officer, Danny Ferguson, to visit Governor Clinton in a business suite at the hotel. According to Jones, Governor Clinton made sexual advances towards her in the business suite, which she vehemently rejected. Jones further claimed that after she rejected Clinton's advances she was punished by her superiors at work, who dealt with her in a rude manner and changed her job responsibilities. Additionally, Jones alleged that once Clinton became President of the United States, Ferguson defamed her by suggesting to a reporter that she accepted Clinton's alleged advances. Finally, Jones claimed that she was defamed by various persons authorized to speak for President Clinton, who denied that the incident ever occurred and branded her a liar.³

On May 6, 1994, Jones filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, naming Clinton and Ferguson as defendants.⁴ The complaint contained four counts: (l)that Clinton, acting under the color of state law, deprived her of her constitutional rights to equal protection and due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments;⁵ (2) that Ferguson and Clinton conspired to violate her federal rights; (3) that Ferguson and Clinton intentionally inflicted emotional distress; and (4) that Ferguson, and Clinton, through his agents, publicly defamed her.⁶ In response to the complaint, Clinton advised the district court that he would file a motion to dismiss on grounds of Presidential immunity. He also requested that all other pleadings and motions be deferred pending resolution of the immunity issue.⁷ The district court granted Clinton's request for deferment.⁸ Clinton then filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice and a motion to toll the applicable statutes of limitation until his Presidency ended.⁹ The district court denied the motion for dismissal on immunity grounds and ruled that discovery could go forward, but ordered the trial stayed until the end of petitioner's Presidency.¹⁰ Both parties appealed the district court's decision.¹¹

A divided panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Clinton's motion to dismiss and reversed the district court's order staying the trial.¹² Clinton filed a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court based on the assertion that the Eighth Circuit's decision posed a serious risk to the role of the Presidency.¹³ The Supreme Court, recognizing the importance of resolving the immunity issue, granted certiorari.¹⁴ The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the decision of the Eighth Circuit¹⁵ and held that the Presi-dent is not constitutionally entitled, except in the most exceptional circumstances, to absolute or temporary immunity from civil damages actions arising out of events that occurred before he took office.¹⁶

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the importance of providing government officials with some form of immunity from civil damages suits.¹⁷ The immunity doctrine, rooted in English common law, was originally applied to judges to protect them from civil suit or indictment based upon acts or omissions committed in fulfillment of their judicial duties.¹⁸ English common law immunity was founded on the principle that it is in the public's best interest to "'secure the independence of the judges, and prevent them from being harassed by vexatious actions.'"¹⁹ This immunity was '"not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge,'" the Court noted at the end of the last century, "'but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence, and without fear of consequences.'"²⁰ In its genesis, official immunity rested on two rationales: (1) the injustice of holding an officer, required by legal obligation to exercise discretion, liable for his good faith efforts to exercise that discretion; and (2) the danger that the threat of liability would discourage an officer from exercising the discretion necessary to his office.²¹

Early American jurisprudence expanded the common law concept of immunity to cover public officials more generally.²² In Spalding v. Vilas,²³ the Court considered the immunity available to the Postmaster General in a civil suit stemming from an official act.²⁴ The Court held that the allegedly tortious action taken by the Postmaster General was authorized by law and within the scope of his official duties; therefore, he was entitled to immunity despite plaintiff's contention that he acted with malice.²⁵ Defendant's motive, the Court held, was "wholly immaterial" because the action was within his official discretion.²⁶ The Court emphasized the public policy reasons for executive immunity, stating that "[t]he interests of the people require that due protection be accorded to [public officers] in respect of their official acts."²⁷

After Spalding, the Court extended the immunity defense to actions outside the common law.²⁸ In Tenney v. Brandhove,²⁹ the Court held that the passage of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983³⁰ did not abrogate the immunity privilege afforded to state legislators at common law for "acts done within the sphere of legislative activity."³¹ Sixteen years later, in Pierson v. Ray,³² the Court reaffirmed the policy of absolute immunity of a judge acting within the judicial role and held that a state judge was immune from a Section 1983 suit.³³ Unwilling to provide a "blanket immunity" to all government officials from Section 1983 suits, the Court developed a concept of qualified immunity for some public officials.³⁴ This concept recognizes that government officials' immunity from suits alleging constitutional violations should be limited to situations in which the exercise of discretion was in good faith.³⁵

The Court in Barr v. Matteo³⁶ held that the absolute common law immunity that was extended to the Postmaster General in Spalding could not be restricted to apply only to executive officers of cabinet rank.³⁷ In Barr, the Court held that the federal Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization was entitled to an absolute immunity defense in an action for libel based on information published at his discretion.³⁸ The Court determined that the scope of petitioner's absolute immunity reached the outer limits of his discretionary duty.³⁹ Thus, despite respondent's contention that Barr acted with malice, the privilege applied because Barr's decision to publish the allegedly libelous material was "within the outer perimeter of [his] line of duty."⁴⁰

In Scheuer v. Rhodes,*¹ the Court extended qualified immunity to state executive officials accused of violating constitutional rights. The Court in Scheuer recognized a qualified immunity available to all executive branch officials for constitutional violations and noted that the degree of immunity depended on the "scope of discretion" the officer was required to exercise when taken in light of the "responsibilities of the office" and "all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based."⁴² Although qualified immunity was the general rule for executive officials accused of constitutional violations, the Court recognized that absolute immunity should be afforded to some executive officials "whose special functions require a full exemption from liability."⁴³ Thus, the Court began its move toward a functional approach to the concept of immunity.

Although expanding immunity generally, the Court rejected an argument that all high ranking federal officials have a right to absolute immunity from constitutional damages actions.⁴⁴ In Butz v. Econo-mou,⁴⁵ the Court held that federal officials have the same qualified immunity as state officials in Section 1983 cases.⁴⁶ However, the Court stated that "there are some officials whose special functions require a full exemption from liability."⁴⁷

Nixon v. Fitzgerald⁴⁸ was the first case to present the claim that the President of the United States possesses absolute immunity from civil damages liability.⁴⁹ In Nixon, respondent asserted two statutory actions under federal laws of general applicability and one constitutional claim.⁵⁰ Respondent argued that the President, like other federal executive officials, is entitled only to qualified immunity for alleged constitutional violations. The Court rejected this argument, noting that the President's "unique status under the Constitution distinguishes him from other executive officials."⁵¹ The Court also rejected respondent's contention that Nixon, by allegedly ordering the discharge of an employee of the Department of the Air Force, was acting outside the "outer perimeter of his duties."⁵² Because Nixon had the constitutional and statutory authority to prescribe reorganizations and reductions in force for the Air Force, the alleged wrongful act was considered to be within the outer perimeter of his duties as President.⁵³ The Court, purporting to apply a functional approach, reasoned that the unique nature of the President's constitutional functions called for absolute immunity from civil damages liability for acts within the "outer perimeter" of his official...