Executive Turnover and the Investigation of Former Leaders in New Democracies

• DOI: 10.1177/1065912920905640
• Author: Young Hun Kim,Donna Bahry
• Published date: 01 March 2021
• Date: 01 March 2021
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912920905640

Political Research Quarterly

2021, Vol. 74(1) 199 –211

© 2020 University of Utah

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/1065912920905640

journals.sagepub.com/home/prq

Article

Peaceful turnover of executive power has long been

viewed as a key sign of consolidation in new democracies

(Huntington 1991; Przeworski 2015; Przeworski et al.

2000). Handovers from one elected leader to another are

taken as an indication that elites and publics focus on

changing the rulers, not the regime, when they are dis-

satisfied with incumbents (Huntington 1991, 267).1 Some

research also suggests that democratic alternation in

office can generate other political benefits, including

public confidence in and support for democracy (Bratton

2004; Cho and Logan 2014; Moehler and Lindberg 2009),

increased public goods (Carbone and Pellegata 2017),

and better quality of governance (Milanovic, Hoff, and

Horowitz 2010).

However, executive turnover in new democracies can

create uncertainty about the status of leaders who leave

office. Peaceful handovers are thought to reflect elite

acceptance of democratic rules of the game, including

benign treatment of leaders who lose power by constitu-

tional means. In this view, presidents and prime minis-

ters (PMs) would be prosecuted post-tenure when there

is compelling evidence of misbehavior, but otherwise

they should be protected from politically driven target-

ing. Yet new democracies typically have few recent

examples of leaders going on to peaceful afterlives, and

mounting a case against a former leader can generate

political capital for a successor administration. Moreover,

since many new democracies experience problems with

weak rule of law, there may be few constraints on politi-

cal targeting of an ex-president or PM.

In fact, over a third (35%) of elected leaders in new

democracies between 1970 and 2011 have faced an ex

post investigation for malfeasance during their term.2 To

cite just a few examples, former Philippines President

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001–2010) was investigated

for corruption and election-tampering. In Guatemala,

Alfonso Portillo (2000–2004) was investigated for embez-

zlement of government funds. Hungary’s Prime Minister

Viktor Orban (1998–2002) was the subject of a govern-

ment probe for corruption after his first term. And in South

Korea, Roh Moo Hyun (2003–2008) faced an investiga-

tion into irregular payments to his family from a major

donor.

Many of the leaders under investigation portray their

cases as politically motivated. But the question is, which

if any political factors matter? Are ex-presidents/PMs

905640PRQXXX10.1177/1065912920905640Political Research QuarterlyBahry and Kim

research-article2020

1The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, USA

2North Carolina Wesleyan College, Rocky Mount, USA

Corresponding Author:

Young Hun Kim, School of Social Sciences & Education, North

Carolina Wesleyan College, 3400 N Wesleyan Blvd., Rocky Mount,

NC 27804, USA.

Email: ykim@ncwc.edu

Executive Turnover and the

Investigation of Former Leaders

in New Democracies

Donna Bahry1 and Young Hun Kim2

Abstract

What prompts governments in new democracies to investigate elected leaders once they leave office? Theorizing

about democratic regimes suggests that leadership turnover by constitutional means should generate few such cases:

democratic entry to and exit from office are thought to prompt benign treatment from successor administrations.

Yet over a third of democratically elected presidents and prime ministers who left office between 1970 and 2011

have faced investigations for malfeasance. This study analyzes the conditions that generate such cases. We find that

the odds of investigation rise when there is strong evidence of former leaders’ personal culpability; but also when the

executive regime is presidential, and the judiciary lacks independence from other branches. Partisanship has a more

limited impact: co-partisanship with the incumbent reduces the odds of investigation for ex-prime ministers, but

sharing a party label with an incumbent offers no such protection to a former president.

Keywords

executive turnover, corruption, investigation, democracies, democratization