Evidence of Ineffectiveness: Advancing the Argument Against Sex Offender Residence Restrictions

• Published date: 01 February 2014
• Author: Richard Tewksbury
• Date: 01 February 2014
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12075

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCE

RESTRICTIONS

Evidence of Ineffectiveness: Advancing the

Argument Against Sex Offender Residence

Restrictions

Richard Tewksbury

University of Louisville

Managing and responding to sex offenses and offenders has been a front and

center issue in criminal justice discussions and debates for the last decade.

Fears have abounded, hyperbole has dominated public and media discourse,

and ever-increasing sanctions and restrictions have been quickly loaded on by policy makers.

Sex offenders stand as today’s boogey-man, feared and misunderstood by nearly all, and

responded to with disgust, distrust, and distain. Efforts to control sex offenses have taken

numerous forms, resulting in both formal and informal sanctions. Standing as one of the

most onerous of the restrictions imposed on sex offenders are residence restrictions—laws

prohibiting sex offenders from living within specified distances of “child congregation

locations.”

The logic of such restrictions is built on public safety—if sex offenders do not reside

within sight or easy walking distance of places children gather, then those children will be

spared sexual victimization. The logic falls apart, however, for sex offenders who do not

target children, sex offenders who (as most do) target victims they know and with whom

they interact, and for those who victimize in ways other than luring nearby children into

their homes. There is an established and still growing body of literature demonstrating the

fallacies of sex offender registration, notification (Jennings, Zgoba, and Tewksbury, 2012;

Sandler, Freeman,and Socia, 2008; Tewksbury, Jennings,and Zgoba, 2012), and residency

restrictions (Duwe, Donnay, and Tewksbury, 2008; Kang, 2012; Nobles, Levenson, and

Youstin, 2012; Socia, 2012). Unfortunately, this is a realm where neither public policy nor

Direct correspondence to Richard Tewksbury, Department of Justice Administration, University of Louisville,

Brigman Hall, Room 204, Louisville, KY 40292 (e-mail: tewks@louisville.edu).

DOI:10.1111/1745-9133.12075 C2014 American Society of Criminology 135

Criminology & Public Policy rVolume 13 rIssue 1