Employer Beware: Changing the Landscape of Employment Discrimination Claims at the Summary Judgment Stage

• Publication year: 2017

Employer Beware: Changing the Landscape of Employment Discrimination Claims at the Summary Judgment Stage

Matthew Bottoms

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Employer Beware: Changing the Landscape of Employment Discrimination Claims at the Summary Judgment Stage^*

I. Introduction

In Quigg v. Thomas County School District,¹ the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit changed the summary judgment framework for mixed-motive employment discrimination cases. The ruling in Quigg will affect both employers and employees and will lead to more mixed-motive discrimination claims reaching the jury, rather than being dismissed through summary judgment. The newly-adopted framework takes the burden-shifting standard out of summary judgment, and many commentators consider it a much more plaintiff-friendly framework.² Under the new framework, in order to survive a motion for summary judgment on a mixed-motive discrimination claim, all the plaintiff must do is show that a protected characteristic was a "motivating factor" for an adverse employment action.³ This standard is significantly lower than the standard that was previously used in the

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Eleventh Circuit,⁴ and it does not force the plaintiff to point to one "true" reason that led to the employment discrimination.⁵

II. Factual Background

In 2007, Linda Quigg (Quigg) became the superintendent for the Thomas County School District in Thomasville, Georgia. In appointing Quigg, the Thomas County School Board (School Board) gave her a three-year contract. In 2008, the School Board extended her contract by one year, with the contract expiring in 2011. Although Quigg received satisfactory or above-satisfactory performance ratings by the School Board during these years, a tumultuous relationship existed between Quigg and members of the School Board. In one instance, Quigg openly supported opponents of current School Board members during elections. In addition, other members of the school district had ethics concerns regarding Quigg's administration of school programs.⁶

The School Board, which was made up of seven people, was set to meet in February 2011 to discuss the possibility of renewing Quigg's contract for another year. Prior to this meeting, two members of the School Board, Scott Morgan (Morgan) and Mark Nesmith (Nesmith) had approached Quigg to discuss her role within the school district. Morgan and Nesmith advised Quigg that she should consider getting a male assistant superintendent in order to "handle" things. After Quigg refused the suggestion, Morgan and Nesmith voiced their opinion to both Quigg and other employees of the school district that it was time for a male to take over as superintendent. At Quigg's contract renewal meeting, the School Board voted five-to-two against Quigg. Morgan and Nesmith were among the people that voted against Quigg. After the vote, Nancy (Hiers), who also voted against Quigg, told a school district employee that she had voted against Quigg because she believed a male was needed for the job.⁷

Following the vote against Quigg, the School Board relieved Quigg of her duties as superintendent.⁸ Quigg then filed both a Title VII claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1964⁹ and a discrimination and retaliation claim under Section 1983.¹⁰ Quigg named as defendants the School District and all the board members who had voted against her.¹¹ Quigg

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pointed to the comments made by members of the School Board to show that illegal bias had been a motivating factor in the decision to not renew her contract. Before trial began, the defendants filed and were granted a motion for summary judgment. The trial court held that Quigg had only presented circumstantial evidence of discrimination and did not raise a triable issue.¹² Using the framework laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,¹³ the trial court held that summary judgment was proper.¹⁴ After the ruling from the trial court, Quigg appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.¹⁵

III. Legal Background

A. The Early Years: Civil Rights Act of 1964 and McDonnell Douglas

The evolution of employment discrimination claims traces its roots to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.¹⁶ It was then that Congress attempted to combat discrimination in the United States by enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.¹⁷ Among other things, Title VII created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and made it illegal for employers to "discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."¹⁸ Title VII not only extends to hiring and termination decisions, but also to employment promotion and demotion decisions.¹⁹ Congress recognized at the time it enacted Title VII that minorities and historically-disadvantaged groups needed protection in order to ensure they were extended equal opportunities to succeed in and become assets to society.²⁰ In a 1971 decision, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized that Congress was making a stand against "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate" because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.²¹

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After the enactment of Title VII, the Supreme Court had to decide the best way to implement the policies in employment discrimination cases.²² In 1973, the Court addressed the issue in the seminal case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.²³ In McDonnell Douglas, an African-American man brought suit against his former employer for rejecting his reemployment application. After the case was heard by the trial and appellate courts, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining the correct framework for employment discrimination cases.²⁴ The Supreme Court held that an employee has the initial burden under Title VII of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination.²⁵ The Court held that the employee can show prima facie discrimination by proving the following factors:

[they] belong[] to a racial minority;

that [they] applied and [were] qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;

that, despite [their] qualifications, [they were] rejected; and

that, after [their] rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.²⁶

If the employee could successfully make this initial showing, the burden of persuasion then shifted to the employer to show some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.²⁷ If the employer was able make this showing, the burden shifted back to the employee to prove that they were the victim of discrimination.²⁸ The employee had to make this showing by a preponderance of the evidence.²⁹ Typically, an employee would attempt to show that the employer's reason for rejection was pretext, or that the employer was not justified in making the decision.³⁰

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This back-and-forth burden-shifting adopted in McDonnell Douglas became the standard for most employment discrimination cases.³¹ Although the Supreme Court never required lower courts to use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework at the summary judgment phase, many courts still looked to the case for guidance.³² In the years following McDonnell Douglas, lower courts used the burden-shifting scheme as the dominant tool both at summary judgment and at trial when dealing with employment discrimination cases.³³ Thus, even though the Supreme Court left the option open for circuit courts to create their own standard for summary judgment, many circuit courts continued to rely on the Supreme Court's decision from McDonnell Douglas.

After the Court adopted the McDonnell Douglas framework, many commentators began to classify McDonnell Douglas as harsh and unforgiving for plaintiffs.³⁴ One commentator described the framework as a gatekeeper, barring legitimate plaintiffs from reaching the jury.³⁵ Many plaintiffs who would otherwise have strong claims could not survive the rebuttable summary judgment framework because they could not prove that the employer's reasoning was pretext.³⁶ For many plaintiffs alleging illegal discrimination, a defendant's motion for summary judgment would result in the plaintiff's claims being dismissed.³⁷ The disposal of these claims at the summary judgment stage deprived plaintiffs of the more fair decision-making assured by a factfinder's decision at trial.³⁸ As a result, the presumed intent of Congress was frustrated for over two decades after the enactment of Title VII in 1964.³⁹ Federal courts, in an attempt to help protect employee plaintiffs, began creating their own standards to be used for employment discrimination at the summary judgment stage.⁴⁰

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B. Mixed-Motive Claims and the Type of Evidence Necessary

When Congress passed Title VII in 1964, there was only one type of employment discrimination claim: single-motive.⁴¹ Over the years since the enactment, the Supreme Court has recognized a second type of employment discrimination claim: mixed-motive.⁴² Single-motive discrimination claims are hard for an employee to prove because the adverse employment action must be predicated on one illegal reason.⁴³ In contrast, an employee can succeed on a mixed-motive discrimination claim by showing that illegal bias based on sex or race was a motivating factor for an adverse employment action, even though there might be other factors that also motivated the action.⁴⁴

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,⁴⁵ which the United States Supreme Court decided in 1989, was the first case in which the Court distinguished the different types of employment discrimination claims under Title VII.⁴⁶ While the distinction may have seemed subtle, it would change the landscape of employment discrimination cases. No longer did an employee have to point to one true reason for the employer's discriminatory motive. Instead, an employer could be held liable for adverse employment decisions based on a mixture of lawful and...