Economic influence activities

DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12249
Published date01 October 2018
Date01 October 2018
AuthorDavin Raiha
830 © 2018 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/jems J Econ Manage Strat. 2018;27:830–843.
Received: 3 March 2017 Revised: 7 February 2018 Accepted: 21 March 2018
DOI: 10.1111/jems.12249
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Economic influence activities
Davin Raiha
IveyBusiness School, University of
WesternOntar io, London, ON, Canada
(Email: draiha@ivey.ca)
Abstract
Firms frequently make operational and strategy decisions to gain political influence.
They locate plants, expand workforces, or choose suppliers, with the aim of affecting
the economy and the electoral success of politicians. This behavior constitutes a non-
traditional form of influence, which I refer to as economic influence activities (EIA).
In this paper, I show how such activities influence policymaking and why firms may
prefer it to more traditional influence activities such as campaign contributions. What
distinguishes EIA is that a firm's strategy choices affects the state of a local economy
and, in turn, the evaluations that voters make of the performance of an officeholder.
I show how firms can use this capability to extract subsidies and policy favors from
incumbent officeholders.
1INTRODUCTION
It is frequently observed that firms make investments,initiate projects, or take other economic actions in order to gain influence or
favors from political decision-makers. Firms demand subsidies, tax breaks, and other benefits in exchange for locating facilities
or investments within a particular jurisdiction. Some firms move plants over borders or strategically select suppliers to induce
policymakers to lower or remove impeding trade restrictions. Sometimes these strategic choices are made even though they are
at odds with the firm's broad market strategy and are not operationally efficient. For example, in 2008 Airbus publicized plans
to open significant production facilities in the United States (despite all of their existing production being located in Europe) in
order to gain U.S. based allies to help resolve their trade litigation problems with the United States, and improve their prospects
of winning a large U.S. government contract for military refueling jets (Hepher, 2008). Examplessuch as this illustrate that it is
not only money and information that firms use to influence politicians and their decisions, but also their economic wherewithal
as firms.
In this paper, I examine how a firm's strategy and operational decisions can constitute a form of influence that differs from
traditional influence activities—such as campaign contributions or informational lobbying. I show how the use of firms' oper-
ational decisions, through their effect on the economy, can influence voters and help incumbents win reelection. Because it is
the economic impact of this activity that distinguishes it from other influence channels, I refer to these activities as Economic
Influence Activities (EIA).
Empirical work in recent years has studied circumstances where firms attempt to wield their economic influence for political
ends. Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, and Thesmar (2007) find that politically connected CEOs, in France, exhibited high rates of job
creation and lower rates of job destruction in election years. Moreover,the results were more pronounced in more politically con-
tested districts. Carvalho (2014) finds that Brazilian firms expanded employment in politically attractive and contested regions
before elections, in exchange for favorable borrowing from public banks. Bonardi and Urbiztondo (2011) similarly show large
U.S. firms reducing layoffs in periods preceding elections, but increasing layoffs afterward. Finally, Bandeira-de Mello (2018)
finds that Brazilian firms systematically located new projects and investments in municipalities where mayors were politically
I thank Dave Baron, Steve Callander,Alejandro Francetich, Guy Holburn, Ig Horstmann, Ken Shotts, Al Slivinski, several seminar audiences, as well astwo
especially helpful referees for comments and advice.

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