Economic Implications of HOPE from the Demonstration Field Experiment

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12415
• Date: 01 November 2018
• Published date: 01 November 2018
• Author: Angela Hawken

POLICY ESSAY

ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF HOPE

Economic Implications of HOPE from

the Demonstration Field Experiment

Angela Hawken

New York University

Alexander Cowell, Alan Barnosky,Pamela Lattimore, Joel Cartwright, and Matthew

DeMichele (2018: 875–899) conducted a strong study of community supervi-

sion in the United States that informs our understanding of outcomes and costs

associated with Honest Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (HOPE) at the four

Demonstration Field Experiment (DFE) sites and of the outcomes and costs of probation

more generally. The findings from their study reveal as many questions as they do answers.

Most are not resolvable through science; rather,they are core philosophical questions about

the role of community supervision, especially for persons supervised on charges related to

illicit drug use. In this policy essay, I discuss the lessons learned from the economic eval-

uation of the HOPE DFE, pose questions that follow from the findings, and note several

implications for future research.

Background

HOPE was designed by Judge Steven Alm in Honolulu in 2004 in collaboration with

probation-department supervisors. It was targeted at persons on probation who were at

high risk of being revoked and returned to prison (typically for long terms, even up to

20 years). The program provided for closer monitoring of supervision conditions, especially

of mandates to desist from drug use, with swift responses for noncompliance. A controversial

feature of the original implementation in Hawaii, on which the DFE was modeled, was a

reliance on a jail sanction (typically 2 days) in responding to violations (many subsequent

implementations under the banner of “Swift, Certain, and Fair” have included an emphasis

on noncustodial responses). A program like HOPE would be net incarceration-reducing

if the short jail stays were more than offset by reductions in prison stays from revocations

avoided. There is no question that closer monitoring will increase supervision costs over

Direct correspondence to Angela Hawken, New York University, 60 5th Ave., 2nd Floor, New York, NY 10011

(e-mail: ahawken@nyu.edu).

DOI:10.1111/1745-9133.12415 C2018 American Society of Criminology 901

Criminology & Public Policy rVolume 17 rIssue 4