Economic Evaluation of the HOPE Demonstration Field Experiment

• Author: Alexander J. Cowell,Pamela K. Lattimore,Joel K. Cartwright,Alan Barnosky,Matthew DeMichele
• Date: 01 November 2018
• Published date: 01 November 2018
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12407

RESEARCH ARTICLE

ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF HOPE

Economic Evaluation of the HOPE

Demonstration Field Experiment

Alexander J. Cowell

Alan Barnosky

Pamela K. Lattimore

Joel K. Cartwright

Matthew DeMichele

RTI International

Research Summary

In the program implemented in the Honest Opportunity Probation with Enforcement

Demonstration Field Experiment (HOPE DFE), the following approach is taken: close

monitoring; frequent drug testing; readily available substance abuse treatment; and

swift, certain, and fair sanctioning to deter probationers from violating supervision

conditions. We assessed in this study the costs and outcomes of the demonstration

program across four jurisdictions, using 24 months of data from 625 probationers

randomly assigned to probation as usual (PAU) or HOPE DFE. Our results reveal that

the HOPE DFE group incurred more criminal justice costs than the PAU group over

the observation period.

Policy Implications

Our study results further demonstrate that HOPE in the DFE is associated with higher

rates of incarceration and residential treatment, leading to an increase in total costs

The Evaluation of the HOPE Demonstration Field Experiment was supported by Award 2011-RY-BX-0003 from

the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions, findings,

and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily

reflect those of the Department of Justice. The authors would like to thank the National Institute of Justice,

the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Angela Hawken and Jonathan Kulick, and the many individuals at the four

study sites who assisted with our data and information gathering. Direct correspondence to Alexander J.

Cowell, Ph.D., RTI International, 3040 E. Cornwallis Road, P.O. Box 12194, Research Triangle Park, NC 27709

(e-mail: cowell@rti.org).

DOI:10.1111/1745-9133.12407 C2018 American Society of Criminology 875

Criminology & Public Policy rVolume 17 rIssue 4

Research Article Economic Evaluation of HOPE

when compared with PAU. Jurisdictions choosing to implement programs like HOPE

to hold probationers accountable would need additional resources from the criminal

justice system to support the program.

Keywords

community supervision, economic evaluation, HOPE demonstration

Hawaii’s HonestOpportunity Probation with Enforcement (Hawaii HOPE) pro-

gram is rooted in the theory that criminals consider rewards and punishments

when deciding to engage in criminal acts (e.g., Apel, 2013; Carmichael and Pi-

quero, 2004; Nagin, 2007). Developed in 2004, Hawaii HOPE uses swift, certain, and fair

(SCF) sanctions, with an emphasis on short-term jail confinement and readily available sub-

stance abuse treatment, to deter probationers from violating their supervision conditions.

Certainty of punishment is achieved through close probation monitoring and frequent

random drug testing. The program is predicated on research findings that show that people

are less likely to change their behavior if they find the punishment unfair or illegitimate

and that responses to unwanted behavior need to be delivered with perceived certainty and

shortly after the unwanted behavior occurs. The certainty, not the severity, of the punish-

ment is critical to deterring probationers from violations. Initial findings of Hawaii HOPE’s

effectiveness drew significant attention nationally when the program was shown to reduce

drug use, violations, new arrests, and revocations to prison (Hawken, 2010; Hawken and

Kleiman, 2009).

The results from three other probation initiatives in which SCF principles were used—

Probation Accountability with Certain Enforcement (PACE) in Anchorage, Alaska; Super-

vision with Intensive Enforcement (SWIFT) in Fort Worth, Texas; and the 24/7 Sobriety

Project in South Dakota—indicated improvement in outcomes (Carns and Martin, 2011;

Kilmer, Nicosia, Heaton, and Midgette, 2013; Snell, 2007). These programs used similar

SCF principles, yet they varied in how closely they resembled the Hawaii HOPE program.

For example, although PACEin Alaska closely resembles HOPE (Carns and Martin, 2011),

SWIFT in Texasdiffered in its use of a graduated sanctioning schedule, the detail of poten-

tial sanctions provided to probationers, the application of positive reinforcement, and the

means of drug testing (Snell, 2007).

In the literature to date, scholars have reported mixed findings on the effect of the

SCF and HOPE approaches. An evaluation in Washington State compared an SCF policy

with a historical cohort and found that relative to the comparison, it reduced incarceration

and recidivism (Hamilton, Campbell, van Wormer, Kigerl, and Posey, 2016) and thus the

related costs (Hamilton, van Wormer, Kigerl, Campbell, and Posey, 2015). Hawken and

colleagues (2016) assessed the effectiveness of Hawaii HOPE using a follow-up period of

76 months and found smaller effects than the initial results that had shorter follow-up

periods. In a randomized controlled trial (RCT) of Delaware’s Decide Your Time RCT

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