Doubting Thomasville's Ability-grouping Program: Holton v. City of Thomasville School District - William Benjamin Bryant

• Publication year: 2008

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Doubting Thomasville's Ability-Grouping Program: Holton v. City of Thomasville School District

I. Introduction

The summer of 2007 was an active season for education cases in the United States federal court system. While the Supreme Court heard several cases related to freedom of speech and school race issues,¹ the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit heard its own case, Holton v. City of Thomasville School District,² in which the court examined the City of Thomasville School District's ("the School District") ability-grouping program.³ The court held that the School District's program was neither intentionally discriminatory nor the result of prior de jure segregation by the district.⁴ The Eleventh Circuit's decision extends the line of cases allowing school districts great deference in the implementation and continuation of their academic programs. This includes programs that result in racially imbalanced school populations, so long as the programs are neither the remnants of past de jure segregation nor the result of present intentional discrimination.

II. Factual Background

The year 2007 marked the second time in two years that the City of Thomasville School District appeared before the Eleventh Circuit to justify its educational programs amid claims of racial discrimination.⁵ The sole remaining issue on appeal in Holton v. City of Thomasville School District (Holton II)⁶ was the legality of the School District's policy of ability grouping.⁷ The Eleventh Circuit previously addressed the other aspects of the original order by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia in 2005.⁸ A review of the district court's decision, and that of the Eleventh Circuit in Holton v. City of Thomasville School District (Holton I),⁹ provides relevant background for understanding the Eleventh Circuit Court's holding in Holton II. A brief introduction to the concept of ability grouping prefaces this discussion.

A. Ability Grouping

Ability grouping, also known as tracking, is a well-established, albeit controversial mechanism used in school districts throughout the United States.¹⁰ The basis for an ability-grouping system is to classify students within a school based upon a perception of their ability to learn.¹¹ The concept revolves around the theory that different students learn at different levels. According to this theory, students should be placed on different tracks that allow each student to learn at the appropriate level.¹² Under such a plan, students on either end of the spectrum would benefit by learning at the proper pace.¹³ Specifically, the policy underlying tracking is that brighter students need to be intellectually challenged so that they do not become bored and lazy, while underperforming students require a more remedial approach so that they do not struggle through a curriculum they cannot comprehend, potentially resulting in frustration and depression.¹⁴

The topic of whether ability grouping is an effective tool to accomplish this goal has been widely debated in the legal and educational communi-ties.¹⁵ Opponents cite a growing achievement gap between those on higher and lower tracks.¹⁶ Indeed, at least one recent study proffered the use of detracking to close these gaps, stating that "[a]chievement follows from opportunities—opportunities that tracking denies."¹⁷ A number of studies have also called attention to the fact that low-income and minority students are disproportionately placed in lower tracks.¹⁸ While a handful of cases have held ability-grouping programs to be unconstitutional, the basis for these decisions has rested largely on findings that the school systems' policies were based on underlying intentional discrimination.¹⁹

B. District Court's Initial Findings

The Thomas County Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (the "NAACP") filed suit on behalf of African-American students enrolled at public elementary, middle, and high schools within the City of Thomasville School District. The plaintiffs alleged that the school system failed to uphold its constitutional obligation to dismantle its formerly de jure segregated system and was operating a segregated public school system in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution²⁰ and Title VI of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964.²¹ The plaintiffs sought judicial supervision of the School District's desegregation efforts.²² The district court, however, found that while racial imbalances existed in several areas of the School District, these imbalances were not traceable to the system's prior de jure segregation and were not the result of intentional discrimination on the part of the School District.²³

The City of Thomasville School District operated a de jure racially segregated school system at the time of the United States Supreme Court's seminal 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education²⁴ and continued to operate a racially segregated school system until 1965.²⁵ The School District then implemented several desegregation plans resulting in more racially balanced schools. The School District's first plan, a freedom-of-choice plan allowing parents to choose the school their children would attend, failed to racially balance the School District. However, the School District's subsequent school assignment plan was successful, reorganizing student attendance zones to create racially balanced schools across the School District. By the late 1970s, though, demographic factors had ushered in the reemergence of several identifiable racially imbalanced schools within the School District, especially at the elementary school level.²⁶ Following a lengthy discussion regarding the racial imbalances among schools within the district and an application of the factors set out in Green v. County School Board,²⁷ the district court found that the School District had carried its burden of proving that the racial imbalances were not traceable to the School District's previous de jure segregated system.²⁸

The specific plan at issue in the present case—whether the School District's use of ability grouping was discriminatory—also passed scrutiny at the district court level.²⁹ The School District had operated some form of an ability-grouping program since the end of its de jure segregation.³⁰ under the plan at issue, the students were grouped at several stages during their time in the public school system. First, students in kindergarten and elementary school were grouped based on perceived abilities and actual performance. Second, middle school students were placed into classes based upon a combination of factors that included standardized test scores and teacher recommendations. Third, high school students were given the ability to choose their own classes under the guidance of teachers, counselors, and parents.³¹

The district court found that "'a disproportionate number of low income children (most of whom happen to be black) are placed in the lower ability groups' and tend to remain in these lower tracks throughout their academic careers."³² The racial disparity among classes in the Thomasville School District was determined by the district court to be a result of the impoverished conditions the students faced, including the absence of a positive and supportive background that is crucial in preparing students to learn.³³ The district court commented that " '[w]hen the racial makeup of a community correlates directly with poverty and when poverty correlates with perceived academic readiness, as it does in Thomasville, "this ability tracking" inevitably leads to ability groups that are racially imbalanced.'"³⁴ The district court ruled that "it was not the intention of the [School District's] tracking system to segregate students based upon race" and that the School District did not manipulate the tracking system to track students based upon race.³⁵ The district court expressed no opinion on whether the disparity in educational opportunity between poor children and wealthier children would create a cause of action.³⁶ "No matter how tempted the [district c]ourt may be to intervene and attempt to 'fix the system,' a court is ill-equipped for such a task. Moreover, it does not have the authority to act as a super-school board or social scientist . . . ."³⁷ According to the district court, the court's function is to remedy violations of federal law, and there is no provision mandating that "poor children be guaranteed a high quality education."³⁸

C. Holton I

In Holton I, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed each aspect of the district court's order with the exception of the findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to the School District's ability-grouping program.³⁹ In remanding that aspect of the district court's order, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the appellants that the district court failed to properly apply the standard established in McNeal v. Tate County School District.⁴⁰ The McNeal standard allows a school district to implement an ability-grouping program, even when there is a segregative effect on the school population, so long as the "assignment method is not based on the present results of past segregation or will remedy such results through better educational opportunities" for those discriminated against.⁴¹

While ability-grouping programs may create racial imbalances within classrooms, employing these programs is not necessarily per se unconstitutional.⁴² Indeed, school systems may implement ability grouping, even if the policy results in some segregation, "so long . . . as such a practice is genuinely motivated by educational concerns and not discriminatory motives."⁴³ While educators are best suited to resolve the question of whether a policy is more beneficial than detrimental to students, the question of whether the policy is constitutional is one for the courts to decide.⁴⁴ The court...