Domestic Relations

• Publication year: 2022

Domestic Relations

Charles V. Crowe

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Domestic Relations

Charles V. Crowe^*

I. Introduction

This Article addresses noteworthy appellate decisions and legislative updates relevant to Georgia domestic relations law during the Survey period from June 1, 2021 through May 31, 2022.¹

II. Alimony

In Williams v. Williams,² the Georgia Court of Appeals examined factors trial courts are to consider in making an award of alimony.³ Jason Williams (Husband) sought review of a divorce decree entered in Jackson County Superior Court. Husband argued, among other things, that the decree awarded an excessive amount of alimony to his former wife, Stephanie Williams (Wife). Prior to their divorce in December 2020, the parties were married for seventeen years and had four children together. Wife was a stay-at-home mother for the greater portion of the marriage. At the time of the divorce, Husband was employed as a corporate director, earning a base yearly salary of $200,000 and an annual bonus in excess of $2,000,000. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered a final decree requiring Husband to pay Wife $3,825 in monthly child support and $4,000 in monthly alimony for ten years or until the youngest child was no longer eligible to receive child support, whichever occurred first. Additionally, Husband was ordered to pay Wife a lump sum alimony

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award of 10% of the net amount of Husband's annual bonus for ten years.⁴

On appeal, Husband argued that the trial court's alimony award was excessive and punitive.⁵ In its ruling, the court of appeals discussed the definition of alimony and standards for awarding alimony under Georgia law.⁶ Alimony is defined as "an allowance out of one party's estate, made for the support of the other party when living separately."⁷ Further, "alimony is authorized, but [is] not required, to be awarded to either party in accordance with the needs of the party and the ability of the other party to pay."⁸ "[F]actors to be considered in determining the appropriate amount of alimony" include "the parties' standard of living, the duration of the marriage, the age and condition of the parties," the parties' "financial resources, the time and training necessary for either party to acquire employment skills, and the contributions of each party to the marriage."⁹

Examining the trial court's evidentiary findings, the court of appeals noted that the parties had been married for seventeen years, Wife had been a stay-at-home mother since the birth of the parties' first child in 2005, and the parties' youngest child was born in 2012.¹⁰ Additionally, the trial court found that, in addition to his base salary, Husband received an annual bonus in excess of $2,000,000 in 2019, was expected to receive an even larger bonus in 2020, and was expected to continue receiving bonuses as long as he maintained his present employment. The trial court also found that Wife held a 33% interest in a company owned by her family and a potential interest in several parcels of real property owned by her family. Lastly, in making its alimony award, the trial court indicated that it specifically considered Wife's needs and Husband's income and ability to pay.¹¹

In regard to the monthly award, the court found Husband's argument "specious" as $4,000 per month is precisely what Husband proposed to pay in his opening statement before the trial court.¹² The court noted that "[i]t is well established that one cannot complain of a judgment, order, or

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ruling that his own procedure or conduct procured or aided in causing."¹³ Furthermore, although Husband contended the trial court inaccurately valued Wife's potential interest in her family's company and real estate holdings to determine her needs, Husband showed no evidence Wife was presently receiving income from the assets.¹⁴

Concerning the yearly percentage of the annual bonus awarded to Wife, the court held, "the trial court had wide latitude to calculate the alimony award, and, in light of its considerations [outlined in its order], we cannot say it abused its discretion."¹⁵ Further, nothing in the final judgment suggested that the trial court intended the alimony award to punish Husband for any misconduct.¹⁶ Accordingly, the court of appeals held that the trial court did not err in its award of periodic and lump sum alimony to Wife.¹⁷

III. Equitable Division of Property

In Franco v. Eagle,¹⁸ Husband appealed the trial court's divorce decree arguing the Gwinnett County Superior Court erred by equitably dividing the value of certain real property.¹⁹ Although the parties' testimony was in dispute concerning whether loan funds from a marital property were used to purchase the property, the evidence was undisputed that Wife's name was never on the deed to the property and it was likewise undisputed that the property was deeded to Husband's brother in 2012, long before the divorce action was filed.²⁰ In its analysis, the Georgia Court of Appeals looked to Armour v. Holcombe,²¹ in which the Supreme Court of Georgia held, "[t]he law of contracts and titles is respected in divorce cases."²² The court further cited Gibson v. Gibson,²³ which held, "property that has been conveyed to a third party is not subject to equitable division absent a showing of fraudulent transfer."²⁴ Concluding that "[t]he record showed [Wife made no efforts], either before or during

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the divorce litigation, to have the conveyance to [Husband's] brother set aside as fraudulent, and that the trial court did not make a finding that the property had been fraudulently transferred," the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in equitably dividing the value of the property between the parties and reversed that portion of the final judgment.²⁵

IV. PATERNITY AND LEGITIMATION

In Shultz v. Walker,²⁶ Billy Wayne Shultz III appealed an order from the Pike County Superior Court denying his motion to set aside an order denying his petition to legitimate his minor child.²⁷ The undisputed facts showed that Shultz was the father of a minor child, B.W.S., born in November 2015. Shultz and the child's mother were never married but were in a relationship at the time of the child's birth. Shultz and the child's mother executed an acknowledgment of paternity and administrative legitimation of B.W.S. a few days after the child's birth. Shultz's relationship with the child's mother ended after he began to exhibit symptoms of mental illness. The two maintained a co-parenting relationship until 2017, when the child's mother cut off contact between Shultz and the child. In February 2019, Shultz filed a petition to legitimate the child. During the proceedings, neither party informed the court about the previous administrative legitimation. After a hearing, the trial court denied Shultz's petition, finding that he had abandoned his opportunity interest to develop his relationship with the child.²⁸

In October 2020, Shultz filed a motion to set aside the judgment arguing that a non-amendable defect appeared on the face of the record as no legitimation was necessary due to his previous administrative legitimation of the child.²⁹ Shultz amended his motion to set aside to also argue that fraud, accident, or mistake rendered the judgment void. The court subsequently denied Shultz's motion on the grounds that there was no legal basis to set aside the judgment.³⁰

The Georgia Court of Appeals analyzed the trial court's ruling under the "abuse of discretion" standard.³¹ Citing applicable law, the court noted that a trial court may set aside its judgment under limited circumstances, of which Shultz raised as follows:

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Fraud, accident, or mistake of the acts of the adverse party unmixed with the negligence or fault of the movant; [and] [a] nonamendable defect which appears upon the face of the record or pleadings. Under this paragraph, it is not sufficient that the complaint or other pleading fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, but the pleadings must affirmatively show no claim in fact existed.³²

The court held that "because Shultz failed to raise the issues of the existence, validity, and effect of the underlying administrative legitimation" of the child for the trial court to consider before denying his petition to legitimate his minor child, the mistake of fact on which the father attempted to rely was "not unmixed with his own negligence or fault in failing to inform the superior court of the previous administrative legitimation"; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the father's motion to set aside the judgment on that ground.³³ However, the court determined that the trial court failed to address Shultz's claim that the administrative legitimation constituted a non-amendable defect upon the face of the record or pleadings; therefore, the case was remanded to the trial court for consideration of this claim.³⁴

In Jefferson v. O'Neal,³⁵ Alvin Jefferson appealed "from the [Monroe County Superior Court's] grant of a legitimation petition filed by Cyprus O'Neal."³⁶ Jefferson was the legal father of a minor child, K.J., who was born in 2011 during Jefferson's marriage to the child's mother. In April 2020, O'Neal filed a petition to legitimate K.J., alleging, among other things, that O'Neal was the child's biological father, that K.J. was living with O'Neal, and that it was in K.J.'s best interests that the legitimation be granted.³⁷ "After the hearing, the trial court issued an order granting the legitimation. The court found that a DNA test had confirmed that O'Neal was K.J.'s biological father" and that "O'Neal did not abandon his opportunity interest in the child as he was unaware that K.J. could be his biological child before 2019."³⁸ The court stated that it considered the child's best interests, "which is the standard to apply when deciding whether to permit the legal father's status to be challenged by a rebuttal of the presumption of legitimacy."³⁹ The...