Does Local Government Competition Reduce Environmental Governance Performance? The Role of Public Value Conflict and Media Sentiment

• Published date: 01 May 2023
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00953997231157744
• Author: Bin Guan
• Date: 01 May 2023
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/00953997231157744

Administration & Society

2023, Vol. 55(5) 824 –867

© The Author(s) 2023

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DOI: 10.1177/00953997231157744

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Article

Does Local Government

Competition Reduce

Environmental

Governance

Performance? The Role

of Public Value Conflict

and Media Sentiment

Bin Guan1,2

Abstract

With the increasing attention paid to environmental protection and sustainable

development in various countries worldwide, the relationship between local

government competition and environmental governance has become more

subtle and complex. This paper provides new insight into their relationship

based on public value theory and media sentiment perspective. Utilizing

panel data from 2012 to 2019 in 216 cities in China, this study integrated

Data Envelopment Analysis, Conflicting Attitudes Model, Computer-Aided

Text Analysis, and machine learning-based sentiment analysis, as well as

nonlinear mediation model to empirically test the relationships among local

governments’ competition pressure, public value conflict, media sentiments,

and environmental governance performance. The study found that: (1)

Competition pressure and environmental governance performance exist in

a “U-curved” relationship. (2) The core mechanism of the above relationship

lies in the mediating role of public value conflict. Within a specific range, the

public value conflict faced by local governments increases as competition

1School of Management, Lanzhou University, China

2China Research Center for Government Performance Management, Lanzhou University,

China

Corresponding Author:

Bin Guan, School of Management/ China Research Center for Government Performance

Management, Lanzhou University, 222 Tianshui South Road, Lanzhou 730000, China.

Email: guanb@lzu.edu.cn

1157744AAS0010.1177/00953997231157744Administration & SocietyGuan

research-article2023

Guan 825

pressure increases. This conflict would push local governments into

a dilemma and induce them to commit misconduct. However, when

competition pressure exceeds this range, the public value conflict faced

by local governments will be weakened, leading environmental governance

performance to rebound. (3) Negative media sentiments significantly alleviate

the negative impact of public value conflict on environmental governance

performance. This study helps researchers and policymakers recognize

government competition’s influence on environmental governance from a

public value perspective, with further exploration and confirmation of the

moderating role of media sentiments. It also provides theoretical and policy

enlightenment for rethinking the behavior logic of local government and

solving the dilemma of local government environmental governance.

Keywords

competition pressure, public value conflict, media sentiment, environmental

governance performance

Introduction

Competition among local governments offers a vital angle to understanding

local governments’ interactions (Breton, 1998) and analyzing decision-mak-

ing preferences by local governments (Tiebout, 1956). Especially in the study

of environmental governance, the economic competition among local gov-

ernments is an important factor that cannot be ignored. According to “race to

the bottom” theory, local governments will likely implement more lenient

environmental standards than neighboring areas to attract production factors

for more significant development advantages (Hille, 2018; Konisky, 2007;

Konisky & Woods, 2010; Madsen, 2009; Woods, 2006). These attempts

would further deteriorate regional ecology. Given the undeniable significance

of environmental governance today, will the actual situation be as simple as

what “race to the bottom” describes? Do local governments truly loosen their

regulatory grips in the economic race? These questions deserve more focus,

examination, and scrutiny.

Recently, countries worldwide have paid increasing attention to environ-

mental protection and sustainable development. Especially in China, the

importance and seriousness of environmental governance have been raised to

an unprecedented level. China’s Central Government has launched an

“Environmental Protection Storm,” manifested by such policies as “Central

Environmental Protection Inspector,” “Lifelong Accountability,” “Military

Order,” and “Target Responsibility Contracts.” In the face of increasingly

826 Administration & Society 55(5)

stringent supervision, it is undesirable for local governments to pursue com-

petitive economic advantages and loosen environmental regulations blindly

because the one-vote veto regime of the ecological environment will directly

affect the promotion of local officials (Guan, 2020; Zhang, 2021), which is a

high price for them to pay. Meanwhile, local governments are also unwilling

to pursue strict environmental regulations blindly and cause themselves to

lag in economic competition, which further lets their production factors flow

into adjacent areas (Cao et al., 2022; Woods, 2006) and put themselves at risk

of being surpassed by surrounding cities. In sum, local governments are in a

dilemma at this stage. Because of this dilemma, the relationship between

competition among local governments and environmental governance has

become subtle and complex. Local governments’ behavioral logic has become

too complicated to be explained by “race to the bottom,” thus the need for

new theories urgently to reexamine the relationship between government

competition and environmental governance and its underlying mechanism.

This study aim to help researchers and policy-makers scientifically under-

stand the behavioral logic of local governments, optimize environmental

policies, and enhance environmental governance performance.

According to Bozeman (2007), a leading scholar in public value research,

“Public values are those providing normative consensus about the principles

on which governments and policies should be based” (p. 13). They should be

the normative principles, standards, and ideals in public policy formation and

public service provision (Bozeman, 2007, 2019; Fukumoto & Bozeman, 2019;

Jørgensen & Bozeman, 2007). Public value guides the behavior and decision-

making of government agencies and public servants (Andersen et al., 2012;

Guan et al., 2021) and gives meaning, direction, and legitimacy to collective

action (Guan et al., 2021). It also determines the goals and results the govern-

ment wants to pursue (De Graaf & Van der Wal, 2017). However, the diversi-

fication and incommensurability of public value will send conflicting signals

to local governments about “what to do and what not to do” and “how to do

and should not do” (De Graaf et al., 2016; Guan et al., 2021; Nabatchi, 2018).

Public value conflicts are extremely common in formulating and implement-

ing public policies (De Graaf et al., 2016; Fukumoto & Bozeman, 2019;

Jaspers & Steen, 2019). With the government being the main body of public

decision-making, it will recognize or prefer more than one public value in

most cases (Guan et al., 2021; X. Wang & Wang, 2020). When diversified

public values are incompatible, irreconcilable, or cannot be realized simulta-

neously, public value conflict occurs (De Graaf & Meijer, 2019; De Graaf &

Paanakker, 2015; Fukumoto & Bozeman, 2019). Being forced to balance and

choose between competing and irreconcilable public values will make envi-

ronmental governance a wicked problem. Such wicked problems caused by