The "Three Doctrines Discussions" of Tang China: religious debate as a rhetorical strategy.

• Author: Garrett, Mary M.

Introduction

In this essay I will be introducing the "Three Doctrines Discussions" of medieval China. These were imperially-sponsored debates between representatives of China's three major religious systems, these being Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism. These debates had a long history. They began during the Period of Disunion (221-580 C.E.), when China had splintered into a number-of separately-ruled, contending states, and they continued during the reunification of the empire under the short-lived Sui dynasty (581-617). After reaching their apogee in the early half of the Tang dynasty (618-960) they then underwent a decline in the mid-Tang and were abandoned after 870.

This study of the "Three Doctrines Discussions" may be of interest to students of argumentation and debate in several ways.(1) The "Discussions" are one of the few instances in which the Chinese state sponsored semi-public, adversarial debates. Fortunately there is a wealth of historical materials and primary sources, including many verbatim accounts, which allows us to paint a fairly comprehensive picture of these debates and their development.(2) Despite the significant differences of language, philosophical heritage, and cultural context between medieval China and the contemporary West, I expect that the procedures, standards of judgment, and underlying rationale of these debates will be surprisingly familiar to Western-trained students of debate. Finally, the abundant records of these debates allow us to trace out a suggestive parallel between the emergence, evolution, and disappearance of the "Three Doctrines Discussions" and major shifts in their political context.

In what follows I first briefly describe the precursors to the "Three Doctrines Discussions" - that is, the varieties of debate whose forms, topics, standards, and functions were the likely models for the "Three Doctrines Discussions." After describing the emergence, growth, and decline of the "Three Doctrines Discussions," I place their history within the larger story of Chinese dynastic politics. Based on this correlation, I propose that the evolution of these debates is best explained as an instance in which the legitimizing functions of the impartial judgment of reasoned debate were rhetorically exploited to political ends. Specifically, by appearing to engage in dispassionate, reasoned judgment of these debates, rulers sought to reinforce their ethos, and that of the dynasty, and thus to contribute to its legitimation. Conversely, the less need they had of such enhancement of their ethos, the greater the tendency to reduce the "Three Doctrines Discussions" to a ritual enactment of a debate, and finally to drop them entirely.

Sources of the "Three Doctrines

Discussions"

First, let me briefly review the argumentative activities from which the "Three Doctrines Discussions" developed, an especially needful task given the common belief that China did not have a tradition of argumentation and debate (Becker 1986). During the Period of Disunion (220-581 C.E.) there developed two distinct practices of philosophical disputation. First, the Buddhists sponsored frequent debates on points of Buddhist metaphysics. These debates took place at the lecture halls associated with Buddhist temples, and they were open to all to attend and even to participate in. There was also a secular, private type of philosophical debate associated with "Pure Talk" (qingtan) activities. These sessions of disputation and explication, limited to invited guests, were drawn from the literati, and the topics ranged over the doctrines of many philosophical schools (Garrett 1993).

In both these kinds of philosophical disputation the discussions concerned abstract metaphysical and ethical themes. There were widely-accepted rules of procedure that were quite similar for both. Seating was based on reputation as a debater; the more well-known the individual, the closer to the host's seat he was placed. Usually the host initiated the debate, but sometimes he took challenges from other contenders. These debates were generally constructive: a proponent proposed an argument for a thesis or interpretation and defended his position; should he lose that round, his opponent then advanced and defended his own position. The participants themselves, as well as the audience members, reached a consensus on who won. Audience members could become participants if they could hold their own in the debate, thus providing a further check on the quality of the argumentation.

The descriptions of these Buddhist and Pure Talk disputations show that both the disputants and the audience were expected to find the better argument, the one more in conformity with "reason," more convincing. What "reason" (li) means in this context can be determined from two different kinds of sources. First, there is a small body of literature which reflects on and prescribes appropriate criteria for judging competing arguments, especially those on abstract, dialectical topics.(3) Whether they knew these works or not, in practice most participants in these disputations assumed the standards articulated in these works, as can be seen when they objected to points in others' arguments or when they admitted defeat. Such instances reveal the normative standards for conforming to "reason." They include such criteria as: internal coherence and non-contradiction; consistency with canonical texts; sufficient evidence; adequate response to objections; conformity to established principles; justification for overriding precedents and principles; and, less often, relevance, consequences, and predictability.

These criteria are no doubt familiar to readers of this journal, and their application in these debates would be equally so, once the Western reader became comfortable with the differing philosophical context. The goal of these disputations - to discover the more defensible and thus, presumably, the more likely or the true conclusion - also echoes traditional Western justifications for debate as a means of testing ideas. This rationale for debate was taken quite seriously; there are many recorded instances in which the loser of a Pure Talk or a Buddhist disputation not only ceded to the winner, as the spirit of the enterprise demanded, but praised the winner's reasoning and publicly switched to that position.

There was an even longer tradition of debate on policy issues at the ruler's court, debates which encompassed such issues as equitable taxation, management of government monopolies, foreign relations, points of ritual, and appointments to official positions. Such proposals were subjected to much deliberation amongst officials and other members of the elite. These debates were less formally structured than the philosophical disputations but were equally competitive and serious. Generally such debates over policy would be carried out orally at the court, or through a lengthy process of written proposals, rebuttals, and counter-attacks which were submitted to the throne and circulated among the officials. Indeed, astute rulers solicited as broad a range of opinion as possible, so as to illuminate all sides of the issue and test the support for various positions. However, the ruler did not usually declare a winner. Instead, after weighing the arguments, the ruler announced his decision and its policy implications, sometimes explaining the reasons for both.(4)

In the case of these court debates as well, prolonged pro/con debate was assumed to be an effective way to inform and improve decision making. In fact, rulers frequently called for submission of written opinions or convened a court conference (tingyi) of high-ranking officials when they were unsure of how best to proceed.(5) What's more, there are many cases in the dynastic histories in which a ruler abandoned a proposal after good reasons were advanced against it.

During the Period of Disunion the debates over policy at the courts of the various rulers expanded to include issues raised by the infiltration of Buddhism from China. Buddhism, with its renunciation of family ties and of social and political obligations 'and its substituting of an alternative source of moral authority and hierarchy, called into question the underpinnings of the traditional Chinese social and political order. Unlike the indigenous Chinese religions, Confucianism and Daoism, which recognized or at least did not overtly challenge the supremacy of secular political authority, Buddhism brought with it radical notions of the religious as an autonomous, even superior sphere. This clash was neatly encapsulated in the question of bowing. In India emperors bowed to monks. Must Chinese Buddhist monks and ruler still bow to their parents and to the ruler, as Confucianism and custom prescribed? There was also an economic aspect to the conflict. Not only were monks and monasteries exempt from taxes, Buddhist establishments accumulated huge fortunes from donors and became money-lenders themselves. With money came power and corruption. In response, from the fifth through tenth centuries there were periodic attempts at state-mandated reforms or purges of the Buddhist religious establishment.

The "Three Doctrines" Discussions

To explore and resolve the social and political issues raised by this foreign religion, the leading lights of Buddhism, Daoism, and, less often, Confucianism, were invited to court to...