Do Decision Variables Improve Microfinance Efficiency? A Stochastic Frontier Analysis for African Countries
Date | 01 March 2017 |
Published date | 01 March 2017 |
Author | Sandra Kendo |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1002/jsc.2118 |
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Strategic Change 26: 159–174 (2017)
Published online in Wiley Online Library
(wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/jsc.2118
Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Strategic Change: Briengs in Entrepreneurial Finance
Strategic Change
DOI: 10.1002/jsc.2118
Do Decision Variables Improve Micronance
Efciency? A Stochastic Frontier Analysis
for African Countries1
Sandra Kendo
Department of Economics – CESEM, Neoma Business School, France
Micronance institutions that aim to increase their asset size and nancial
performance boost their efciency when they make nancial innovations, improve
client follow‐up, and monitor the projects they support to limit the risk of failure.
e micronance sector in Africa is characterized by a high degree of segmentation
among informal and formal lenders. is fact is illustrated by an asymmetric
market distribution, shared between an oligopoly of lenders grouping large assets
and a multiplicity of lenders with small assets. e high number of micronance
institutions (MFIs) have limited nancial and social performance. Only lenders
with signicant assets achieve better results in terms of product portfolio quality,
borrower diversication, risk minimization, and increased nancial protability.
Only MFIs with signicant assets can reach a high enough level of eciency to
enable them to achieve their twofold objective, namely nancial and social sustain-
ability. MFI eciency refers to their ability to produce a maximum number of
outputs from a set of available inputs (Farrell, 1957). In this case, MFIs must be
able to reduce their costs and achieve economies of scale.
Micronance eciency studies use diverse approaches to measure the eciency
level of individual MFIs. Firstly, some micronance eciency studies take a statisti-
cal approach, employing nancial and social ratios that appear limited for a robust-
ness check analysis (Yaron, 1992; Navajas et al., 2000). To improve this, authors
apply data envelopment analysis (DEA) or a stochastic frontier approach (SFA) to
assign eciency scores to MFIs. For example, Gutierrez‐Nieto et al. (2007) use a
DEA approach to measure MFIs’ eciency. eir approach clearly species the
inputs and outputs of each MFI and how some specic variables can impact the
eciency score. ey identify a country eect on eciency, mainly relying on the
status of MFIs [non‐governmental organizations (NGOs), micronance banks,
credit and saving cooperatives]. Hermes and Lensink (2011) use stochastic frontier
analysis to examine the link between micronance institutions’ outreach to the
1JEL classication codes: C24, C67, G21, O55.
Using a stochastic cost frontier,
this study evaluates the efciency
score of African micronance
institutions.
Moreover, we employ a Tobit
model to investigate how decision
variables impact the efciency of
micronance institutions in
African countries.
Results show that an increase in
asset size and nancial
performance, which positively
impacts technical efciency, is
more effective for nancial
cooperatives and non‐bank
nancial institutions with MFIs.
160 Sandra Kendo
Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strategic Change
DOI: 10.1002/jsc
poor and their eciency. e outreach indicators they
consider are average loans per borrower and percentage of
female borrowers in the total loan portfolio of the MFI. A
high average loan per borrower indicates less deep out-
reach, since in this case the MFI is expected to provide
fewer loans to poor borrowers (Hermes and Lensink,
2011). A negative relationship has been established
between the average loan balance (outreach depth measure)
and eciency (Hermes and Lensink, 2011), which indi-
cates that MFIs are less ecient in this case.
Each of these methodological approaches has its
advantages and limits. In this study, we choose an SFA
developed by comparing the results of an intermediation
approach to micronance development activities with
those of a production approach. Considering both
approaches, we make an analysis related to the SFA by
investigating whether the initial results related to outreach
and nancial performance impacts are reliable, in terms
of the technical eciency of micronance. us, the
objective of this study is to evaluate the impacts of deci-
sion variables (size/nancial performance/outreach/risk
level) on micronance eciency. First, we assume positive
links between the size and eciency of micronance insti-
tutions. Second, we assume a negative relationship between
average loans and micronance eciency. ird, we
assume a positive relationship between nancial perfor-
mance and micronance eciency. Last, we assume a
negative eect between the risk level and eciency of MFIs.
We applied panel data on 172 MFIs over the period
2004–2011 and found that asset size and return on equity
(a measure of nancial performance) had a positive inu-
ence on technical eciency. Moreover, we observed that
average loans and risk premium (a measure of risk level)
had a negative impact on the technical eciency of micro-
nance. ese eects as results depend on nancial coop-
eratives and non‐bank nancial institutions. Our four
hypotheses are validated by some specic aspects of the
institutional organization of MFIs.
is article is organized as follows. First, we present a
literature review focusing on micronance eciency.
en, we explain the methodology applied to evaluate
technical score eciency and its determinants. Last, we
present and discuss the results and conclude with some
important points.
Literature review
e ability of micronance institutions to achieve eco-
nomic eciency through control and management of
transaction costs is related to their internal governance,
which is partially responsible for agency problems within
MFI organizational structures. Good governance requires
the existence of a clear denition of the institutional
framework and a transparent and ecient decision‐
making mechanism. e accumulation of functions by
some MFI sta members makes it dicult to accurately
assess the organization and functioning of MFIs. Agency
conicts may also occur between borrowers and lenders
in institutions such as credit and saving cooperatives and
mutual organizations, where clients’ dual status may
sometimes lead to decisions being taken that are less than
optimal for the institution. Micronance institutions that
focus on governance issues minimize risks, secure their
nancial investments, and reduce agency costs arising
from conicts between managers and shareholders
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
Good governance can improve institutions’ eciency
by reducing transaction costs. e micronance sector
features ve interrelated governance components: the
quality and reliability of information technologies; the
clarity of organization principles; the denition of a clear
strategic vision shared by all members of the organization;
the implementation of legitimate forms of power that are
suited to the institution; and the organization’s rm estab-
lishment in society at large (Lapenu, 2002). Some particu-
larities of MFI governance are based mainly on the
stakeholders involved in wealth creation and the way
resources are used (Lapenu and Pierret, 2005). e parties
involved here are not only shareholders, ocers, and
owners; they are also borrowers, investors, and credit
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