Discerning Possibilities for Action: A Typology of Approaches to Moral Imagination

• Author: Timothy J. Hargrave
• Published date: 01 September 2012
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8594.2012.00408.x
• Date: 01 September 2012

Discerning Possibilities for

Action: A Typology

of Approaches to

Moral Imagination

TIMOTHY J. HARGRAVE

ABSTRACT

The existing literature on moral imagination proposes

that actors can best respond to ethical dilemmas by

tailoring their actions to the practical demands of the

situation. It has done little to develop this insight,

however. To address this gap, I used institutional

theory to identify six ideal type approaches to moral

imagination. I proposed that in addressing ethical

dilemmas, the morally imaginative actor takes account

of two situational factors: first, the social construction

of the unmet ethical claim or obligation which consti-

tutes the ethical dilemma, and in particular whether or

not it is broadly perceived to be legitimate; and second,

its own degree of power. The framework presented rep-

resents the first attempt to systematically enumerate

approaches to moral imagination and identify their

boundary conditions.

Timothy J. Hargrave is an Assistant Professor, School of Business, University of Washington,

Bothell, WA. E-mail: thargrave@uwb.edu.

bs_bs_banner

Business and Society Review 117:3 307–328

© 2012 Center for Business Ethics at Bentley University. Published by Blackwell Publishing,

350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.

INTRODUCTION

Moral imagination is the “ability to imaginatively discern

various possibilities for acting within a given situation

and to envision the potential help and harm that are

likely to result from a given action” (Johnson 1993, p. 202).

Scholars have emphasized that moral imagination involves the

pragmatic tailoring of action to context. Dewey portrayed moral

imagination as engaging the “hard stuff of the world of physical

and social experience” (1933/1986, p. 33; cited in Fesmire

2003, p. 66). Werhane wrote that moral imagination involves

“concentration on the network of relationships and patterns

of interaction” (2002, p. 40; also see Werhane 2008), while

Moberg and Seabright stated that moral imagination involves an

assessment of “the practical demands of the situation” (2000,

p. 872).

In this article, I seek to further develop the pragmatic perspec-

tive on moral imagination. I first identify two ideal type contextual

factors that influence the actor’s approach to moral imagination.

One is whether or not the unmet ethical claim or obligation that

is the subject of the ethical dilemma is broadly perceived to be

legitimate and the second is the actor’s power. Based on these

factors, I then identify six ideal type approaches to moral imagi-

nation, each associated with particular conditions (combinations

of the two factors). The six approaches are creation, coercion,

compromise, coalition, consent, and collaboration. Each repre-

sents “a [possibility] for acting within a given situation” that could

deliver a moral outcome (Johnson 1993, p. 2002). The article

contributes to understanding of moral imagination by providing

the first systematic effort to characterize the actions that consti-

tute moral imagination as well as the boundary conditions under

which they apply.

In the next section, I discuss the pragmatic nature of moral

imagination, and then in the article’s third section, I present a

typology of six approaches to moral imagination, each suited to a

particular context. In the article’s fourth section, I discuss the

implications of this typology of approaches, and then in the final

section, I briefly summarize conclusions.

308 BUSINESS AND SOCIETY REVIEW