From dialectical theory to reflective practice: response to Hunt, Meyer, and Lippert.

• Author: Polcar, Leah E.

Even contradiction-oriented argumentation scholars probably would agree that the teaching of argumentation (debate, critical thinking) has important effects on the eventual success of our students (see, for example, Bruffee, 1992; Jackson, 2002; Kuhn, Shaw, & Felton, 1997; Zeidler, 1997). While I welcome any attempt to improve teaching practices and outcomes (as, I'm sure, do all "chalk and talk" teaching advocates [see Sellnow, 2006]), Hunt, Meyer, and Lippert's (2006) underlying justification for treating field-dependent and field-independent cognitive styles as the key to improvement seems to me to be theoretically lacking. Although Sellnow also makes this point, she is concerned primarily about insufficient justification for Hunt et al.'s preference for Witkin's (1978) model. I agree but would suggest, further, that simply defending this model against other learning/cognitive styles still would miss the point. Although there may be reasons why Witkin's system is preferable to, say, cognitive complexity or a simple measure of IQ to my mind Hunt et al.'s results reveal that learning outcomes are not hampered (or improved) primarily by student learning styles but, instead, by what we teach about (and utilize from) argumentation and debate.

DEFINING ARGUMENTATION

I am concerned about Hunt et al.'s conception of argumentation as abstract and impersonal. They appear to treat argument as a product, either in O'Keefe's (1977) sense of [argument.sub.1] or in the sense that an argument makes a case for a proposition in oral or written form. For example, they suggest that instruction can advantage field-independent (FI) thinkers, since argumentation production and evaluation is "abstract" (i.e., taught by reference to the Toulmin model in lecture form) and "impersonal," while disadvantaging field-dependent (FD) thinkers, who prefer to engage in discussion (pp. 158-159). This conception is also manifest in the puzzling finding that "the debate format was found to restrict opportunities for interpersonal communication, which is the preferred mode of communication for FD thinkers" (pp. 159-160). (1) Finally, Hunt et al. assert that FD students suffer in debate courses, which require "critical, logical, and linear thought" (p. 157): "critical thinking tasks that require students to consider several concepts simultaneously, generate alternative solutions to complex problems, and integrate knowledge from multiple sources, may reinforce the learning of FI thinkers" (p. 159). In such a conception, there is little more to debate and argumentation than being able to think logically, that is, systematically evaluating the relationships between premises and conclusions.

This conception of argumentation is not wholly problematic. Certainly, mastery of argumentation production and evaluation must include just these skills: One must be able to reason adequately (e.g., consider and understand several concepts simultaneously) and identify and evaluate systematic relationships among arguments and standpoints, whether these relationships are formal, informal, or some combination thereof. But two aspects are troubling: (1) some of the very concepts and skills that are essential to pedagogy are thought a priori to advantage one type of student; and (2) limited to particular cases, this conception ignores the dialectical features of argumentation that modern theories have elaborated at length and that should be essential in debate.

First, at least when viewed as a communicative activity, argumentation is not solely defined by formal concerns, such as logical relationships between premises and conclusions. This does not mean that formal concerns are irrelevant. Take, for instance, the pragma-dialectical approach, which defines argumentation as a "verbal, social, and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward a constellation of one or more propositions to justify this standpoint" (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2002, p. xii). When supplemented with considerations of rhetorical maneuvering, this approach encompasses not just convincing a reasonable critic, but doing so in a manner that increases the likelihood that the arguer's standpoint will be accepted (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2003). This seems to be the central...