Dealing with the Modern Terrorist: The Need for Changes in Strategies and Tactics in the New War on Terrorism

• Author: Joseph L. Albini
• Published date: 01 December 2001
• Date: 01 December 2001
• DOI: 10.1177/0887403401012004001
• Subject Matter: Journal Article

CRIMINALJUSTICEPOLICYREVIEW/December 2001Albini/DEALINGWITHTHEMODERN TERRORIST

Dealing With the Modern Terrorist:

The Need for Changes in Strategies and

Tactics in the New War on Terrorism

Joseph L. Albini

International Security Consultant, Las Vegas, Nevada

As the new millennium has arrived, so has the appearance of a new breedof terrorist,

highly sophisticated in technological skills, sometimes motivated by political and/or

religious beliefs and sometimes motivated by the monetary incentive to sell his ser-

vices as a mercenary.This type of terrorist made an appearance in the United States

during the Y2K crisis and, under its cover,appeared and then disappeared creating

further terrorby now hiding in the shadows. Using the Italian Red Brigades as a case

study, this article examines how the rules of the game of dealing with terrorists has

been crucially altered by this new breed and discusses how these rules will present

new problemsthat in turn will necessitate the consideration of serious changes in the

tactics and strategiesemployed by law enforcement agencies and governments as they

carry their fight against terrorism into the future.

There is no question that the nature of terrorist groups has changed dramati-

cally within the past decade. Indeed, so quickly has this change taken place

that the mind-set of both those academics who study terrorism and those

governmental officialsand agents who must deal with its realities on a daily

basis have not yet, it seems, fully been able to adapt to the challenges that

these changes have perpetuated. Among these changes, we note that, tradi-

tionally,terrorist groups were primarily sponsored and financed by the gov-

ernments of various countries. Suddenly, around the middle of the 1990s,

this all changed. Government intelligence agencies found that they had,

without realizing it, lost track of the leaders of terrorist groups, while the

leaders of the groups themselves, in many cases, had lost track of their

members; so too, group affiliations changed dramatically, the ideological

beliefs and principles of many groups were abandoned and the “mercenary

terrorist”—trained specialists who would sell their services for a

fee—made their appearance. Terrorism experts now began using the term

leaderless resistance, a term denoting the fact that terrorist groups are now

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© 2001 Sage Publications

composed of small groups or individuals who carry out terrorist attacks

(Krane, 2000, p. 1).

The major theme of this article deals with the need to develop new and

more effective diplomatic and other tools as well as nonconventional ways

of dealing with this new form of terrorism. In evaluating these new

approaches, the author will draw lessons from the experiences of the Italian

government in its successful battle against one of the most violent terrorist

groups that has ever existed, one which held Italy enslaved for almost two

decades—The Red Brigades.

History has all too often dispelled the myth that governments like to per-

petuate about themselves, mainly, that they never negotiate with terrorists.

Ironically, this issue of negotiating has become a vital part of the changes

that governments now havehad forced on them as part of the new evolution

of terrorism. Despite the fact that governments would like to continue to

perpetuate the myth that they never have and never will negotiate with ter-

rorists, negotiation is indeed a vital part of the new mode of dealing with the

new terrorism, a mode without alternatives, which now has been forced

upon them. As Raphael Perl (1996, p. 4) clearly notes, although U.S. policy

publicly proclaims “no concessions to terrorists,”U.S. practice has not been

so pure as it has used a variety of resources to gain the safe return of hostages

and has encouraged other nations to do likewise; so too, as Perl further

notes, the surrender and extradition of accused terrorists by governments

lend testimony to the likely and logical conclusion that negotiation tactics

indeed were employed to enhance this manner of cooperation. A recent

example of this was indicated in an article written by Scott Macleod (2000,

pp. 40-42) in which he notes how Hizballah, the historical and well-known

Lebanese terrorist group, has now not only driven Israeli soldiers off Arab

land by force, it is rapidly establishing itself as a Lebanese political party.

The success of this group was grounded not only in its very effectiveuse of

force exemplified by its “martyrs” but also by its purposeful willingness to

work within the political system of Lebanon. This illustrates a unique but

clear example of the fact that modern terrorist groups can and do use, along

with force and intimidation, many other tactics which are geared at manipu-

lating political systems into creating an environment that will stimulate the

use of arbitration and negotiation with the leaders of such terrorist groups.

We should note that the fact that Time Magazine (“Conversation with ter-

ror,”1999, pp. 38-39) was willing to arrange and publish an interview with

none other than Osama bin Laden, leader of the Taliban terrorist group in

Afghanistan and a leader wanted for murder by the U.S. government in the

bombing of American embassies abroad, illustrates that there is an open line

256 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY REVIEW / December 2001