Reading between the lines: the South Dakota Supreme Court's interpretation of S.D.C.L. section 20-9-4.1 in Gronseth v. Chester Rural Fire Protection District & Chester Fire Department.

• Author: Farris, Holly R.

Society has traditionally enforced a duty of reasonable care upon citizens who come to the aid of others in need. When a fear of liability led to the diminishment of aid to those requiring assistance, Good Samaritan statutes were enacted across the nation. Good Samaritan statutes granted immunity to those rendering emergency care or services to those in need. S.D.C.L. section 20-9-4.1, the South Dakota Good Samaritan statute, is a broadly written statute, interpreted for the first time in Gronseth v. Chester Rural Fire Protection District & Chester Fire Department. The South Dakota Supreme Court's decision resulted in a statute that protects any person who rendered volunteer services from liability against any civil damages incurred during volunteer actions. The decision extended S.D.C.L. section 20-9-4.1's immunity to volunteers at any location while rendering emergency care and services. Additionally, volunteers are protected from civil damages claims by any party injured while the volunteer was in the scope of rendering emergency care and services. Justice Judith Meierhenry correctly declined to follow the majority holding on grounds that there was a decided lack of legislative history to indicate the intent of the South Dakota Legislature. Without such a directive, the South Dakota Supreme Court should not have granted broad immunity to Good Samaritans. The South Dakota Legislature should therefore amend S.D.C.L. section 20-9-4.1 and look to other state statutory schemes for effective, precise language that would reflect the true legislative intent.

1. INTRODUCTION

   Good Samaritan statutes exist in some form in every state in the nation. (1) Each statute is unique in its language, resulting in statutes offering both broad and narrow protection to those who voluntarily render emergency services and care. (2) S.D.C.L. section 20-9-4.1, the South Dakota Good Samaritan statute, is a broadly written statute that remained uninterpreted, until Gronseth v. Chester Rural Fire Protection District & Chester Fire Department ("Gronseth"). (3) In Gronseth, the South Dakota Supreme Court held that a firefighter "driving his personal vehicle to the fire hall" was rendering emergency care and services, thus making him eligible for immunity from civil damages claims under S.D.C.L. section 20-9-4.1. (4)

   Justice Judith Meierhenry, in her dissenting opinion, correctly declined to follow such a broad interpretation of the statute. (5) She declared that the actions taken by the firefighter were not within the scope of protected services because immunity under the statute was not unlimited, despite the broadness of its language. (6) The statute's broad language, as interpreted by the South Dakota Supreme Court, could create future problems by granting unlimited immunity for volunteer rescuers from civil damages. (7) The South Dakota Legislature should therefore amend S.D.C.L. section 20-9-4.1 to narrow the language and refine the reflected legislative intent. (8)

   This note first addresses the factual and procedural history of Gronseth. (9) Second, there is a discussion of the common-law Good Samaritan doctrine. (10) Then, this article explores the background of various Good Samaritan statutes nationwide. (11) Additionally, the development of S.D.C.L. section 20-9-4.1 is discussed. (12) Next, there is an overview of statutory construction within South Dakota. (13) Finally, this note concludes that Justice Meierhenry correctly argued that such a broad interpretation of S.D.C.L. section 20-9-4.1 essentially created unlimited liability for Good Samaritans, despite a lack of legislative history to indicate that was the intent of the South Dakota Legislature. (14)

2. FACTS AND PROCEDURE

   On July 4, 2007, Tim Bauman, a volunteer firefighter for the Chester Fire Department, attended a Fourth of July celebration in Wentworth, South Dakota. (15) The Chester Fire Department, located within the Chester Fire Protection District, is one of several volunteer fire departments serving the state of South Dakota.(16) While in Wentworth, Bauman received a page from the Chester Fire Department alerting him to respond to a fire. (17) Bauman and his wife, also a volunteer emergency responder, left in their personal vehicle for the fire hall. (18) Bauman traveled south from Wentworth to the Chester Fire Department via Lake County Road 15. (19) In response to the emergency, Bauman drove with the vehicle's emergency lights activated in excess of the speed limit. (20)

   At the same point in time, Mandi Gronseth was heading north on Lake County Road 15. (21) Areyman Gabriel, Gronseth s friend, was driving Gronseth's vehicle. (22) Gabriel attempted to turn left onto Horizon Heights Road at the same time Bauman reached the peak of a hill near the intersection with Horizon Heights Road. (23) Subsequently, Bauman's pickup collided with the passenger side of Gronseth's vehicle, severely injuring Gronseth. (24)

   Gronseth initially brought a suit against Bauman, the Chester Rural Fire Protection District, and the Chester Fire Department. (25) The suit commenced as a diversity action in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota. (26) Gronseth alleged negligence by Bauman, which she argued was the proximate cause of her injuries. (27) Additionally, Gronseth alleged that the Fire District and Department were liable for Bauman's negligence under the theory of respondeat superior." (28) Gronseth agreed to dismiss Bauman with prejudice through a stipulation of all parties. (29)

   Gronseth then moved for partial summary judgment, stating that issues of material fact regarding the cause of the accident were undisputed. (30) Following testimony by witnesses to the collision and experts on accident reconstruction, the court decided that material issues of fact did exist as to whether Bauman's speed or Gabriel's lack of attention caused the accident. (31) Therefore, the court denied the motion for partial summary judgment. (32)

   Based on Gronseth's earlier dismissal of Bauman from the suit, Chester Fire also submitted its own motion for summary judgment. (33) The defendants argued that a claim for vicarious liability cannot withstand a dismissal of the agent, because the dismissal of the agent also serves as a release of the principal. (34) The court rejected this argument and denied the motion for summary judgment. (35) In addition, the court reasoned that because the parties only agreed on the stipulation to dismiss Bauman after agreeing that Chester Fire would assume responsibility for Bauman's negligence, it was not the intention of any party for Bauman's dismissal to serve as res judicata. (36) This decision supports respondeat superior and its public policy justification. (37)

   As an alternative, Chester Fire also moved for summary judgment based on S.D.C.L. section 20-9-4.1. (38) The text of the statute provides:

   No peace officer, conservation officer, member of any fire department, police department and their first aid, rescue or emergency squad, or any citizen acting as such as a volunteer, or any other person, is liable for any civil damages as a result of their acts of commission or omission arising out of and in the course of their rendering in good faith, any emergency care and services during an emergency which is in their judgment indicated and necessary at the time. Such relief from liability from civil damages shall extend to the operation of any motor vehicle in connection with any such care or services. Nothing in this section grants any such relief to any person causing any damage be his willful, wanton or reckless act of commission or omission. (39) Chester Fire argued that S.D.C.L section 20-9-4.1 applied because at the time of the accident, Bauman was reacting to an emergency in the course of his duties as a volunteer firefighter. (40) Therefore, Bauman's accident arose out of his rendering of emergency care while using a motor vehicle. (41) The South Dakota Supreme Court had yet to interpret the Good Samaritan statute. (42) The application of the Good Samaritan statute was a question of law, one that might be determinative of awarding summary judgment to the defendants. (43) If the statute was applicable, Gronseth would then have the burden of proving Bauman's behavior was willful, wanton, or reckless. (44) The district court recognized the importance of this aspect of state law, and it subsequently certified a question of law to the South Dakota Supreme Court. (45) The certified question, in pertinent part, was whether or not a volunteer firefighter driving his personal vehicle to a fire hall was rendering emergency care and services to the extent that those actions could be protected by S.D.C.L. section 20-9-4.1. (46)

   The defendant Fire District argued that the intent of the South Dakota Legislature was to extend liability immunity to those who operated "any motor vehicle in connection with any" type of emergency care or services. (47) Gronseth countered that the statute was enacted to protect emergency care providers from liability claims for injuries to "the person they were serving or providing care to," not innocent third-party bystanders. (48) In addition, Gronseth argued that Bauman, in the singular act of driving his P4rsonal vehicle to the fire hall, had not yet rendered emergency care or services. (49)

   In its answer to the certified question, the South Dakota Supreme Court held that Bauman had begun and was in the process of rendering emergency care and services when he drove his personal vehicle to the fire hall. (50) The court used the plain, ordinary, and popular meaning of the language of the statute to interpret the legislative intent. (51) In doing so, the court found that the South Dakota Legislature intended broad protection for rescuers, including the use of motor vehicles used while rendering emergency care or services. (52)

   Justice Meierhenry, writing in dissent, declined to find such broad immunity...