CTC-ICT Focus on Israel: In Word and Deed? Global Jihad and the Threat to Israel and the Jewish Community.

• Author: Atiyas-Lvovsky, Lorena

From its early development in the 1980s to the present, the global jihad movement has exhibited a deep antagonism toward Jews and Israel. Global jihadis have expressed their enmity to "Zionists"--jihadi shorthand for the State of Israel and the Jewish community writ large--both in their ideological pronouncements and in operations on the ground. (1) While the anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli stance of global jihadis in both word and deed is well documented, the relationship between verbal denunciation of Israel and Jews and violent anti-Jewish and anti-Israel actions is less understood.

To address this gap, this article traces the correlation between "anti-Zionist" rhetoric on the part of global jihadis and their operations against Israeli and Jewish targets. Understanding the links between jihadi words and deeds in this context has important implications for policy: Not only can such insights help practitioners better assess the threat of jihad against Israel and the Jewish community, but they can provide scholars with a better understanding of why, how, and when extremist language translates into physical violence, thereby shedding greater light on the drivers of terrorist violence more broadly.

To explore this question, the authors reviewed official publications of the two leading jihadi organizations, the Islamic State and al-Qa'ida. The analysis covers the period from 2014 to July 2023 in the case of the Islamic State, and from 1988 to July 2023 for al-Qa'ida. The authors reviewed published texts in four major jihadi outlets: the first two, As-Sahab Media and Al-Malahim Media Outlet, are affiliated with al-Qa'ida leadership and al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), respectively. The other two, Al-Furqan media outlet and Al Naba weekly magazine, are affiliated with the Islamic State. As official mouthpieces of the two leading global jihadi organizations today, these sources serve as an authoritative guide to global jihadi followers. These outlets help shape the policies of al-Qa'ida, the Islamic State, their affiliates and associates, and those of other jihadi entities. All four are also known to have prominently covered Jewish, Israeli, and Palestinian issues. Specifically, the authors compared the timing of the publication of relevant articles and statements with the timing and impact of global jihadi attacks in Israel, as well as attacks on Jewish and Israeli targets outside of Israel. The study also examines the impact of global jihadi attacks on statements of the organization's senior officials. The authors applied a timespan of six months since the date of the publication in order to assess the possible mutual effects between jihadi pronouncements and operations against Jewish and Israeli targets.

As far as the operational activities of the Islamic State and al-Qa'ida are concerned, this study examines various levels of militant activities, from recruitment and emigration to jihadi theaters to training. The examined operational activities also include the initiation of specific attacks and the planning and execution of attacks by jihadi operatives, including lone attackers inspired by these groups. Notably, the authors include both successful and unsuccessful attacks as well as thwarted plots in this empirical study. The study also covers arrests on Israeli soil of terrorist operatives, such as those who established a terrorist cell and planned attacks, and of individuals who have expressed support for global jihad, as they may harbor information that can be useful in generating a more complete picture of terrorist motivations and capabilities. (a) For the purpose of this study, no differentiation is made between these different levels of involvement, despite the fact that they can represent different levels of organizational and operational capabilities and threats.

The study also examines the impact of key political and security-related events in Israel on the jihadi ideological climate and operations on the ground. Examples include the Al-Aqsa Intifada (2000-2005) and major military operations launched by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) against militant Palestinian groups. These include Operations Cast Lead (December 2008-January 2009), Pillar of Defense (November 2012), Protective Edge (July-August 2014), and Guardian of the Walls (May 2021). Additional major events covered in the study are the wave of knife attacks in Israel, sometimes referred to as the "Knives Intifada" (2015-2016); the Trump administration's recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in December 2017, and the subsequent move of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem (May 2018); the so-called "Deal of the Century" and the signing of the Abraham Accords between Israel and several Arab and Muslim states (2020); and other important dates, for example Israel's Independence Day (referred to by Palestinians as "al-Nakba," or "The Catastrophe") and anniversaries of major peace agreements.

This article begins with some observations on the gaps between jihadi pronouncements and violent actions with respect to Israel and the Jewish community. This will be followed by an in-depth analysis of al-Qa'ida's statements and operational activities, divided into three main periods: the foundational period (1988-2000); the "second decade" from the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000 to the Arab Spring' revolutions in 2011; and the post-Arab Spring period from 2011 to July 2023. The authors then conduct a similar analysis for the Islamic State, divided into two periods: an early period that spans the declaration of the Islamic Caliphate in 2014 to its collapse in 2017; and a later, post-Caliphate phase spanning the years from 2018 to July 2023. The final section presents the authors' conclusions.

Israel and the Jews First?

The global jihad and its constituent organizations such as al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State are no strangers to criticism for their apparent failure to prioritize Israel in their broader struggle against the 'unbelievers.' Both organizations tend to respond to these accusations apologetically, explaining that the Palestinian issue and the jihad against Israel have not been forgotten, but merely postponed to a later stage in the jihadi struggle. In March 2009, Usama bin Ladin explained that due to peace agreements in place between Israel and several of its Arab neighbors, Israeli borders have been difficult for the mujahideen to penetrate. Consequently, according to bin Ladin the jihadis were prioritizing the toppling of local regimes so that they could establish a staging ground for future attacks against Israel. (2) The idea to postpone the fight against Israel was also reflected in the "Seven Stage Plan" devised by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his cohort, initially published by Jordanian journalist Fuad Hussein in 2005. Envisioned by al-Qa'ida as a strategy to establish an Islamic caliphate, the Seven Stage Plan made numerous references to the struggle against Israel. In the third and fourth stages, for example, the plan referred to both direct operations against the State of Israel, as well as plans to strike at Israel indirectly, namely by harming the U.S. economy (i.e., striking Israel via its key ally). (3)

The Islamic State has felt similarly compelled to explain to the broader jihadi community its failure to stage high-profile attacks against its Zionist archenemy thus far. In a 2016 article posted by Al-Wafa, an Islamic State-supporting media outlet, the group cited two main reasons: First, difficulties penetrating Israeli territory due to a "defensive envelope" provided by the Syrian, Jordanian, Saudi, and Egyptian militaries, and even by the Lebanese Shi'a militia Hezbollah. The second excuse given by the Islamic State was its preoccupation with the fight against coalition forces, mainly in Iraq and Syria, which diverted resources away from the fight against the Jewish state. As a result, the Islamic State insinuated that it would be best to wait for it to build up a foothold on the ruins of the "near enemy" in order to be better prepared for the attack on Israel, even if this would take more than a decade. (4)

Al-Qa'ida

Al-Qa'ida in its First Decade: From its Formation (1988) until the Al-Aqsa Intifada (2000)

In the period between al-Qa"ida's 1988 formation up to the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the al-Qa'ida leadership touched upon the Israeli and Palestinian issues on several occasions. Generally speaking, the leadership highlighted the importance of waging jihad against Israel and liberating Palestine and the Al-Aqsa Mosque. It also criticized the establishment of ties between Israel and Arab countries (December 1994, (5) January 1995, (6) August 1998, (7) November 1998). (8) Bin Ladin's February 23, 1998, announcement of the formation of a "World Islamic front for jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders" is one of the more prominent examples of this expression. (9 b)

Prior to 9/11, activists who evidently agreed with these messages made relatively few attempts to conduct attacks on Israeli territory, and these were foiled by successful intelligence and counter terrorism activities. In 1997, for example, five young Jordanians of Palestinian descent were arrested for planning to enter Israel and perpetrate attacks on its soil. (10) In 2000, several arrests were recorded, including those of three young men who, separately from one another, planned attacks on Israeli territory. All three had trained in jihadi training camps in Afghanistan. (11) The first decade after al-Qa'ida's formation also witnessed a number of attempts to target Israeli and Jewish targets outside of Israel, including plots to target the Israeli embassy in Bangkok (March 1994), a synagogue (1994) and a Jewish school (1995) in France, and Israeli tourist destinations in Jordan (1995, 1999) and Egypt (1996), among others. (12)

Notwithstanding the occasional references to Israel and to Jews in general, the first period under review...