Criminal justice decision making in social and legal context

Published date01 November 2019
AuthorGreg Pogarsky
Date01 November 2019
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12469
DOI: 10.1111/1745-9133.12469
EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS
Criminal justice decision making in social and legal
context
Behavioral economic applications
Greg Pogarsky
University at Albany, State Universityof New York
Correspondence
GregPogarsky, School of Criminal Justice,University at Albany, State University of New York,135 Western Avenue, Draper
Hall 219, Albany, NY 12222.
Email:gpogarsky@albany.edu
On April 19–20, 2018, the School of Criminal Justice at Albany held a symposium called “Criminal
Justice Decision Making in Social and Legal Context.” The articles in this series comprise part of the
intellectual output from that symposium. Many thanks are owed to Dean William Pridemore, whose
leadership made the symposium possible. Generous university-level support was also provided by for-
mer President Robert Jones and former Provost James Stellar. The event was timed to capitalize on
recent advancements in behavioral economics and to generate innovative thinking about crime theory
and policy. Several broad themes emerged.
First and foremost is the potential for behavioral economics to inform thinking about the nature of
crime and societal responses to it. Principles of choice are essential to a range of criminological theories
beyond rational choice. These include social control, social learning, and institutional anomie. But the
traditional economic notions of costs, benefits, and risk often applied in criminology (see Becker,
1968; McCarthy, 2002) may be outdated. Behavioral economics offers refined and more descriptively
realistic models of decision-making.
Prospect theory was formative for behavioral economics (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The theory
updated economic notions of expected utility to account for predictable ways in which people regard
risk and probability. Thereafter, a more encompassing, dual-systems version of behavioral economics
emerged (Kahneman, 2011). System 2 includes the contemplative processes envisioned by rational
choice and prospect theories. System 1 includes intuitive, heuristic, and generally faster processes that
have been neglected until recently in offenderdecision-making research. Pogarsky and Herman (2019,
pp. 823–839) outline how the interrelationship between these types of decision processes suggests
innovative possibilities for prosocial “nudges.”
Loughran (2019, pp. 737–758) leads with an expanded perspective on offender decision-making
infused with behavioral economic principles. Thereafter Hoeben and Thomas (2019, pp. 759–784)
focus on the many social dynamics at workwhen individuals have the opportunity to offend. But issues
of agency and choice extend far beyond offenders. Various other actors exercise discretion and make
Criminology & Public Policy. 2019;18:735–736. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/capp © 2019 American Society of Criminology 735

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