Crime, Fear, and Legitimating Ideologies

AuthorRobert Wood,James Hawdon
Published date01 December 2014
Date01 December 2014
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/0734016814538649
Subject MatterArticles
Article
Crime, Fear, and
Legitimating Ideologies:
State of the Union Addresses
as Hegemonic Strategy
James Hawdon
1
and Robert Wood
2
Abstract
Beckett and Sasson argue that the wars on crime and drugs of the 1980s and 1990s were part of an
elite-engineered hegemonic strategy aimed at replacing the welfare state with the security state. As
the welfare state came under attack, a new hegemonic strategy emerged that attacked welfare pol-
icies and promoted ‘‘tough on crime’’ policies. Yet, Beckett and Sasson note that for the new hege-
monic strategy to be successful, it must be rooted in the experiences and cultural beliefs of the
general population. We investigate the possibility of an elite-engineered effort to build support for
tough on crime policies by conducting a time series analysis using General Social Survey data and
statements by presidents in State of the Union addresses from 1972 to 2010. Specifically, we predict
aggregate levels of fear of crime and support for welfare spending with presidential mentions of
‘‘crime’’ and ‘‘welfare’’ in State of the Union addresses. Our results indicate that fear increases when
presidents discuss crime and welfare in the State of the Union. In addition, fear of crime is inversely
related to supporting welfare spending. These relationships hold even after controlling for crime
rates. Our findings offer support for Beckett and Sasson’s argument.
Keywords
social constructions of crime/justice, crime/delinquency theory, critical criminology, crime policy,
courts/law, moral panics
A 2008 New York Times article criticizes the United States for having the world’s highest incarcera-
tion rate, exceeding Mexico’s, which holds the second highest rate, 3 times over (Liptak, 2008).
Although the U.S. crime rates and incarceration rates have fallen in recent years, the United States
still has the highest incarceration rate globally (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2012). This was not
always the case, however. The rate of imprisonment rose dramatically beginning in roughly
1
Center for Peace Studies and Violence Prevention, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA, USA
2
Department of Sociology, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA, USA
Corresponding Author:
James Hawdon, Center for Peace Studies and Violence Prevention (MC 0911), Norris Hall, 205a, Virginia Tech 495 Old
Turner Rd, Blacksburg, VA 24061, USA.
Email: hawdonj@vt.edu
Criminal Justice Review
2014, Vol. 39(4) 377-393
ª2014 Georgia State University
Reprints and permission:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0734016814538649
cjr.sagepub.com
1980. Rising incarceration rates could possibly be explained by a parallel rise in crime rates, but
incarceration rates increased despite declining crime rates in the 1990s and stable rates since.
Another possible explanation for the rapid increase in U.S. incarceration rates since the 1980s could
be dramatic increases in rates of drug use since a substantial number of prisoners are serving sen-
tences for drug offenses (Carson & Golinelli, 2013). However, rates of drug use decreased drama-
tically in the 1980s (see Hawdon, 1996) and, despite fluctuations since the early 1990s, rates of drug
use remain well below those of the early 1980s when incarceration rates began increasing dramati-
cally (see Johnston, O’Malley, Bachman, & Schulenberg, 2010).
If the increasing incarceration rates were not a result of increased drug use or crime, why then
have they occurred? Moreover, why has the public discussion of crime and drugs been so punitive
in nature (see Beckett, 1994; Caplow & Simon, 1999; Hawdon, 2001) when rates of crime and drug
use have declined? One explanation is that the public discussion of drug use and crime may
exaggerate reality in support of a punitive policy approach. Marked increases in jail or prison popu-
lations, despite a lack of any increased crime problem, make such policies hard to defend (Beckett &
Sasson, 2000). However, the adoption of punitive anticrime and antidrug policy may not have any-
thing to do with the reality of crime; instead, they may be part of a legitimating hegemonic strategy
used by elites to maintain their dominant position.
This article offers a partial test of Beckett and Sasson’s argument that a new hegemonic strategy
of a security state replaced the previous welfare state strategy.
1
We argue that for Beckett and
Sasson’s argument to be plausible, we should be able to detect (a) an increased use of ‘‘security state
rhetoric’’ and (b) evidence that this rhetoric creates an atmosphere that would lead ‘‘regular people’’
to support security state policies. We also argue that promoting a sense of fear would be one way of
generating support for the antiwelfare policies of the security state. Then, using data from presiden-
tial State of the Union (STOU) addresses, Uniform Crime Reports, the General Social Survey (GSS),
and other governmental sources, we conduct a time series analysis to determine whether the content
of STOU speeches influences levels of fear of crime independent of empirical crime rates. We also
investigate whether fear of crime and the rhetoric of STOU speeches lead to oppositional attitudes
toward welfare spending. Failing to find evidence of the use of security state rhetoric or a relation-
ship between this rhetoric and public opinion supporting security state policies would offer evidence
that refutes Beckett and Sasson’s argument.
We begin by reviewing some of Gramsci’s (1971) basic arguments regarding hegemony. We then
briefly discuss Beckett and Sasson’s specific argument regarding the replacement of the welfare
state hegemonic strategy with that of the security state. After this discussion, we present our empiri-
cal analysis and then discuss the implications of our findings.
Literature Review
Using a neo-Marxist theory of hegemony and relying heavily on Gramsci’s (1971) theory of
hegemony, Beckett and Sasson (2000) explain the dramatic rise in U.S. incarceration rates since
1980. As Gramsci (1971) argues, in states such as the United States with strong civil society vis-
a`-vis the state, the ruling classes use cultural and ideological mechanisms, including the media and
political institutions, to generate consent and secure their hegemony. The lower classes generally
accept the status quo because they adopt the ruling class’ definition of reality, which always pro-
motes a favorable opinion of the capitalist society that supports them. The elite wins support through
hegemonic strategies that endorse the capitalist system.
Yet, Gramsci (1971) viewed the ruling class as fractured, with competing groups vying for con-
trol of the state. In the competition among elites for control of the state, they will try to mobilize
public support around the functions of the state. While these competing visions of the state will
always include a defense of the capitalist system, they offer alternative means of reaching
378 Criminal Justice Review 39(4)

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT