CRAVEN, WESLEY FRANK, and JAMES LEA CATE (Eds.). The Army Air Forces in World War II. Vol. IV: The Pacific— Guadalcanal to Saipan (August 1942 to July 1944). Pp. xxi, 625. Chicago: University.of Chicago Press for the Air Historical Groups, USAF, 1950. $6.00

• Author: Arthur P. Watts
• Date: 01 March 1951
• DOI: 10.1177/000271625127400140
• Published date: 01 March 1951
• Subject Matter: Articles

216

Russians,

some

of

whom

spent

a

large

part

of

their

lives

as

exiles

from

Russia.

On

this

phase

of

the

subject

the author

dupli-

cates

some

of

the

earlier

work

of

David

Hecht.

Americans

who

write

of

Russian-Amer-

ican

relations

inevitably

fall

into

errors

growing

out

of

their

unfamiliarity

with

the

Russian

milieu;

the

same

is

true

of

Rus-

sians

who

write

of

America.

The

author

is

less

than

accurate

when

he

touches

on

such

subjects

as

the

American

Revolution,

the

Monroe

Doctrine,

and-the

Homestead

Act.

His

knowledge

of

Anglo-American

re-

lations

is

most

inadequate.

England

was

not

&dquo;compelled&dquo;

by

the

United

States

after

the

war

of

1812

to

recognize

expatriation

(p.

357).

The

&dquo;last

vestiges

of

tension&dquo;

in

Anglo-American

relations

did

not

dis-

appear

in

the

early

years

of

this

century

(p.

346),

as

every

adult

native-born

Amer-

ican

knows,

especially

if

he

has

Hibernian

antecedents.

As

for

Russian-American

re-

lations,

one

fails

to

perceive

after

reading

W.

B.

Thorson,

whom

the

author

cites,

any

&dquo;high

tide

of

Russo-American

friend-

ship&dquo;

at

the

time

of

Portsmouth

in

1905

(p.

349).

The

American

abrogation

of

the

Russian

commercial

treaty

in

1911

was

not

&dquo;unusually

courageous&dquo;

(p.

370);

it

was

primarily

an

act

of

blind

emotionalism,

without

any

real

appreciation

of

the

con-

sequences.

Looking

at

Russia

today-the

ideological

antipodes

of

America-one

must

conclude

that

the

American

impact

has

been

techno-

logical

rather

than

ideological,

and,

except

for

things

material,

relatively

inconsequen-

tidal.

Grateful

though

one

is

for

the

au-

thor’s

convenient

assembling

of

interesting

data,

chiefly

in

the

realm

of

ideas,

one

lays

the

volume

down

with

the

feeling

that

the

really

significant

impact

could

have

been

described

in

much

less

compass.

THOMAS

A.

BAILEY

Stanford

University

CRAVEN,

WESLEY

FRANK,

and

JAMES

LEA

CATE

(Eds.).

The

Army

Air

Forces

in

World

War

II.

Vol.

IV:

The

Pacific—

Guadalcanal

to

Saipan

(August

1942

to

July

1944).

Pp.

xxi,

625.

Chicago:

University.of

Chicago

Press

for

the

Air

Historical

Groups,

USAF,

1950.

$6.00.

This

volume,

the

third

of

seven

to

be

published

on

the

role

of

the

Air

Forces

in

World

War

II,

shows

a

marked

improve-

ment

over

volumes

I

and

II

both

in

or-

ganization

and

in

English

style.

Beginning

with

the

Allies’

desperate

struggle

to

stem

the

Japanese

advance

in

the

lower

Sol-

omons

and

southeastern

New

Guinea,

the

narrative

relates

how

they

seized

the

in-

itiative ;

it

follows

the

drive

of

MacArthur’s

forces

along

the

New

Guinea

coast

and

the

simultaneous

advance

of

the

Navy

through

the

Gilberts,

Marshalls,

and

Marianas,

and

ends with

both

commands

in

a

position

to

attack the

Philippines.

The

war

in

the

Pacific

was

an

entirely

different

type

from

that

fought

in

Europe.

There

were

no

large

scale

land

battles

involving

great

masses

of

infantry,

armor,

and

artillery;

and

until

after

July

1944

air

power

waged

no

strategic .

warfare

against

the

Japanese

homeland

and

afforded

rela-

tively

little

close

support

of

ground

forces

However,

great

skill

was

developed

in

sup-

port

of

amphibious

forces

in

landing

opera-

tions.

The

detailed

story

of

each

campaign

is

introduced

by

a

lucid

account

of

the

pre-

liminary

strategic

planning,

and

is

followed

by

a

frank

evaluation

in

which

no

attempt

is

made

to

gloss

over

errors

of

failures.

These

sections

reveal

&dquo;the

vast

abyss

of

the

conflicting

views

of

MacArthur

and

the

Navy,

reflected

in

the

sharp

debates

over

strategy.&dquo;

As

a

result,

the

broad

principles

laid

down

by

the

Combined

Chiefs

of

Staff

were

elaborated

upon

by

the

American

Joint

Chiefs

much

more

fully

for

the

war

in

the

Pacific

than

for

the

European

phase

of

the

struggle.

Consequently,

having

com-

paratively

little

to

do _with

strategic

plan-

ning,

MacArthur’s

staff

was

primarily

con-

cerned

with

the

more

tactical

problem

of

making

efhcient

use

of

the

troops

and

equipment

at

its

disposal

to

capture

the

objectives

on

the

dates

specified

by

Wash-

ington.

Almost

lost

in

the

maze

of

details

is

an

account

of

the

air-action

that

led

to

one

of

the

bitterest

controversies

over

the

war

in

the

Pacific-the

Battle of

Bismarck

Sea

(2-3

March

1943).

The

official

report

of

that

important

strategic

victory,

dated

7

April

1943,

claimed

the

complete

destruc-