Court rules against former employee alleging improper firing

• Published date: 01 March 2020
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1002/nba.30736
• Date: 01 March 2020

MARCH 2020 NONPROFIT BUSINESS ADVISOR

11

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DOI: 10.1002/nba

The department filed a motion for summary

judgment.

It rst argued most of the harassing comments

weren’t racially charged, and that any comments iden-

tifying his race were either compliments or directed

at the alleged harassers.

EMPLOYEE WINS ➔ The district court judge

agreed that some of the alleged harassment wasn’t

inherently racial. But the judge ruled that a reasonable

jury could nd that the overall pattern of harassment

was racially motivated because the “vanilla swole”

and “white boy” comments explicitly singled out the

plaintiff as white.

The department next contended that the alleged

harassment was neither severe nor pervasive.

But the judge said the record showed that the

plaintiff had been subjected to a continuous stream

of harassment at the hands of multiple supervisors

and co-workers over several months. Moreover, he

said the harassment allegedly kept the plaintiff from

performing his assigned duties because it: (1) caused

him to lose concentration, (2) forced him to devote

time to making verbal complaints and (3) caused him

to participate in the ensuing investigations.

The department next argued that it wasn’t liable

because all of the alleged harassing statements came

from his co-workers, and his supervisors responded

reasonably to each complaint.

But the judge said the alleged failure to stop the

harassment cast doubt on whether those responses

were reasonable.

He also said the coordinator might have meant

well when she directed the co-workers to “leave the

white boy alone,” but that instruction would muddle

whatever message against harassment the department

was sending, because it might have signaled it was

OK to identify the plaintiff by his race.

He also said the plaintiff had specically alleged

that some supervisors had participated in the harass-

ment, and ruled that a reasonable jury could nd that

an employer’s action in verbally counseling employees

regarding anti-harassment policies wasn’t reason-

ably likely to stop the purported harassment if the

co-workers saw supervisors both taking part in the

same kind of behavior and otherwise injecting race

into the workplace.

The judge denied the department’s motion.

[Volvillia v. Illinois Department of Human Services,

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Il-

linois, No. 17 C 6056, 07/09/2019].

Title VII

Court rules against former employee

alleging improper ring

The plaintiff was a black man who worked as a

direct care provider for Housing Opportunities for

Persons with Exceptionalities.

On an unspecied date, HOPE’s executive director

called the plaintiff to ask whether he could cover for

another employee’s shift. The plaintiff responded

that he was unavailable because he had made plans

to celebrate his graduation from a community col-

lege program.

The director called again the next morning to re-

mind the plaintiff that he had signed an agreement

in which he promised to cover extra shifts when he

was available.

The two then met in HOPE’s ofce later that day

to continue the discussion.

When the plaintiff insisted he was unavailable

because of a legitimate excuse, the director allegedly

said, “I can’t stand your black *ss” and “Get out of

here. Get out of this ofce.”

The plaintiff interpreted the director’s comments

to mean he was red, and left the premises forever. He

subsequently led a suit claiming racial discrimina-

tion in violation of Title VII.

HOPE led a motion for summary judgment,

arguing that the plaintiff had voluntarily resigned.

It also argued that even if a judge or jury decided

he had been red, there wasn’t enough evidence to

show there was a discriminatory intent because (1)

the plaintiff had admitted that the “black *ss” remark

was “very much out of character” and (2) the director

had lled his position with black people.

The district court judge granted HOPE’s motion.

The plaintiff rst argued on appeal that a rea-

sonable jury could nd that HOPE had red him

because of his race because the director said to

him, “I can’t stand your black *ss” just before she

red him.

The appellate court said the director’s alleged com-

ment was improper in any workplace.

EMPLOYER WINS ➔ However, it ruled that

no reasonable jury could nd a violation of Title

VII because the director’s purported comment had

nothing to do with the termination decision. The

court acknowledged that a comment unrelated to

a termination decision could sometimes tend to

show racial animus if it was accompanied by other