Conflict Management in Illicit Drug Cryptomarkets

• Author: Carlo Morselli,Masarah Paquet-Clouston,David Décary-Hétu,Judith Aldridge
• DOI: 10.1177/1057567717709498
• Published date: 01 December 2017
• Date: 01 December 2017
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Conflict Management in Illicit

Drug Cryptomarkets

Carlo Morselli

1

, David De

´cary-He

´tu

1

,

Masarah Paquet-Clouston

1

, and Judith Aldridge

2

Abstract

Illegal drug markets have been described as “stateless” systems. Drug dealers, moreover, are

commonly considered to have a predilection toward the use of violence to resolve disputes arising

from dealing activities. While some studies have undermined this popular perception, new trends

surrounding the distribution of illegal drugs via online channels (drug cryptomarkets) have shifted

the transactional setting from the physical to virtual realm, thus decreasing the likelihood of violent

resolution outcomes even further. This article examines conflict management strategies within

cryptomarkets by coding discussion forums between vendors and buyers. Violence, as expected, is

absent. Strategies more likely reflect alternatives that have been recognized in conflict management

research within and beyond illegal mark et settings: tolerance, avoidance, os tracism, third-party

intervention, negotiation, and threats. The overall setting from which such resolutions emerge is

clearly not subject to formal regulations, but our analyses illustrate the multitude of informal social

control mechanisms that are consistently at play and which underlie the self-regulatory and

communal processes that are firmly in place.

Keywords

conflict management, violence, illegal drugs, cryptomarkets, self-regulation

Illegal drug markets, in keeping with illegal markets more generally, have been described as

“stateless” settings (Wilkins, 2001), leaving participan ts to resolve their problems and disputes

without the benefit of formal mediating agents and guidelines (Cooney, 1998; Jacques, 2010;

Reuter, 1983). Without legally binding contractual arrangements afforded by the state, illegal drug

markets have been argued to go hand-in-hand with violence. In his tripartite framework, Goldstein

(1985, 1997) remains explicit in regard to this association: “violence is intrinsic to involvement with

any illicit substance” (Goldstein, 1985, p. 497). This drug–violence nexus is designed around

psychopharmacological (violence due to the effects of a drug), economic compulsi ve (violence

1

Centre international de criminologie compare

´e / School of Criminology, Universite

´de Montre

´al, Montre

´al, Canada

2

University of Manchester, Manchester, UK

Corresponding Author:

Carlo Morselli, Universite

´de Montre

´al, C.P. 6128, succursale Centre-ville, Montre

´al, Que

´bec, Canada H3C 3J7.

Email: carlo.morselli@umontreal.ca

International CriminalJustice Review

2017, Vol. 27(4) 237-254

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DOI: 10.1177/1057567717709498

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enacted when stealing to buy drugs), and systemic (violence because of extralegal transactional

issues) features. While support for the nexus has been found when focusing on the experiences of

consumers (see Copes, Hochstetler, & Sandberg, 2015), the prevalence and consistency of violence

has been less clear-cut when examining the supply side of illegal drug trafficking settings.

Some researchers construe violence as a social phenomenon, even before considering the selling

of drugs specifically. Violence, in this sense, pervades all spheres of a drug dealer’s life. Sommers

and Baskin (1997) consider that the violence of drug sellers stems not from the distribution of drugs,

but rather from the drug underworld that provides a context that favors the use of violence within a

larger social environment. Pearson and Hobbs (2001, p. 41) concur: “many of those featuring

prominently in middle market drug dealing networks bring with them prior reputations for violent

action,” with some drug trade participants predisposed to violence even before becoming involved in

drug selling. Support for this perspective is demonstrated by the finding that certain drug markets,

such as those dealing in cocaine or crack, are more violent than other illegal drug markets (Fagan &

Chin, 1990; Johnson, Golub, & Fagan, 1995), suggesting that it is not marketplace illegality per se

that deterministically creates violence. Moreover, we find considerable variation in violence con-

nected to drug trafficking across countries, with recent increases (e.g., Mexico) and decreases (e.g.,

Colombia) in violence not simply linked to the existence and persistence of trafficking in these

locations (Duran-Martinez, 2015).

For others, the place of violence in illegal drug settings has been largely overstated. Reuter (2009)

has stressed that illegal drug markets are relatively peaceful. Violence has been found to be a last

resort, with general consensus identifying the importance of the multiple alternatives to violence

employed by drug market actors (Meeson & Morselli, 2012). Contrary to the leading assumption

underlying Goldstein’s framework, Jacques and Wright (2008, pp. 222–223) argue that violence “is

not an invariant or inevitable feature of drug markets; many such markets experience little or no

serious violence, and even the most violent drug markets are peaceful most of the time.” Dickinson

(2017) also provides similar evidence on the importance of avoiding violence in drug dealing

settings, with firsthand examples of dealers practicing prevention by offering free drugs to clients

so as to avoid snitching and eventual enforcement (see also Dickinson & Wright, 2015). Dickinson’s

dealers were more likely to threaten clients with avoidance than violence. Such assertions are also

supported by Coomber (2006) who also describes drug dealing experiences that, in general, indicate

that the claim that violence is systematic or systemic in illegal drug markets is largely overstated.

Ethnographic research also supports such an appraisal. Taylor’s (2007) study of drug dealing

disputes illustrates that outcomes are generally influenced by the seriousness of the dispute and the

relational features uniting participants in conflict. Most drug dealing conflicts were found to present

little harm and ill intent. For those that were more serious, the likelihood of violence was largely

dependent on a preceding enemy link between conflicting parties; friends and long-standing busi-

ness partners were more likely to find nonviolent resolutions. However, and as Jacques’s (2008)

critique of Taylor’s book also makes apparent, there is much more to this resolution setting than a

clear-cut dichotomy between violence and nonviolence. Jacques’s point touches on a crucial fallacy

emerging from many past drug market settings: The focus on violence in illegal drug markets has

generally been approached from a simplistic outlook, lacking the comparison with nonviolence or

the even more nuanced assessment that would integrate specific forms of nonviolent outcomes.

Much of past research on violence in illegal drug markets (and illegal markets in general) has been

tainted by a self-fulfilling prophecy that has us searching for violence and only violence. This fallacy

suggests that, if we look for violence in illegal drug settings, we will find it, but this does not allow us

to generalize such observations to a market as a whole. Essentially, violence is but one form of

conflict management and scenes of violence must therefore be situated within a wider repertoire of

conflict management and resolution alternatives. The importance of such alternatives is best

expressed by one of the drug dealers who shared his experience and despair with having to resolve

238 International Criminal Justice Review 27(4)