Comprehensive moral thinking and the demandingness objection

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/basr.12197
• Date: 01 March 2020
• Published date: 01 March 2020
• Author: Travis Butler

Bus Soc Rev. 2020;125:143–158.

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143

wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/basr

Received: 6 February 2020

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Accepted: 6 February 2020

DOI: 10.1111/basr.12197

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Comprehensive moral thinking and the

demandingness objection

TravisButler

© 2020 W. Michael Hoffman Center for Business Ethics at Bentley University. Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden,

MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.

Philosophy and Religious Studies, Iowa

State University, Ames, IA

Correspondence

Travis Butler, Philosophy and Religious

Studies, Iowa State University, Ames, IA.

Email: tbutler@iastate.edu

Abstract

In his tripartite theory of corporate responsibility, Kenneth

Goodpaster argues for the inclusion of “Comprehensive

Moral Thinking (CMT)” as the third part alongside share-

holder and stakeholder thinking. CMT requires managers

sometimes to act for reasons of dignity or a just community,

against what shareholder and stakeholder thinking recom-

mend. To address concerns about the demandingness of

CMT, Goodpaster argues that the responsibilities it imposes

are significant but qualified or conditional: they require

only that managers make efforts to address problems of dig-

nity and justice, especially in cooperation with other willing

firms. If extreme efforts are required or if other firms are

unwilling to cooperate, managers can be justified in decid-

ing in favor of shareholder or stakeholder values, even when

dignity or justice is at stake. I raise two problems for the

appeal to qualified responsibility—an extensional problem

about the inability of the account to yield the correct judg-

ment in important cases and an internal problem about the

coherence of the account when qualified responsibility is in-

cluded. I conclude by considering the prospects of a theory

that includes CMT but rejects qualified responsibility.

KEYWORDS

corporate responsibility, dignity, justice, stakeholders

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BUTLER

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INTRODUCTION

Theories in ethics sometimes face criticism because they are too demanding. The Demandingness

Objection (DO), as this criticism is now known, seeks to undermine its target theories by showing

that the requirements they posit simply ask too much of human beings. The underlying logic of the

objection is that while it is natural to expect ethical norms to make demands of us and to call us to our

better selves, there is a point at which extreme demandingness becomes a philosophical problem and

reflects poorly on the theory of which the norms are a part.

The DO is most familiar in the domain of moral theory where theorists must struggle to accord

morality its proper place in human life and to reconcile its demands with appropriate partiality and

commitment to nonmoral projects.1

But a version of the objection can challenge theories in applied

ethics as well, including especially business ethics which operates in a domain where considerations

of shareholder value and stakeholder satisfaction are often seen as overriding.2

The DO will pose a

special challenge to theories that require managers at least sometimes to subordinate these values to

the demands of morality.

In his tripartite theory of corporate responsibility, Kenneth Goodpaster defends just such a require-

ment by adding what he calls “Comprehensive Moral Thinking (CMT)” as the third part alongside

shareholder and stakeholder thinking.3

CMT requires managers at least sometimes to act for reasons

of dignity or a just community, against what shareholder and stakeholder thinking recommend. CMT,

thus, imposes demands that go beyond simply trying to satisfy the desires of the stakeholders.4

For this reason, it is natural that Goodpaster's defense of CMT shows sensitivity to the DO.

Specifically, he argues that the responsibilities imposed by CMT are significant but qualified or con-

ditional: they require only that managers make efforts to address problems of dignity and justice,

especially in cooperation with other willing firms (Goodpaster 2009, pp. 146–150). If extreme efforts

are required or if other firms are unwilling to cooperate, managers can be justified in deciding in favor

of shareholder or stakeholder values, even when dignity or justice is at stake.

After explaining Goodpaster's account of CMT in more detail, I raise two problems for his appeal

to qualified responsibility—an extensional problem about the inability of the account to yield the

correct judgment is clear and ethically significant cases and an internal problem about the coherence

of the account when qualified responsibility is included. These problems motivate the search for an

alternative to CMT as modified by qualified responsibility. I conclude by considering the prospects of

a theory that includes CMT but rejects qualified responsibility.

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THE ELEMENTS OF CMT: DIGNITY AND A

JUST COMMUNITY

The inclusion of CMT as a necessary constituent of corporate responsibility is motivated by the con-

viction that there are moral considerations that are (a) important for responsible decision making in

business, but (b) unlikely to be captured by shareholder and stakeholder thinking alone, at least insofar

as stakeholder thinking is defined in terms of desire-satisfaction of stakeholder groups. This last quali-

fication leaves a hostage to fortune as it evidently opens the possibility of addressing the concerns that

motivate by CMT by offering a more sophisticated account of stakeholder thinking rather than adding

CMT as a third part. We will return to this possibility in Section 4.

With stakeholder thinking defined in terms of desire-satisfaction, however, it is quite plausible

to maintain that the two-part theory will not capture all ethically relevant considerations in all cases.

Specifically, the two-part theory is unlikely to capture moral values that derive from a conception of