Commercial Transportation
| Publication year | 2021 |
Commercial Transportation
Madeline E. McNeeley
Sarah L. Adle
Elizabeth M. Brooks
Joshua H. Dorminy
Stephen G. Lowry
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Commercial transportation involves all the significant forms of passenger and freight transportation across the United States. This Article surveys significant judicial, regulatory, and legislative developments in Georgia commercial transportation law from June 1, 2020, through May 31, 2021.1
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In Stubbs Oil Company, Inc. v. Price, the Georgia Court of Appeals answered several questions pertaining to liability in a wrongful death action involving a commercial motor vehicle.2 Specifically, the question before the Georgia Court of Appeals in Stubbs was whether an oil company, as well as its insurer, that hired a motor carrier to transport its oil could be held vicariously liable as defendants.3
Three people were killed when Christopher Hinson, who was operating an oil tanker truck at seventy-nine miles per hour, collided with a compact vehicle.4 Hinson was employed by Southern Oil Refinery, LLC (Southern Oil) and was on his way to obtain oil for delivery at the time of the crash. Stubbs Oil Company, Inc. (Stubbs Oil), a business involved in purchasing fuel products from large oil companies and reselling the fuel to retail gas station franchises and agricultural and government entities, occasionally hired Southern Oil to transport fuel to its retail service stations. On June 19, 2015, Hinson retrieved the fuel tanker from Southern Oil's facility and, while on his way to pick up the fuel, rear-ended a vehicle driven by Beverly Baird. Baird and the two passengers in her vehicle, Nicholas Price and Ricardo Dewberry, all died as a result of the collision.5 The representatives of their estates filed suit, specifically alleging that "Hinson's negligent operation of the fuel tanker truck resulted in a motor-vehicle collision that killed three people, and Southern Oil was vicariously liable as Hinson's employer."6 The plaintiffs also argued that Stubbs Oil was vicariously liable because it "acted as Hinson and Southern Oil's statutory employer under the FMCSRs [Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations]" and that Federated Service Insurance Company (Federated), Stubbs Oil's insurer, was liable under the direct action statute permitting actions against the insurer of a motor carrier for hire.7
Stubbs Oil and Federated filed separate motions for summary judgment at the trial court level.8 Stubbs Oil contended that it could not be vicariously liable to the plaintiffs because, "(1) [I]t was a shipper, rather than a motor carrier for hire, and was not a statutory employer under the FMCSRs; (2) Hinson and Southern Oil were independent contractors under Georgia law; and (3) it owed no duty to ensure
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Southern Oil's carrier status."9 Federated argued that it could not be held vicariously liable to the plaintiffs and was not subject to a direct action under Title 40, Chapter 1, Section 112 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated.10 The Gordon Superior Court denied both motions for summary judgment, summarily finding that Southern Oil "could only operate as a private motor carrier, and therefore, Stubbs Oil was—seemingly by implication—Hinson and Southern Oil's statutory employer."11 Stubbs Oil and Federated received permission for interlocutory appeals.12
As to Stubbs Oil's appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals analyzed the language in the FMCSRs and reversed the trial court's finding that Stubbs Oil was a motor carrier, determining that Stubbs Oil was a shipper rather than a motor carrier under the FMCSR definitions.13 The plaintiffs argued that, even if Stubbs Oil was a shipper pursuant to the FMCSRs, it could still be held liable as a statutory employer, but the court rejected this argument.14 The court stated initially that the FMCSRs apply only to motor carriers, not to shippers who engage carriers to transport their goods.15 The court also noted that Georgia precedent makes "the existence of a lease between the defendant and the owner of the vehicle . . . the defining element in creating a statutory employment relationship under the FMCSRs[,]" and it reasoned that because there was "[no] evidence of either a written or oral lease between Hinson or Southern Oil and Stubbs Oil," Stubbs Oil could not be held liable as a statutory employer.16 The court of appeals further noted that "the tanker truck involved in the accident bore the logo and [Department of Transportation (DOT)] number of Southern Oil, not Stubbs Oil," and Stubbs Oil exercised no control over how Hinson or Southern Oil carried out the delivery, further supporting the conclusion that Stubbs Oil was not operating as a motor carrier at the time of the collision.17
Similarly, the court of appeals concluded that Stubbs Oil could not be held vicariously liable under a respondeat superior theory because Southern Oil was acting as its independent contractor.18 The court of
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appeals analyzed the facts under O.C.G.A. § 9-2-4, the employer-liability statute, and held that Stubbs Oil "merely hired Southern Oil to transport its fuel products to a retail service station, but had no input as to the driver or the vehicle Southern Oil would use to complete the task."19 The court concluded that Southern Oil retained the right to perform delivery of the fuel "by their own means, method, and manner," foreclosing any possibility that Southern Oil could be considered anything other than an independent contractor.20
Stubbs Oil's last contention on appeal was that it did not owe a duty to ensure Southern Oil's carrier status.21 The court of appeals acknowledged the trial court's order was "not entirely clear" as to the basis for the denial of summary judgment, but "seem[ed] to imply" a document regarding Southern Oil's alleged lack of operating authority nine months after the incident, which created a genuine issue as to whether Stubbs Oil had breached a duty to ensure its carrier status before the incident.22 The court was "unpersuaded" that this document created an issue for trial, and it noted the plaintiffs had not cited any Georgia authority for their other proposition that "Stubbs Oil should be liable for negligently hiring Southern Oil because the act of driving a tractor-trailer is inherently dangerous[.]"23 Stubbs Oil did not owe a duty to the plaintiffs to ensure Southern Oil's carrier status and, thus, could not be held liable under this theory.24
Finally, as to Federated's appeal of the direct-action question, the court held that because Stubbs Oil could not be held vicariously liable, its insurer also could not be held liable.25 Because Stubbs Oil was acting as a shipper, not a motor carrier, at the time of the crash, Stubbs Oil's insurer could not be held liable to the plaintiffs under O.C.G.A. § 40-1-112.26
In reversing the trial court on every issue that was appealed, the court of appeals made clear that the ultimate purpose of permitting joinder of an insurance company in a negligence action involving a motor carrier is in furtherance of the public policy behind the Motor Carrier Act, which is to protect the public against injuries caused by a motor carrier's negligence and to allow the insurer to stand in the shoes of the motor
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carrier.27 The key is that such liability can only be extended to the insurer of the motor carrier itself, not the insurer of the shipper.28
Commercial aviation is largely controlled by federal authority, but there are many areas where it is within state jurisdiction. Multiple state organizations are involved in aviation regulation, as it has environmental, public safety, and economic impacts. Due to the significant role that aviation plays in this state, the Georgia Aviation Authority exists to assist "state aircraft and aviation operations, ensuring the safety of people traveling by air and aviation property."29 While there were no judicial developments during this Survey period, state legislative and regulatory agencies continued to address aviation issues, despite the ongoing Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic.
Noting that "the current and future economic health of Georgia relies on thriving airports and an efficient air travel industry," the state legislature enacted a resolution creating the Joint Study Committee on Airport Infrastructure and Improvements.30 The committee will perform a study on funding and policy development relating to airports, emphasizing efficiency, and coordination within the aviation industry.31 By year's end, the committee must file a report and any proposed legislation it deems necessary based on the study's results.32 Thus, there is potential aviation legislation on the horizon to protect and advance Georgia's role as a national "leader in the movement of goods and persons[.]"33
The legislature also passed a bill governing the licensing of airports.34 Operating airports without regulation of minimum and uniform safety requirements endangers lives and property.35 To establish and improve a safer system of airports and operating conditions within them, the state provides for the licensing of airports based on certain rules and regulations.36 One such rule is that an airport operator must first obtain,
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and thereafter maintain, a valid license.37 This statutory amendment lays out the procedure and remedies for an airport operator's failure to comply with the state's licensing requirements.38
On the regulatory front, the Environmental Protection Division of the Department of Natural Resources adopted air quality rules relevant to aviation.39 The Georgia Air Quality Act serves to:
[P]reserve, protect, and improve air quality and to control emissions to...
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