Codes of Ethics, Disciplinary Codes, and the Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Frameworks: Evidence from a Survey of Civil Servants in Poland

• Author: Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling,Kim Sass Mikkelsen
• DOI: 10.1177/0734371X20949420
• Published date: 01 March 2022
• Date: 01 March 2022
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0734371X20949420

Review of Public Personnel Administration

2022, Vol. 42(1) 142 –164

© The Author(s) 2020

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DOI: 10.1177/0734371X20949420

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Article

Codes of Ethics, Disciplinary

Codes, and the Effectiveness

of Anti-Corruption

Frameworks: Evidence

from a Survey of Civil

Servants in Poland

Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling1

and Kim Sass Mikkelsen2

Abstract

What is the effect of disciplinary codes and codes of ethics on containing corruption

in the civil service? We assess whether both tools are effective and whether they

interact to reinforce each other. Using a unique survey of central government civil

servants from Poland, we find that, where applied in practice, disciplinary and ethics

codes reinforce each other to contain kickbacks as one form of corruption in the

civil service. By contrast, disciplinary codes and codes of ethics on their own are

not strongly associated with kickbacks in central government ministries. The paper

concludes that anti-corruption tools work most effectively when managers have

multiple consistently implemented tools at their disposal.

Keywords

civil service, codes of ethics, disciplinary codes, anti-corruption frameworks, corruption,

Eastern Europe

Introduction

Since the Madrid summit in 1995, the European Union (EU) has included the develop-

ment of a professional, impartial administration with effective anti-corruption tools as

part of the administrative capacity criterion for countries wishing to join the EU.

1University of Nottingham, UK

2Roskilde University, Denmark

Corresponding Author:

Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling, Professor of Political Science, School of Politics and International Relations,

University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK.

Email: j.meyer-sahling@nottingham.ac.uk

949420ROPXXX10.1177/0734371X20949420Review of Public Personnel AdministrationMeyer-Sahling and Mikkelsen

research-article2020

Meyer-Sahling and Mikkelsen 143

Though the beginning of an EU guided anti-corruption framework was slow to develop

after 1995, disappointment with the performance of Bulgaria and Romania eventually

pushed the EU into action, attaching anti-corruption requirements to the distributions

of its funds (Vachudova, 2009). To this day, the EU continues to evaluate candidate

and potential candidate states in Eastern Europe, provide advice, and pose require-

ments in relation to the development of their anti-corruption frameworks.

However, too little is known about the effectiveness of these recommendations.

Indeed, we know little about whether or not anti-corruption frameworks lead to less

corruption and which types of frameworks are effective under which circumstances.

Existing studies tend to be case studies focused on how independent anti-corruption

agencies can reduce corruption in their countries (e.g., de Speville, 2010; Quah, 2010).

This approach, while valuable, is simultaneously too narrow and too broad.

Theoretically, the approach is too narrow in its focus on agencies rather than giving

due attention to the potential impact of other anti-corruption tools such as disciplinary

codes and codes of ethics, ethics training and ethical leadership. Empirically, the

agency approach is too broad in its focus on entire countries. Theories of how anti-

corruption tools work tend to take the individual as the unit of analysis, theorizing how

individuals behave rather than entire countries. Consequently, it is problematic to con-

duct empirical analyses at the country level without taking into account the micro-

foundations of how anti-corruption instruments work (Treisman, 2007, p. 222). As a

result, the conclusions of country level studies may be erroneous when tested at the

individual level (Gingerich, 2013).

In this article, we provide an explorative evaluation that addresses these limitations.

We contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we change the focus from organiza-

tionally independent anti-corruption agencies to two commonplace anti-corruption

tools that can be used in any public organization: disciplinary codes and codes of eth-

ics and examine how they affect civil servants’ experience with kickbacks as one form

of corruption in their work environment. Second, we provide an empirical analysis

using individual-level survey data of civil servants employed across central govern-

ment in one former communist country: Poland.

To understand how disciplinary codes and codes of ethics may help contain kick-

backs, we draw on a sizable literature on the consequences of these types of tools for

ethical decision-making, employee performance, and unethical behavior. We test to

what extent civil servants – when directly asked about their day-to-day experience at

the workplace – link the use of disciplinary and codes of ethics to preventing the pay-

ment of kickbacks in their work environment. This focus on a particular subtype of

corrupt behavior, while potentially a disadvantage for the generality of our conclu-

sions, is necessary for individual-level research, as it makes the issue concrete for

respondents.

When considering how anti-corruption tools work from an HRM perspective, dis-

ciplinary codes function by requiring compliance on the part of employees subject to

a threat of punishment. By contrast, codes of ethics act as guidelines that essentially

appeal to the better nature of employees (e.g., Meine & Dunn, 2013). In this article, we

examine how disciplinary codes and codes of ethics influence kickbacks in public