Civil Liberties

• Author: Milton R. Konvitz
• Published date: 01 May 1967
• Date: 01 May 1967
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/000271626737100103
• Subject Matter: Articles

38

Civil

Liberties

By

MILTON

R.

KONVITZ

Milton

R.

Konvitz,

J.D.,

Ph.D.,

Ithaca,

New

York,

is

Professor

of

Industrial

and

Labor

Relations

and

Professor

of

Law,

Cornell

University.

He

is

also

Director

(

since

1952

)

of

the

Liberian

Codification

Project.

He

is

a

member

of

the

National

Com-

mittee

of

the

American

Civil

Liberties

Union,

of

the

National

Lawyers

Committee

of

the

National

Association

for

the

Advancement

of

Colored

People,

of

the

Commission

on

Law

and

Social

Action

of

the

American

Jewish

Congress,

of

the

Board

of

Directors

of

the

Workers

Defense

League,

of

the

Board

of

Governors

and

of

the

Executive

Committee

of

the

Columbia

University

Center

for

Research

and

Education

in

American

Liberties,

and

one-time

member

of

the

New

York

State

Advisory

Commission

of

the

U.S.

Civil

Rights

Commission.

He

is

the

author

of

Expanding

Liberties:

Freedom’s

Gains

in

Postwar

America

(

1966

);

Fundamental

Liberties

of

a

Free

People

(

1957

);

Constitution

and

Civil

Rights

(

1947

);

Bill

of

Rights

Reader

(

1965

),

and

of

other

works.

He

was

a

member

of

the

Institute

for

Advanced

Study

and

Fellow

of

the

Center

for

Advanced

Study

in

the

Behavioral

Sciences,

and

a

Fellow

of

the

Ford

Foundation,

Guggenheim

Foundation,

and

Fund

for

the

Republic.

ABSTRACT:

Our

political

institutions

are

based

on

certain

moral

principles.

Some

are

stated

in

the

Constitution;

others,

unmentioned,

are

necessary

to

give

"breathing

space"

to

those

enumerated.

The

freedoms

expressly

stated

may

be

inter-

preted

as

expressions

of

even

more

fundamental

values.

And

the

Constitution

also

protects

the

traditions

and

collective

conscience

of

our

people.

However,

it is

not

enough

for

a

nation

to

profess

to

be

a

democracy.

Totalitarian

states

have

made

the

same

profession.

A

nation

must

look

at

the

facts

to

estimate

the

degree

to

which

it

lives

by

its

ideals.

We

have,

on

the

one

hand,

our

values,

and,

on

the

other,

a

con-

siderable

amount

of

data

which

show

how

inadequately

the

values

are

fulfilled.

There

is

an

unconscionable

lag

of

time

between

proof

of

malfunction

and

its

cure.

The

problem

is,

then,

to

get

the

guardians

of

our

goals

to

read

the

indicators.

There

are

enough

instances

of

honest

governmental

report-

ing

to

warrant

the

calculated

risks

of

relying

on

it.

We

also

have

private

watchdog

organizations

interested

in

civil

liber-

ties,

and

their

efficacy

is

shown

in

their

record.

Watchdogs

—like

the

presidential

veto—are

built

into

our

political

system,

and

independent

observers

of

our

national

scene

also

con-

tribute

to

raising

our

sights.

However,

there

still

remains

a

need

for

a

privately

financed

organization

for

research

into

civil

liberties.—Ed.

39

I N

his

recent

study

of

the

Hebrew

Scriptures,

Erich

Fromm

describes

one

of

the

functions

of

the

prophets

as

follows:

They

do

not

think

in

terms

of

individual

salvation

only,

but

believe

that

individual

salvation

is

bound

up

with

the

salvation

of

society.

Their

concern

is

with

the

establishment

of

a

society

governed

by

love,

justice

and

truth.

They

insist

that

politics

must

be

judged

by

moral

values,

and

that

the

function

of

political

life

is

the

realization

of

these

values.’

OUR

FUNDAMENTAL

VALUES,

GOALS

OR

PRESUPPOSITIONS

Today

it

is

doubtful

if,

in

the

light

of

our

experience

of

states,

governments,

and

nations,

we

can

accept,

without

serious

qualifications,

the

prophetic

be-

lief

&dquo;that

politics

must

be

judged

by

moral

values,

and

that

the

function

of

political

life

is

the

realization

of

these

[moral]

values.&dquo;

We

would

be

much

more

inclined

to

agree

with

Reinhold

Niebuhr,

whose

political

realism

clearly

recognizes

and

accommodates

itself

to

the

limits

of

morality

in

political

life

and

accepts

the

fact

that

political

realities

are

power

realities

and

that

power

must

be

countered

by

power;

that

self-interest

is

the

primary

datum

in

the

actions

of

all

groups

and

nations.2

But

this

extreme

statement

also

needs

qualifications.

For

politics

and

morals

are

not

altogether

separate.

There

is

room

for

the

moral

judgment

of

po-

litical

action,

provided

that

the

moral

principles

are

not

kept

and

used

as

pure

abstractions;

provided

that

our

judg-

ment

takes

into

account

the

indescrib-

able

complexities

of

social

life;

pro-

vided

that

our

thinking

is

far

removed

from

utopian

commitments

and

fanatic

claims;

provided,

in

a

word,

that

our

judgment

proceeds

from

humility

in

the

face

of

the

complexity

of

forces,

recog-

nition

of

the

small

role

left

for

creative

action,

and

obligation

to

try

to

accom-

modate

and

harmonize

competing

values.

These

considerations

make

the

moral

judgment

harder

than

was,

I

suspect,

apparent

to

the

prophets

of

the

Hebrew

Scriptures,

or

to

Jesus

when

he

preached

the

Beatitudes;

but

when

hedged

in

these

ways,

the

moral

judgment

is

in-

separable

from

political

action

that

is

more

than

naked

tribalism

or

a

front

for

the

narrowest

form

of

selfishness.3

3

With

these

qualifications,

the

moral

judgment

may

even

be

said

to

be

basic

in

the

sense

that

it

is

the

indispensable

condition

for

the

social

life

of

man-

who

is,

we

assume,

in

his

social

char-

acter

more

than

a

social

insect.4

4

In

one

of

his

many

attempts

to

trans-

late

biblical

insights

and

ideas

into

mod-

ern

conceptions,

Niebuhr

has

said

that

the

first

problem,

in

the

creation

of

com-

munity

and

the

establishment

of

justice,

is

the

recognition

of

the

following

three

presuppositions:

(1)

Recognition

must

be

given

to

the

dignity

of

man

which

assures

that

in

the

ultimate

instance

he

is

regarded

as

an

end

in

himself

and

not

merely

as

an

instrument

in

a

social

or

political

process....

(2)

The

law

of

love

must

be

presup-

posed

as

the

law

of

human

existence.

(3)

At

the

same

time

the

perennial

force

of

self-love

and

self-interest

must

be

taken

for

granted.5

1

Erich

Fromm,

You

Shall

Be

as

Gods:

A

Radical

Interpretation

of

the

Old

Testament

and

Its

Tradition

(New

York:

Holt,

Rinehart

and

Winston,

1966),

pp.

117-118.

2

Gordon

Harland,

The

Thought

of

Reinhold

Niebuhr

(New

York:

Oxford

University

Press,

1960),

p.

180.

3

Cf.

Reinhold

Niebuhr

"Moralists

and

Politics,"

in

Neibuhr’s

Essays

in

Applied

Christianity,

ed.

D.

B.

Robertson

(New

York:

Meridian

Books,

1959),

p.

78.

4

Sidney

Hook,

Political

Power

and

Per-

sonal

Freedom

(New

York:

S.

G.

Phillips,

1959),

p.

94.

5

Reinhold

Niebuhr,

"The

Cultural

Crisis

of

Our

Age,"

Harvard

Business

Review

(Jan-

uary-February

1954),

p.

33,

at

p.

36.