Chapter 5 - §3. Evidence subject to exclusion for involuntariness

• Jurisdiction: United States

§3. Evidence subject to exclusion for involuntariness

§3.1. Exclusion of statement. A defendant's involuntary statement cannot be used against the defendant in a criminal case for any purpose. Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 398; People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 492; People v. Sanchez (2019) 7 Cal.5th 14, 50; People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1094, disapproved on other grounds, People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76; People v. Vasila (1st Dist.1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 865, 873. Thus, it cannot be used in the prosecution's case-in-chief, for impeachment, or for rebuttal. See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 398; Guerra, 37 Cal.4th at 1094; Vasila, 38 Cal.App.4th at 873.

§3.2. Exclusion of evidence derived from statement. Generally, evidence that the police derive from a defendant's involuntary statement is presumed to be tainted and must be suppressed. People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 359; see People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 108-09; People v. Vasila (1st Dist.1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 865, 873; cf. Harrison v. U.S. (1968) 392 U.S. 219, 222 (D's admissions at trial were tainted "fruit" because admissions were motivated by earlier introduction of D's unlawful confession). To rebut this presumption, the prosecution must demonstrate a sufficient break in the causal chain between the involuntary statement and the later statement so...