Chapter 3 - § 3.6 • DISMISSAL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL

• Jurisdiction: Colorado

§ 3.6 • DISMISSAL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL

§ 3.6.1—Summary of the Constitutional Right to a Speedy Trial

A defendant has a constitutional right to a speedy trial under both the federal and state constitutions. U.S. Const., Amend. VI; Colo. Const., art. II, § 16. No specific time period attaches to the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Instead, the courts look at four basic factors in determining whether the constitutional right has been violated: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the degree to which the defendant has asserted a claim for a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355 (Colo. 1993).

Although the statutory right to speedy disposition of criminal charges derives from the federal and state constitutions, and is "intended to render these constitutional guarantees more effective," Simakis v. District Court, 577 P.2d 3, 4 (Colo. 1978), "compliance with the statutory requirements does not automatically satisfy constitutional demands." Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355, 1362 (Colo. 1993). If the constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated, the charges against the defendant must be dismissed with prejudice and may not be re-filed.

The U.S. Constitution and the Colorado Constitution contain virtually identical speedy trial provisions. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. . . ." Section 16 of Article II of the Colorado Constitution provides in relevant part: "In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to . . . a speedy public trial. . . ." The analysis under the U.S. Constitution and the Colorado Constitution is the same. Lucero v. People, 476 P.2d 257 (Colo. 1970); Falgout v. People, 459 P.2d 572 (Colo. 1969). In Lucero, the Colorado Supreme Court held, "it is our position that Colorado constitution, art. II, § 16, is congruent with the United States Constitution, amendment VI." Lucero, 476 P.2d at 259.

A defendant who believes his or her constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated must raise the issue prior to the commencement of trial. Keller v. People, 387 P.2d 421 (Colo. 1963). Failure to raise an objection prior to the commencement of trial constitutes a waiver of the constitutional right to speedy trial. Id. at 425; Valdez v. People, 483 P.2d 1333 (Colo. 1971). It is the defendant's burden to establish that his or her constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. Falgout v. People, 459 P.2d 572, 577 (Colo. 1969); Gelfand v. People, 586 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Colo. 1978); Casias v. People, 415 P.2d 344, 347 (Colo. 1966).

Unlike the statutory right to speedy trial, which begins to run on the date the defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the period for a defendant's constitutional speedy trial right may start to run from the date the defendant falls into the status of "an accused." A defendant has been "accused," and his or her constitutional right to a speedy trial attaches, once the defendant is formally accused by a charging document such as a criminal complaint. People v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 943, 951 (Colo. 1982).

The constitutional right to a speedy trial has no set time period within which a trial must occur. People v. O'Neill, 523 P.2d 123 (Colo. 1976). Accordingly, the determination...