Chapter 20 - § 20.4 • TIMING OF THE APPEAL

• Jurisdiction: Colorado

§ 20.4 • TIMING OF THE APPEAL

The CRUAA expressly provides appeals under the arbitration statutes are taken in the same manner as any other appeal.⁶² Appeals under the FAA are also taken in the same manner as any other appeal, although there is no express provision to that effect.

These jurisdictional and timing issues were explained in Blue Sky Group LLC v. Redcon Homes, Inc.⁶³ Blue Sky and Redcon entered into an asset purchase agreement with an arbitration clause. Disputes arose, and Blue Sky filed a motion to compel Redcon and its president and principal shareholder, Stang, to arbitrate.

On October 24, 2004, both defendants filed a motion to stay the arbitration on the ground that Stang was not subject to the arbitration agreement. A January 2005 order compelled Blue Sky and Redcon to arbitrate, but held that Stang individually was not a party to the arbitration agreement. The Colorado Court of Appeals noted that the order denying the motion to compel Stang to arbitrate was appealable through interlocutory appeal under C.R.S. § 13-22-228. However, as no appeal was taken within 45 days as prescribed by C.A.R. 4(a), the right was lost. The court noted, however, that upon final judgment entering, the order denying the motion to compel Stang to arbitrate was appealable.

Blue Sky and Redcon proceeded to arbitration. However, Blue Sky asserted claims against Stang. Stang again filed a motion to stay arbitration on the ground that the court previously determined those issues not within the scope of the arbitration agreement. Blue Sky acknowledged that the court's January order concluded that the arbitration did not involve Stang personally, and Stang was not subject to the arbitration agreement. However, Blue Sky asked the court to pierce the corporate veil and allow it to arbitrate its claims against Stang individually.

In June 2005, the trial court granted Stang's motion to stay arbitration as against Stang individually, saying that the alter ego theory against Stang was simply an attempt to circumvent the January 2005 order.

Blue Sky appealed, saying the trial court erred in enjoining the arbitration against Stang individually because its corporate veil piercing claims (Stang liable for acts of Redcon) were within the scope of the arbitration.

The court held that it had jurisdiction over the June 2005 order but lacked jurisdiction to consider Blue Sky's appeal to the extent that Blue Sky, in fact, was challenging the merits of the January 2005 order. As...