§19.6 Analysis

JurisdictionWashington

§19.6ANALYSIS

Courts tend to construe CR 19 in different ways depending on the nature of the case and the relationship of the parties. The goal, however, is to render complete relief by evaluating the parties and subj ect matter of the case according to the directives of CR 19(a). As described below, Washington courts engage in a two-part inquiry under CR 19. Burt v. Wash. State Dep't of Corn, 168 Wn.2d 828, 833, 231 P.3d 191 (2010).

(1)Joinder of parties needed for just adjudication

The first step in a CR 19 analysis is to determine whether a party is needed for just adjudication. This entails determining whether an absent party should be joined and can be joined. Burt, 168Wn.2dat833.

(a)Determination of parties needed for just adjudication

Under CR 19(a), there are three grounds on which a court may determine that a party is needed for a just adjudication. The first is where the court cannot accord "complete relief to the parties already before the court in the absence of the nonjoined party. CR 19(a)(1). Unlike the latter two grounds for determining that a party is needed for a just adjudication, this prong does not require that the absent party claim any interest relating to the subject of the action. It is rare, however, for a court to rely on the "complete relief prong alone in determining that a party is needed for a just adjudication. The second ground on which the court may find a party necessary for a just adjudication is when the absent party claims an interest in the subject of the action and it may "impair or impede" the absent party's ability to protect that party's interest if the court proceeds with the action. CR 19(a)(2)(A). Under this prong, it is prejudice to the absent party that leads to the conclusion that the party is needed for a just adjudication. The third ground on which the court may find a party necessary for a just adjudication is when the absent party claims an interest in the subject of the action and it may expose an existing party, usually a defendant, to a risk of "double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations" if the court proceeds with the action. CR 19(a)(2)(B). Under this prong, it is prejudice to an existing party that leads to the conclusion that an absent party is needed for a just adjudication.

Under CR 19(a)(2), the court will find that a party is needed for a just adjudication if nonjoinder "may" either impair or impede an absent party's ability to protect its interest or expose an existing party to inconsistent obligations. The Washington Supreme Court has held that the use of the term "may" suggests a "low standard" based on the "possibility" of prejudice for determining that an absent party is needed for a just adjudication. Burt, 168 Wn.2d at 833. This "low" standard applies only to determinations of whether a party is needed for a just adjudication under CR 19(a); it does not apply when the court determines, as described below, whether it should proceed with or dismiss an action because a party needed for a just adjudication cannot be joined. The considerations of CR 19(a) are analogous to the grounds for intervention by a nonparty under CR 24. In Estate of Bunch v. McGraw Residential Ctr, 11A Wn.2d 425, 437, 275 P.3d 1119 (2012), the court held that a nonparty's qualifying as a necessary party under CR 19(a) supported the nonparty's right to intervene as a party in the action.

Not all interests are sufficient to qualify a person for inclusion in the suit pursuant to CR 19(a). "[PJersons are not necessary parties even if they are involved in the subject matter of litigation if no recovery is sought against them and judgment would not prejudice their interests." Serres v. Wash. Dep't of Ret. Sys., 163 Wn.App. 569, 588, 261 P.3d 173 (2011), review denied, 173 Wn.2d 1014 (2012). For example, the jury's need to consider an absent party's market share in evaluating the defendant's liability in a product liability case did not require joinder in the suit. Boys v. Abbott Labs., 122 F.R.D. 583 (W.D. Wash. 1988). Likewise, contract vendors, mortgagees, and beneficiaries under deeds of trust were not indispensable parties in an action seeking judicial review of a zoning action when the property owners and developers were capable of representing the absent parties' interests. Cathcart-Maltby- Clearview Cmty. Council v. Snohomish Cnty., 96 Wn.2d 201, 634 P.2d 853 (1981); see also In re Guardianship of Grant, 109 Wn.2d 545, 569, 747 P.2d 445, amended, 757 P.2d 534 (1988)(state waived right to joinder by agreeing to be bound in case in which state's interest was litigated by others). Parties who have no claim cannot be necessary parties. Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 638-39 (9th Cir. 1988).

The standard for determining that a party is a necessary party when that party claims an interest relating to the subject of the action under CR 19(a)(2)(A) aligns with the standard for permitting intervention of right under CR 24(a)(2). However, "[j]ust because a person may be a proper party with a right to intervene does not make that person a party who must be joined as a defendant." Crosby v. Cnty. of Spokane, 137 Wn.2d 296, 304-05, 971 P.2d 32 (1999).

(b)Feasibility of joinder

If an absent party is necessary for just adjudication under CR 19(a)(1), CR 19(a)(2)(A), or CR 19(a)(2)(B), the party "shall be joined" by the court if feasible. CR 19(a); Burt, 168 Wn.2d at 834.

If a necessary party refuses to join as a plaintiff, he or she must be joined as a defendant, subject to realignment as appropriate. A defendant thus joined may object on the ground of improper venue. Old Nat'l Bank of Wash. v. Rainier Bancorp., 18 Wn.App. 353, 357, 567 P.2d 695 (1977). If a defendant joined under CR 19(a) validly objects to venue, the court may proceed to determine whether the action should proceed or be dismissed under CR 19(b). But dismissal will rarely be appropriate in Washington because RCW 4.12.025 provides that venue will lie wherever any one of multiple defendants resides and because Washington statutes permit the court to change the place of the trial. RCW 4.12.030.

In limited circumstances, an absent necessary plaintiff who is beyond the court's jurisdiction may be joined under the "involuntary plaintiff doctrine. E.g., Hill v. Cox, 110 Wn.App. 394,410,41P.3d495, review denied, 14 Wn.2d 1024 (2002); Babcock v. Maple Leaf Inc., 424 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). Such action is limited to cases in which the absent party is under a duty or obligation to permit use of his or her name as a plaintiff. For example, if an absent party is a patent owner, and the exclusive licensee under the patent is being damaged because of infringements, the exclusive licensee may name the absent owner as an involuntary plaintiff if the owner refuses to join the action upon request. See Indep. Wireless Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 269 U.S. 459, 46 S. Ct. 166, 70 L. Ed. 357 (1926). In such circumstances, the involuntary plaintiff need not consent to joinder. See Inland-W Inv. Co. v. Winkler Realty Corp., 65 F.R.D. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).

In some cases, however, joinder may not be feasible. In these cases, the court will proceed to CR 19(b) and determine whether it should proceed with or dismiss the action. Joinder may be found to be impossible due to actions of the plaintiff.

Coastal Building Corp. v. City of Seattle, 65 Wn.App. 1, 6, 828 P.2d 7, review denied, 119 Wn.2d 1024 (1992). A property owner...

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