Chapter 18 - § 18.2 • RESOURCES FOR INTERVENTION

• Jurisdiction: Colorado

§ 18.2 • RESOURCES FOR INTERVENTION

For years, many Colorado courts have appointed parenting coordinators in family law cases. Until 2005, there was no statute that established or defined the role of a parenting coordinator, which resulted in a lack of uniformity or agreement as to what this role entailed. That year, a statute was enacted providing a framework for professional intervention in family law cases that includes parenting coordinators, domestic relations decision-makers, and arbitrators.

The driving goal was a desire to provide resources for intervention and assistance to parties in high-conflict cases and a desire that these parties will not be forced to resort to formal court proceedings to resolve every single dispute or disagreement that arises.

The statute is structured to provide three differing levels of intervention in a high-conflict case (from the lowest level of intervention to the highest). This allows an individualized approach to each case.

§ 18.2.1—Parenting Coordinator

The first level of intervention is set forth in C.R.S. § 14-10-128.1, which creates the "parenting coordinator." C.R.S. § 14-10-128.1; for further discussion of parenting coordinators, see Coates, "A Brief Overview of Parenting Coordination," 38 Colo. Law. 61 (July 2009). The parenting coordinator is defined as a neutral third party who assists in the resolution of disputes between the parties concerning parental responsibilities, including but not limited to implementation of court-ordered parenting plans. The parenting coordinator must be an individual with appropriate training and qualifications, and must have a perspective acceptable to the court. C.R.S. § 14-10-128.1(1). This criterion is intentionally vague in recognition of the fact that there are differing levels of resources for parenting coordinators in different parts of the state. This language allows courts discretion in choosing a parenting coordinator.

A parenting coordinator can be appointed at any time after the entry of an order regarding parental responsibilities by agreement of the parties, the request of one party, or the court on its own motion. Id. However, in the absence of an agreement by the parties, to appoint a parenting coordinator the court must make findings that the parties have failed to adequately implement their parenting plan, and that mediation is inappropriate or has been unsuccessful. The court must consider the effect of any documented evidence of domestic violence on the parties' ability to engage in parenting coordination, C.R.S. § 14-10-128(2), though the Colorado Court of Appeals found in a 2008 case, In re Marriage of Rozzi, 190 P.3d 815 (Colo. App. 2008), that domestic violence alone does not deprive a trial court of the authority to appoint a parenting coordinator. The question has been raised as to whether a parenting coordinator can be appointed at permanent orders if there is an existing order for a temporary parenting plan. The statute is silent on this issue, but the argument seemingly could be made.

The parenting coordinator, like the CFI, must disclose any familial, financial, or social relationship with the parties, attorneys, or judicial officer. The duties of the parenting coordinator are noted in the statute. Such duties include, but are not limited to, (1) assisting the parties in creating agreed-upon, structured guidelines for implementing their parenting plan; (2) developing guidelines for communication between the parties; (3) suggesting resources for the parties in learning communication skills; (4) informing the parties of resources for developing improved parenting skills; (5) assisting the parties in realistically identifying the sources and causes of conflict between them; and (6) assisting the parties in developing parenting strategies to minimize conflict. C.R.S. § 14-10-128.1(3). However, a parenting coordinator appointed pursuant to C.R.S. § 14-10-128.1 cannot impose decisions upon the parties or resolve disputes that the parties are unable to resolve. In re Marriage of Dauwe, 148...