§ 12.7 Standard of Review Applied to Specific Rulings: Civil Cases
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§12.7 STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLIED TO SPECIFIC RULINGS: CIVIL CASES
This section discusses the standards of review applicable to various rulings in civil cases.
(1) Pretrial rulings
The appellate courts have reviewed the following pretrial rulings under the abuse of discretion standard of review:
Dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Sales v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 163 Wn.2d 14, 19, 177 P.3d 1122 (2008); Myers v. Boeing Co., 115 Wn.2d 123, 128, 794 P.2d 1272 (1990); Lisby v. PACCAR, Inc., 178 Wn. App. 516, 521, 316 P.3d 1097 (2013).
Motions to amend a complaint or file a supplemental complaint under CR 15. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bonet, 144 Wn.2d 502, 509-10, 29 P.3d 1242 (2001); Herron v. Tribune Pub. Co., Inc., 108 Wn.2d 162, 165, 736 P.2d 249 (1987) (listing factors); Wallace v. Lewis County, 134 Wn. App. 1, 25, 137 P.3d 101 (2006) ("Refusing to grant leave to amend without stated reasons or where the reasons are not readily apparent may be an abuse of discretion.").
Although a trial court's decision not to allow a party to amend its complaint is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion, when the ruling is based on the court's determination of the law, it is reviewed de novo. State ex rel. Evergreen Freedom Found. v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 111 Wn. App. 586, 605, 49 P.3d 894 (2002) (reviewing de novo denial of amendment based on priority of action legal doctrine (citing Wilson v. Horsley, 137 Wn.2d 500, 505, 974 P.2d 316 (1999), and Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wn.2d 299, 339, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993))), review denied, 148 Wn.2d 1020 (2003). The issue of whether the requirements of CR 15(c) have been met for an amendment of a complaint that adds a new party to relate back to the date the complaint was originally filed is also reviewed de novo. Martin v. Dematic, 182 Wn.2d 281, 288, 340 P.3d 834 (2014).
Discovery rulings and sanctions. Trial court discovery rulings are ordinarily reviewed for abuse of discretion, Ameriquest Mortg. Co. v. Office of Atty. Gen., 177 Wn.2d 467, 478, 300 P.3d 799 (2013) (affirming order compelling production of e-mails), but when such rulings involve issues of law, such as interpretation of statutes or judicial decisions, they are subject to de novo review, Fellows v. Moynihan, 175 Wn.2d 641, 649, 285 P.3d 864 (2012) (reversing order denying discovery of files on grounds of statutory privilege). Whether a privilege against discovery has been waived is also reviewed de novo. Lodis v. Corbis Holdings, Inc., 172 Wn. App. 835, 854, 292 P.3d 779 (2013). Trial court rulings on motions for sanctions for discovery violations are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Magana v. Hyundai Motor Am., 167 Wn.2d 570, 582, 220 P.3d 191 (2009) (affirming striking of pleadings and default judgment as discovery sanction); Mayer v. Sto Indus., Inc., 156 Wn.2d 677, 684-90, 132 P.3d 115 (2006) (affirming monetary discovery sanctions); Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance, 131 Wn.2d 484, 506, 933 P.2d 1036 (1997) (reversing dismissal of plaintiff's corporate negligence claim as discovery sanction); Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wn.2d at 338-39 (reversing trial court's denial of monetary sanctions for discovery violations); Taylor v. Cessna Aircraft Co., Inc., 39 Wn. App. 828, 696 P.2d 28 (noting that trial court's discretion in imposing sanctions is not unbridled and "[i]mposition of unduly light sanctions will only encourage litigants to employ tactics of evasion and delay, in contravention of the spirit and letter of the discovery rules"), review denied, 103 Wn.2d 1040 (1985). See also §12.7(19), below.
Decisions on motions for class certification. Schnall v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 171 Wn.2d 260, 266, 259 P.3d 129 (2011). See also Miller v. Farmer Bros., 115 Wn. App. 815, 820-21, 64 P.3d 49 (2003), for a discussion of the parameters of a trial court's exercise of discretion in deciding whether to certify a class.
Decisions denying motions for recusal of judge. Tatham v. Rogers, 170 Wn. App. 76, 87, 283 P.3d 583 (2012).
The appellate courts consider the following pretrial rulings to be matters of law subject to de novo review:
Arbitrability. Grandee v. LDL Freedom Enters., Inc., 176 Wn.2d 598, 602, 293 P.3d 1197 (2013); Mount Adams Sch. Dist. v. Cook, 113 Wn. App. 472, 477, 54 P.3d 1213 (2002), rev'd on other grounds, 150 Wn.2d 716, 81 P.3d 111 (2003); Mendez v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 111 Wn. App. 446, 453, 45 P.3d 594 (2002); Stein v. Geonerco, Inc., 105 Wn. App. 41, 45, 17 P.3d 1266 (2001).
Dismissal under CR 12(b)(6) or CR 12(c). In re Parentage of C.M.F., 179 Wn.2d 411, 418, 314 P.3d 1109 (2013); Tenore v. AT&T Wireless Servs., 136 Wn.2d 322, 329-30, 962 P.2d 104 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1171 (1999); Cutler v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 124 Wn.2d 749, 755, 881 P.2d 216 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1169 (1995); M.H. v. Corp. of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 162 Wn. App. 183, 189, 252 P.3d 914, review denied, 173 Wn.2d 1006 (2011). For purposes of review, all facts pleaded by plaintiff are accepted as true, as well as any hypothetical facts that might sustain the claim for relief. See Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 142 Wn.2d 68, 122-23, 11 P.3d 726 (2000); Tenore, 136 Wn.2d at 330; Haberman v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 109 Wn.2d 107, 120, 744 P.2d 1032 (1987), 750 P.2d 254 (1988); M.H., 162 Wn. App. at 189. CR 12(b)(6) and CR 12(c) motions "should be granted 'sparingly and with care,' and only in the unusual case in which the plaintiff's allegations show on the face of the complaint an insuperable bar to relief.'" San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax, 160 Wn.2d 141, 164, 157 P.3d 831 (2007) (CR 12(b)(6)) (quoting Tenore, 136 Wn.2d at 330, and Hoffer v. State, 110 Wn.2d 415, 420, 755 P.2d 781 (1988)); accord, M.H., 162 Wn. App. at 189 (CR 12(c). "Dismissal under CR 12(b)(6) is only appropriate if 'it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that no facts exist that would justify recovery.'" In re Parentage of C.M.F., 179 Wn.2d at 418 (quoting Cutler, 124 Wn.2d at 755).
When matters outside the pleadings have been considered by the trial court on a CR 12(b)(6) motion, the appellate court treats the motion as a motion for summary judgment and applies the same standard of review that applies to a summary judgment motion under CR 56. Granville Condo Homeowners Ass'n v. Kuehner, 177 Wn. App. 543, 550-51, 312 P.3d 702 (2013); Suleiman v. Lasher, 48 Wn. App. 373, 376, 739 P.2d 712, review denied, 109 Wn.2d 1005 (1987); see CR 12(c).
(2) Summary judgment
The appellate courts review summary judgment decisions de novo, engaging in the same inquiry as the trial court, to determine if the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law and if there is any genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial. Int'l Marine Underwriters v. ABCD Marine, LLC, 179 Wn.2d 274, 281, 313 P.3d 395 (2013); Michak v. Transnation Title Ins. Co., 148 Wn.2d 788, 794-95, 64 P.3d 22 (2003). A trial court's factual findings are superfluous on summary judgment and are entitled to no weight. Chelan Cnty. Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n v. Chelan County, 109 Wn.2d 282, 294 n.6, 745 P.2d 1 (1987). All facts, and reasonable inferences therefrom, must be viewed most favorably to the party resisting the motion, and summary judgment is properly granted only "if reasonable minds could reach only one conclusion from the evidence presented." Bostain v. Food Express, Inc., 159 Wn.2d 700, 708, 153 P.3d 846, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1040 (2007); Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wn.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982). Even if the facts are undisputed, if reasonable minds could draw different conclusions, summary judgment is improper. Chelan Cnty. Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n, 109 Wn.2d at 295. If, however, the nonmoving party does not come forward with evidence sufficient to establish each of the elements of his or her claim that are put into issue by the moving party's opening papers, summary judgment is properly granted. Young v. Key Pharms., Inc., 112 Wn.2d 216, 225, 770 P.2d 182 (1989). An order granting summary judgment may be affirmed on any legal basis supported by the record. LaMon v. Butler, 112 Wn.2d 193, 200-01, 770 P.2d 1027, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989); Hadley v. Cowan, 60 Wn. App. 433, 444, 804 P.2d 1271 (1991).
'"[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must apply the standard of proof which will apply at trial.'" Burton v. Twin Commander Aircraft, LLC, 171 Wn.2d 204, 223 n.8, 254 P.3d 778 (2011) (quoting Gossett v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 133 Wn.2d 954, 973, 948 P.2d 1264 (1997)). That is true in defamation cases, Momah v. Bharti, 144 Wn. App. 731, 742, 182 P.3d 455 (2008), review granted, 165 Wn.2d 1027, review dismissed per stipulation (2009); Alpine Indus. Computers, Inc. v. Cowles Publ'g Co., 114 Wn. App. 371, 388-89, 57 P.3d 1178 (2002), amended, 64 P.3d 49 (2003); Wood v. Battle Ground Sch. Dist., 107 Wn. App. 550, 568, 27 P.3d 1208 (2001); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255-56, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).Although a private individual bringing a defamation action must merely prove negligence by a preponderance of the evidence, a public official must prove actual malice, i.e., knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth or falsity, by clear and convincing evidence. Momah, 144 Wn. App. at 739-40; Wood, 107 Wn. App. at 568; see also Richmond v. Thompson, 130 Wn.2d 368, 385-86, 922 P.2d 1343 (1996) (the "clear and convincing" standard of proof applies only to actual malice element of claim). It is also true in other types of cases. See, e.g., Adams v. Allen, 56 Wn. App. 383, 393, 783 P.2d 635 (1989) (elements of fraud must be proven by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence; evidence insufficient to withstand summary judgment), overruled on other grounds by Caughell v. Grp. Health Co-op. of Puget...
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