§ 12.5 Procedural Decisions and Equitable Determinations Are Generally Reviewed for Abuse of Discretion

• Jurisdiction: Washington

§12.5 PROCEDURAL DECISIONS AND EQUITABLE DETERMINATIONS ARE GENERALLY REVIEWED FOR ABUSE OF DISCRETION

Many trial court decisions do not involve legal issues or factual determinations, but instead involve procedural points or equitable determinations that will be reviewed for an "abuse of discretion."

An abuse of discretion standard often is appropriate when (1) the trial court is generally in a better position than the appellate court to make a given determination; (2) a determination is fact intensive and involves numerous factors to be weighed on a case-by-case basis; (3) the trial court has more experience making a given type of determination and a greater understanding of the issues involved; (4) the determination is one for which "no rule of general applicability could be effectively constructed"; and/or (5) there is a strong interest in finality and avoiding appeals.

State v. Sisouvanh, 175 Wn.2d 607, 621-22, 290 P.3d 942 (2012) (citations omitted).

Underlying the abuse of discretion standard is the premise that there is an acceptable range of decisions trial judges may make in particular situations, and the appellate court will not reverse decisions that fall within that acceptable range even though the appellate judges personally might have reached a different result. Such trial court decisions will be reversed only if they fall outside the acceptable range of possible decisions. "Affording discretion to a trial court allows the trial court to operate within a 'range of acceptable choices,'" but "appellate courts retain the authority to clarify and refine the outer bounds of the trial court's acceptable range of choices and, in particular to identify appropriate legal standards." Sisouvanh, 175 Wn.2d at 623 (quoting State v. Rohrich, 149 Wn.2d 647, 654, 71 P.3d 638 (2003)).

The appellate courts' characterization of what constitutes an abuse of discretion varies. The courts have sometimes stated that discretion is abused only when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. See, e.g., State v. Wooten, 178 Wn.2d 890, 897, 312 P.3d 41 (2013); Griggs v. Averbeck Realty, Inc., 92 Wn.2d 576, 584, 599 P.2d 1289 (1979). The "no reasonable person" test for determining what constitutes an abuse of discretion provides little opportunity at either the trial or appellate level for setting out the proper reasoning behind a discretionary decision. When the appellate court disagrees with the trial court, the appellate court's reversal has unnecessarily pejorative overtones, for a reversal under the "no reasonable person" standard by its terms implies that the trial judge is not a reasonable person. See Coggle v. Snow, 56 Wn. App. 499, 506-07, 784 P.2d 554 (1990) (disapproving the "no reasonable person" test); City of Benton City v. Adrian, 50 Wn. App. 330, 338-39, 748 P.2d 679 (1988) (rejecting the "no reasonable person" standard in reviewing injunctive relief).

Although some appellate courts continue to recite the "no reasonable person" test, the more common articulation of the "abuse of discretion" standard is that announced in State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971) ("Where the decision or order of the trial court is a matter of discretion, it will not be disturbed on review except on a clear showing of abuse of discretion, that is, discretion manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons."); see also Moreman v. Butcher, 126 Wn.2d 36, 40, 891 P.2d 725 (1995). Other appellate courts have combined the "no reasonable person" and Junker tests, such that:

Under an...