Chandler v. James: Welcoming Student Prayer Back in the Schoolhouse Gate - Sarah Beth Mabery

• Publication year: 2000

Chandler v. James: Welcoming Student Prayer Back in the Schoolhouse Gate

In Chandler v. James,¹ the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's order permanently enjoining enforcement of an Alabama statute that permitted student-initiated religious speech in public schools.² The court of appeals concluded that permitting student-initiated religious speech did not violate the Establishment Clause and such speech is protected by the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment.³

I. Factual Background

In 1993 the Alabama Legislature enacted a statute that stated, in pertinent part, "On public school, other public, or other property, non-sectarian, non-proselytizing student-initiated voluntary prayer, invocations and/or benedictions, shall be permitted during compulsory or non-compulsory school-related student assemblies, school-related student sporting events, school-related graduation or commencement ceremonies, and other school-related student events."⁴ In 1996, Michael Chandler, a DeKalb County school vice principal, and his son, a DeKalb County student, challenged the facial validity of the statute and the application of it in DeKalb County schools. Named as defendants were the Governor of Alabama, the State Superintendent of Education, the members of the State Board of Education, and the DeKalb County and City of Talladega Superintendents and Boards of Education. The District Court for the Middle District of Alabama granted partial summary judgment for plaintiff in March 1997, holding the statute to be facially unconstitutional. The district court permanently enjoined DeKalb County from enforcing the statute. The permanent injunction prohibited defendants from permitting all but private student prayer. In November the district court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order, which stated that defendants unconstitutionally organized or sponsored religious activities. The court also granted plaintiffs summary judgment on the claim that the statute was applied unconstitutionally and appointed a monitor to oversee enforcement of the injunction. All defendants appealed; although, the Governor only appealed on the ground that the First Amendment's Establishment Clause does not apply to the states. The remaining defendants appealed regarding whether the district court could require them to prohibit nonprivate student-initiated prayer.⁵ The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the court erred in permanently enjoining DeKalb County from permitting student-initiated prayer and remanded the case.⁶

II. Legal Background

The constitutionality of the district court's permanent injunction prohibiting DeKalb County from permitting student-initiated religious speech that is not purely private depends upon the distinction the United States Supreme Court has made between private and government action. Also important to the disposition of this issue are the rights of students within the school setting.

The First Amendment provides, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech."⁷ The Fourteenth Amendment made the First Amendment applicable to the states.⁸

The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of prayer in school in Engel v. Vitale.⁹ The Court concluded that the use in classrooms of a prayer written by government officials as part of a program to promote religious activities violated the "constitutional wall of separation between Church and State" because the state and federal government lack the power to designate an official prayer.¹⁰ Likewise, in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp,¹¹ the Court struck down as unconstitutional statutes requiring a reading from the Bible, without comment on the reading, at the beginning of each school day.¹² This was because the state and federal government cannot pass laws that '"aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.'"¹³ According to the Court, the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses mandate governmental neutrality with regard to religion.¹⁴

A. The Establishment Clause

In these first two school prayer cases, the Court addressed the issue of a state imposing religious activity on school children, and in the subsequent cases to be discussed, the Court addressed the issue of private actors. In Widmar v. Vincent,¹⁵ the Court decided whether state actors can prohibit private speakers from using university facilities for religious speech.¹⁶ The Court concluded that by providing the university's facilities to registered student organizations, the university created an open forum and must justify exclusion of religious clubs under applicable constitutional norms.¹⁷ By prohibiting religious clubs from using its facilities, the university imposed a content-based exclusion that could only be sustained by showing that the exclusion was necessary to serve a compelling state interest and was narrowly drawn.¹⁸ The university asserted compliance with the Establishment Clause as its compelling interest.¹⁹ While agreeing that compliance with the Establishment Clause is a compelling interest, the Court did not find that the "equal access" policy necessarily conflicted with the

Establishment Clause.²⁰ In concluding that an open forum policy that was nondiscriminatory toward religious speech would provide religion with only incidental benefits, the Court held that an open forum does not confer "any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices."²¹ The Court was also persuaded by the fact that the open forum is available to religious as well as nonreligious speakers, and the Establishment Clause does not prohibit extending general benefits to religious groups.²² However, this does not mean that the university could not establish reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.²³

Following Widmar, in 1984 Congress adopted the Equal Access Act (the "EAA")²⁴ requiring "equal access" policies in public secondary schools under certain circumstances and in compliance with specific guidelines.²⁵ The EAA provides:

It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Federal financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal access or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a meeting within that limited open forum on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at such meetings.²⁶

In addition to requiring equal access policies, the EAA delineates certain criteria for offering a fair opportunity, including the following: that meetings be student initiated and voluntary; that the school, government, or its agents or employees do not sponsor meetings; and that agents or employees of the school or government only attend religious meetings in a "nonparticipatory capacity."²⁷ The EAA further prohibits the states or their political subdivisions from requiring participation in religious activities or from influencing content or form of any religious activities.²⁸ By enacting these provisions Congress sought to clearly distinguish between activities initiated and controlled by students and those initiated and controlled by the school or government: The former is permitted while the latter is prohibited.

In 1989 the Court interpreted the EAA and ruled on its constitutionality in Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens.²⁹ The Court recognized that in passing the EAA, Congress had extended the holding in Widmar to public secondary schools.³⁰ The Court proceeded to interpret the meaning of the phrase "noncurriculum related student group" to determine if Westside High School had to provide equal access to a Christian club.³¹ While a majority of the Court agreed with regard to the statutory interpretation, the Court was divided with regard to the rationale for upholding the EAA as constitutional.³² In her opinion for the plurality, Justice O'Connor examined Widmar, concluding that the Court reasoned that opening university facilities to religious groups sends a message of "neutrality rather than endorsement."³³ The plurality found the logic of Widmar applicable and concluded that a school does not endorse student speech when the speech is allowed on a nondiscriminatory basis.³⁴ The plurality recognized concern over actions being perceived as government support of religion in the "eyes of impressionable youngsters."³⁵ However, there is "a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect."³⁶ In addition, secondary school students are mature enough to recognize that the school is not endorsing student speech it merely permits.³⁷ As an additional safeguard, the statute prohibits active participation by school officials and limits such meetings to "noninstructional time"; therefore, there is little risk, if any, of state endorsement or coercion.³⁸ Also, the school could avoid any "mistaken inference of endorsement" by making it clear that recognition of a club is not an endorsement of the members' views.³⁹

In Wallace v. Jaffree,⁴⁰ the Court concluded that an Alabama statute which permitted a moment of silence "for meditation or voluntary prayer"⁴¹ was unconstitutional because it indicated the state's intent that prayer be considered the favored practice.⁴² Justice O'Connor, concurring, stated that the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from "conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion ... is favored."⁴³ A state-sponsored moment of silence could be constitutional, if properly written, because it is "not inherently religious"; moreover, "[b]y mandating a moment of silence, a State does not necessarily endorse" what happens during that period.⁴⁴

Thus, the Court has concluded that a state does not establish religion by...