Cash Limits, Hospital Prescribing and Shrinking Medical Jurisdiction

AuthorChristopher K. M. Pong,William J. Jackson,Audrey S. Paterson,Simona Scarparo
Published date01 November 2014
Date01 November 2014
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/faam.12042
Financial Accountability & Management, 30(4), November 2014, 0267-4424
Cash Limits, Hospital Prescribing
and Shrinking Medical Jurisdiction
WILLIAM J. JACKSON,AUDREY S. PATERSON,CHRISTOPHER K. M. PONG
AND SIMONA SCARPARO
Abstract: In recent years substantial research effort has been applied to the study
of the introduction of accounting logics into medical practice, but little of that effort
has been applied to the area of the prescribing of medicines, especially in the hospital
setting. This paper uses the sociology of the professions as a lens to analyse how policy
and managerial initiatives promoting cost and budgetary concerns have affected
medical jurisdiction and prescribing practice within the setting of Scottish acute
hospitals. The findings suggest that the introduction of accounting logic is shrinking
medical jurisdiction and stratifying the profession within the hospital setting.
Keywords: cash limits, hospital prescribing, medical jurisdiction
INTRODUCTION
In recent years the attempts by government to redefine the boundaries
of authority within healthcare organisations have gained increasing traction
(Denis et.al., 1999, pp.104–5), and the traditional culture of professionalism
that underpinned organisations such as hospitals has increasingly come under
challenge (Brock et al., 1999, pp.1–2). Central to these changes are the
introduction of market-based reforms with new structures of accountability and
a heightened attention to ‘accounting logics’ (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997).
These changes could be argued to have been aimed at and impacted upon the
medical profession. As Eve and Hodgkin (1997, p.74) have observed the medical
professionals had for long been a group that used ‘huge amounts of public
money’, but ‘barely had to account for their decisions’ and the reforms sought
The first and second authors are from the School of Management & Languages, Heriot-
Watt University, Edinburgh. The third author is from the Nottingham University Business
School. The fourth author is from the Deakin Graduate School of Business, Deakin University,
Melbourne, Australia.
Address for correspondence: Audrey S. Paterson, School of Management & Languages,
Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh EH14 4AS, UK.
e-mail: A.Paterson@hw.ac.uk
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2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road,
Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. 403
404 JACKSON, PATERSON, PONG AND SCARPARO
to address that situation. For example, major NHS reforms have resulted in
the inclusion of clinicians into managerial and financial management roles,
moving them more centrally into the organisation and its control systems
(Kitchener, 2000). As a result, professional activity is potentially affected in
all areas and a substantial body of extant academic research has grown up
around the analysis of these changes. However, the great scale and complexity
of healthcare organisation means that some areas of medical practice have been
relatively neglected in the accounting literature. One such area of neglect is
that of prescribing practice by clinicians; a fact which is surprising given the
scale of medicine cost to the NHS and the attention that has been paid to the
area by successive governments.
According to Britten (2001) pressures exerted by the state through the NHS
reforms and prescribing control initiatives have resulted in the prescribing
authority becoming a battleground in which clinical autonomy is vigorously
defended. This has arguably been exacerbated by the inclusion of medicines
expenditure into the overall cash limited budgets. Previously the exclusion of
medicines from the cash limit provided a safety valve for the unpredictability
of demand for prescription medicines, but now substantial cost variability has
been introduced which puts greater strain on clinical directorates and demands
greater attention to control. Additionally, a long series of government reforms
has aimed to put accounting rationales at the heart of prescribing through
the creation of overarching bodies that provide authoritative statements on
best practice based on cost as well as medical criteria. In the face of such
resource constraints and the increasing intrusion of cost and budgetary issues it
is unsurprising that doctors find themselves with reduced clinical freedom (Eve
and Hodgkin, 1997).
Undoubtedly part of the reason for this challenge is the position of remarkable
strength that the UK medical profession held in relation to control over its work.
The profession of medicine used medical discourse centred on the concepts of
safety and efficacy of treatment as a shield against intervention from managerial
concerns such as cost. Only clinicians it seemed were able to judge these matters
and non-medical concerns were held to be counter to the interests and needs
of the patient. Abbott (1988, p.47) observed that ‘most professions — American
medicine is the great exception here — have treatment cost as a central problem
in prescription’. In the past he could easily have added UK medicine to his
exception, but UK policy direction has for some decades tried to reverse this
attitude with substantial effort applied to areas such as prescribing. However,
only limited effort has been given to exploration of the effects of these accounting
discourses on prescribing practice and the work that has been done has focused
on primary rather than secondary care. By analysing the prescribing work of a
group of clinicians working in Scottish acute hospitals this study begins to fill
that gap. Using the lens of the sociology of the professions and in particular
the work on jurisdiction by Abbott (1988) the study examines changes that have
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2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

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