Carruthers v. State: Thou Shalt Not Make Direct Religious References in Closing Argument - Marcus S.henson

• Jurisdiction: Georgia,United States
• Publication year: 2001
• Citation: Vol. 52 No. 2

CASENOTE

Carruthers v. State: Thou Shalt Not Make

Direct Religious References in Closing

Argument

In Carruthers v. State,¹ the Georgia Supreme Court addressed the very "precise line" that must be drawn between religious references that are permissible and those that must not be allowed in the sentencing phase of capital cases.² Specifically, the court held that the prosecutor's use of direct quotations from the Bible "invoked a higher moral authority and diverted the jury from the discretion provided to them under state law."³ The court ultimately found that the allowance of these direct religious references, over the objection of defense counsel, constituted an impermissible violation of defendant's right to due process.⁴

I. Factual Background

On December 12, 1995, Jannette Williams arrived at Anthony Carruthers' house and took Carruthers and Billy Edward Easter, Jr. to her house in her car. She invited the men into her home and, after conversing with them for a period of time, she sat on Carruthers' lap. Carruthers whispered something into her ear, to which Williams responded that she had a boyfriend. Carruthers proceeded to grab her arm. At this point, Easter went upstairs to use the bathroom.⁵

Easter went back downstairs when he heard the sound of breaking glass. When Easter arrived downstairs, he saw Carruthers choking Williams. After Williams fell to the floor unconscious or semiconscious, Carruthers cut her neck with a knife. He commented that the knife was dull and threw it across the room. When Williams showed signs of life, Carruthers went to the kitchen, obtained another knife, and cut Williams' neck in a repetitive motion, nearly decapitating her. Thereafter, Carruthers rolled Williams over and stabbed her eleven times in the chest.⁶

Only a short time after the murder, Carruthers' girlfriend saw Williams' car at Carruthers' residence, noticed his bloody clothes in his washing machine, and noticed scratches on his neck. Subsequently, Carruthers and Easter drove to Florida in Williams' car, and Carruthers sold the car for drugs. Upon discovering that the drugs were fake, Carruthers chased and possibly shot at a man who had been involved in the sale. When he returned to Georgia, Carruthers told his girlfriend that he had killed a woman who owed him money. Shortly thereafter, on December 20, 1995, Williams' car was found in Florida. Blood was found in the automobile, and a DNA test matched the blood with Williams'.⁷

On October 2, 1996, a Clayton County grand jury indicted Carruthers for malice murder, among other charges.⁸ Trial began on March 23, 1998, and on March 27, the jury found Carruthers guilty on all counts.⁹ Prior to closing arguments in the sentencing phase, Carruthers filed a motion in limine requesting that during closing arguments the court exclude "any Bible passages that appealed to the passion of the jury and would encourage it to impose a death sentence based on religion."¹⁰ A preargument hearing was held in which the prosecutor made known his intent to cite passages directly from the biblical books of Romans,

Genesis, and Matthew. Carruthers' counsel objected to the prosecutor's use of these biblical references. The trial court, however, overruled the objections and permitted the passages to be used.¹¹

In closing arguments, the state focused on the issue of deterrence. Making direct references to biblical passages, the prosecutor contended it was imperative that society deter criminals by imposing a death sentence on those who kill other people.¹² Specifically, the prosecutor argued:

Deterrence is very important and the Bible suggests to us why deterrence is appropriate. Romans tells us that every person is subject to the governing authority, every person is subject. And in Matthew it tells us, who sheddeth man's blood by man shall his blood be shed for in the image of God made [he] man. For all they who take the sword shall die by the sword, and this is a message that is very clear, that society must deter criminals.¹³

After arguments were heard, on March 29, the jury fixed the sentence for the malice murder at death. The trial court then sentenced Carruthers to death.¹⁴

Carruthers filed a motion for a new trial in April and amended that motion twice before it was denied by the court on February 3, 1999.¹⁵ Following the denial of the motion, this appeal was brought on June 24, 1999.¹⁶

II. Legal Background

The Georgia Supreme Court has addressed the issue of the proper scope of closing arguments a number of times. In dealing with this issue the court has been guided by statutory provisions and precedent. These general guiding principles are worth consideration before a more in depth evaluation of recent developments is undertaken.

Importantly, the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") requires that the Georgia Supreme Court conduct an independent review of all death sentences.¹⁷ Particularly, with regard to the issue of the permissible scope of arguments in the sentencing phase of capital cases, the Code states the court shall determine "[wjhether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor."¹⁸ This determination requires a careful review of the entire record to discover the existence of any unauthorized factors that might have affected the ultimate decision to impose a death sentence.¹⁹ Undoubtedly, a close examination of the arguments made by counsel is well within the purview of what is required by this statute.²⁰

In addition to this statutory guidance, the court has been aided in addressing the general issue of the permissibility of passionate arguments by reference to a key case from 1983. Grappling with arguments designed to appeal to the emotions of the jury in a capital case, the court in Conner v. State²¹ held that "argument by the prosecutor which 'dramatically appeals' to such legitimate emotional response is not 'constitutionally intolerable.'"²² The court reasoned that the imposition of the death penalty necessarily involved a certain degree of emotional response and that it was not, and could never be, "a wholly rational, calculated, or logical process."²³ While Conner did not deal with direct references to religious texts, it did permit an appeal to emotion to play a very broad role.²⁴

With this guidance, the court has addressed the narrower topic of religious references in closing arguments of the sentencing phase of capital cases in several important opinions. These opinions tend to show, when analyzed together, that the court has developed a uniform and structured way of resolving this issue. In these opinions, the court consistently made determinations regarding three key elements: (1) an evaluation of the proper or improper nature of the references that were made; (2) a consideration of whether a timely objection was raised by defense counsel; and (3) a consideration of whether the allowance of the references by the trial court constituted reversible error. Because these determinations were made with regard to varying religious references that were characterized by the court in different ways, and because the circumstances under which the references were made differed from case to case, these relatively recent opinions provide an important context within which the Carruthers opinion can be examined.

One type of religious reference that the court has addressed involved what could be characterized as a response to religious-oriented arguments made by defense counsel. In Todd v. State,²⁵ the court held that responsive religious references were not improper.²⁶ The court conceded that arguments for the imposition of the death penalty based on the defendant's religion would be improper; however, when a defendant has offered evidence in mitigation regarding his postarrest church attendance, a prosecutor is permitted to question the "genuineness of the defendant's 'jail-house' religious conversion."²⁷ Additionally, the majority noted defendant failed to raise a timely objection to the references that he later contended were improper.²⁸ This failure set the standard of review as a determination of whether or not the argument in reasonable probability changed the result of the trial, rather than a question of whether the argument was objectionable.²⁹ Applying this standard, the court did not find sufficient prejudice to reverse.³⁰

Disagreeing with the majority's reasoning in Todd, Justice Benham wrote a noteworthy dissent addressing, among other things, the religious references of the prosecutor.³¹ Characterizing the references as more than simple responses to the defense's argument, Justice Benham found several arguments that he considered to be prejudicially improper. First, the prosecutor contended the State was entitled to "Old Testament Retribution."³² Additionally, the prosecutor "disparaged mercy as a sentencing consideration" with references to the New Testament and quoted the biblical passage, "[h]e who sheddeth the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed."³³ Justice Benham reasoned that these arguments, along with other arguments regarding the enforcement of the "laws of the Bible," not only improperly appealed to religious affiliations but also "urged the jury to apply a law other than that of Georgia as given to the jury by the trial court."³⁴ Furthermore, he contended allowing these arguments constituted a denial of defendant's right to due process and was a clear violation of the guidelines in O.C.G.A. section 17-10-35, prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty with passion and prejudice.³⁵ Though well reasoned, Justice Benham's dissent did not change the way the court approached what it characterized as responsive religious references.

In Crowe v. State,³⁶ the court again held arguments to be permissible given the context in which they were made.³⁷ The prosecutor contended that "the Bible says that you shall be put to death if you kill somebody."³⁸ The court...