Campaign Finance (Update 1)

AuthorMarlene Arnold Nicholson
Pages296-297

Page 296

Criticism of political-funding practices and calls for further reforms increased in the latter half of the 1980s as the cost of campaigns continued to escalate and repeated fundraising scandals were publicized. Turnover of congressional seats reached an all-time low, in part because challengers found it difficult to compete in expensive media campaigns. The growing number of POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES contributed most heavily to congressional incumbents, particularly to those in the majority party, and both parties exploited the loopholes found in the federal funding restrictions.

During this period the Supreme Court again considered the constitutionality of existing campaign-finance restrictions, continuing to grapple with the conflict between FIRST AMENDMENT liberties and the concern for political equality, a conflict inherent in attempts to regulate political funding. In the mid-1980s, the Court reiterated and even strengthened principles previously established in BUCKLEY V. VALEO (1976), including the rejection of equalization of political influence as an appropriate rationale for funding restrictions. However, at the end of the 1980s, a majority of the Court for the first time explicitly resolved the conflict by giving preference to equality rather than liberty, possibly signaling that they would view further legislative reforms with greater favor than in the past.

In Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Committee (1985) the Court invalidated a federal statute that limited independent expenditures by political committees supporting presidential candidates who accepted public subsidies. Writing for the majority, WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, then an Associate Justice, asserted that "the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far identified" were preventing the appearance and reality of corruption. Defining the term "corruption" more explicitly than in previous cases, Justice Rehnquist made clear that he was referring to "quid pro quo" arrangements with office holders.

One year later, in Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL) (1986), the Court held that the federal requirement that independent expenditures by CORPORATIONS in federal elections be made through voluntary funds given to political committees was unconstitutional as applied to MCFL. However, a change in the premises of a majority of the Justices was evident in Justice...

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