Political Action Committees

AuthorFrank J. Sorauf
Pages1932-1933

Page 1932

For political action committees (PACs) and for all other contributors to campaigns for public office, the modern constitutional era began in 1976 with the Supreme Court's decision in BUCKLEY V. VALEO. In sorting out the constitutionality of the many parts of the FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT (FECA) of 1971 and 1974, the Court reaffirmed the protections of the FIRST AMENDMENT'S FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION for PACs, citing a long line of precedents that included NAACP V. ALABAMA (1958). The Court further held all campaign contributions and expenditures to be the expression of political views and thus protected by the First Amendment.

The protections of the First Amendment notwithstanding, the Court permitted much of the congressional regulation of PACs in the FECA to stand as a legitimate exercise of Congress's right to prevent "corruption or the appearance of corruption." All PAC contributions are limited

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to $5,000 per candidate per election. Moreover, in California Medical Association v. FEC (1981), Congress was within its constitutional powers in forbidding them to accept more than $5,000 per year from any group or individual. But because the Court in Buckley extended greater protections to campaign spending than to campaign contributions, PACs are free to pursue unregulated independent spending in campaigns?spending done, that is, without the cooperation or knowledge of the candidate being aided.

For a subset of PACs, those with sponsoring parent organizations, the burden of regulation is heavier. If a parent organization is a corporation or labor union, it is (and has long been) prohibited under federal law (and the laws of some states) from making direct political expenditures. The PAC, then, must be a "separate, segregated fund" that raises its own money for its political spending. The parent organization, however, is free under federal law to pay the overhead costs of the PAC and to direct its decisions. PACs with parent organizations are further restricted by law in their fund-raising: PACSs of membership organizations may solicit only their members; with a few rarely used exceptions, union PACs may solicit only their members; and corporate PACs may solicit only stockholders and nonunion employees. These limits were upheld in FEC v. National Right to Work Committee (1982).

Even though the major constitutional precedents in this area have arisen largely in cases under the FECA, they...

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