Calling on the Legislature: Dixon v. State and the Scheme to Protect Minors - Jed D. Manton

• Citation: Vol. 56 No. 2
• Publication year: 2005

CASENOTE

Calling on the Legislature: Dixon v. State and Georgia's Statutory Scheme to Protect Minors from Sexual Exploitation

In Dixon v. State,' the Georgia Supreme Court analyzed Georgia's statutory scheme to protect children from sexual exploitation.' A jury convicted Marcus Dixon of statutory rape and aggravated child molestation, for which he received the mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years to serve ten.³ The Georgia Supreme Court reversed Dixon's conviction for aggravated child molestation.⁴ As a result of the reversal, Dixon was released from prison because he had already served the requirements for his statutory rape conviction.⁵ The majority and concurring opinion urged the Legislature to clarify Georgia's statutes to expressly distinguish statutory rape from child molestation.⁶ The dissenting opinions argued that "no legal justification whatsoever" existed for the reversal of Dixon's conviction, and a.once clear statutory scheme to protect children from exploitation was clouded by the majority.⁷ This Note argues that future courts will not hold the Dixon opinion expanded the scope of the rule of lenity because either: (1)the use of the rule of lenity was dicta, or (2) the rule of lenity, as used in Dixon, only applies to situations where the Legislature clearly intended for misdemeanor punishment to apply.

I. Factual Background

Marcus Dixon, a highly recruited football player and honor student, planned to attend Vanderbilt University on an athletic scholarship. During his senior year at Pepperrell High School in Dalton, georgia, Dixon admitted he had sexual intercourse with a sophomore student in one of the school's classroom trailers. Dixon was eighteen years old at the time; the girl was fifteen years old. Dixon maintained the act was consensual, and the victim fabricated the rape accusation because she feared what her father would do if he discovered his daughter had intercourse with an African-American.' the victim testified that after school Dixon approached her in the trailer, locked the door, and forced her to have sex with him. Specifically, the victim introduced evidence of vaginal injuries and a bruised arm.⁹ The defense argued that the "slight" vaginal injuries were not caused by force and were incidental to sexual intercourse. Dixon denied causing the bruises on the victim's arm.¹⁰ The testimony of two additional witnesses was also admitted for the "limited purpose of illustrating [Dixon's] intent, motive or bent of mind in engaging in the act of intercourse with the 15-year old."¹¹ One young woman testified Dixon had exposed himself to her, and another testified Dixon had placed his hands inside her underwear."

On May 15, 2003, a jury found Dixon guilty of statutory rape and aggravated child molestation, but acquitted him of all other charges including rape, sexual battery, false imprisonment, and aggravated assault.¹³ As required by Georgia's mandatory sentencing laws, Dixon received a sentence of fifteen years to serve ten for the aggravated child molestation conviction.¹⁴

A large amount of media coverage surrounded the case and sentencing.¹⁵ An outcry ensued claiming the sentence was unjust because Dixon was found not guilty of rape, sexual battery, false imprisonment, and aggravated assault.¹⁶ Because Dixon was acquitted of rape and sexual battery, many felt the jury's verdict proved that the sexual encounter was consensual.¹⁷ However, Dixon's appeal did not allege that the verdict proved the act was consensual, but rather that Georgia's Legislature could not have intended for a teenager to serve a minimum of ten years in prison for non-rape intercourse with another teenager." On September 2, 2003, Dixon filed a Notice of Appeal to the Georgia Suprerne Court invokingj urisdiction by challenging the constitutionality of the aggravated child molestation statute.¹⁹ On May 3, 2004, Dixon's conviction for aggravated child molestation was reversed, and he was released from prison having completed his sentence for misdemeanor statutory rape.²⁰

11. Legal Background

A. Statutory Rape

Statutory Rape in Georgia is a strict liability crime, and the State must prove only that the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with a person under the age of sixteen.²¹ The relationship between the age of the defendant and victim can cause statutory rape, a felony, to be reduced to a misdemeanor.²² Section 16-6-3(a) of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.")²³ governs statutory rape, and a person is guilty of a felony "when he or she engages in sexual intercourse with any person under the age of 16 years" who is not his or her spouse.²⁴ However if "the victim is 14 or 15 years of age and the person so convicted is no more than three years older than the victim," then the defendant will be guilty of a misdemeanor rather than a felony.²⁵ The misdemeanor provision prevents teenagers who engage in consensual sex and are not more than three years apart in age from being charged with a felony.²⁶

In 1995the Georgia Legislature added the misdemeanor provision and gave the trialjudge discretion to sentence a teenager guilty of statutory rape to either a felony or a misdemeanor.²⁷ However, in 1996 the Legislature again amended O.C.G.A. section 16-6-3 to specifically eliminate any discretion a trial judge may have in sentencing a defendant to a felony or a misdemeanor.²⁸ The 1996 amendment mandated one will only be guilty of a misdemeanor when certain age factors are established.²⁹

Both the 1995 and 1996 amendments are consistent with laws in other states and recognize that two teenagers engaging in consensual sex should not be subject to felony prosecution.³⁰ Some states, such as Arkansas, Iowa, and Colorado, have enacted statutory rape laws that only criminalize sexual activity when a defendant is a specified number of years older than the victim.³¹ Other states, like Georgia, California, and Ohio, prevent a defendant from being charged with a felony when certain age factors are present.³² Regardless of the approach taken, either to totally decriminalize or to reduce the punishment to a misdemeanor, the majority of states have laws to differentiate sexual activity between teenagers from sexual activity between a much older defendant and a minor victim.³³

B. Child Molestation and Aggravated Child Molestation

Child molestation is not a strict liability crime and requires the State to prove the defendant engaged in "any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person."³⁴ Aggravated child molestation occurs when one "commits an offense of child molestation which act physically injures the child or involves the act of sodomy."³⁵ A person convicted of aggravated child molestation is subject to the sentencing requirement under O.C.G.A. section 17-10-6.I,³⁶ and the defendant must serve a minimum of ten years in prison.³⁷ Unlike statutory rape, the Legislature has not passed any amendments to reduce child molestation or aggravated child molestation to a misdemeanor depending on the age of the defendant and the victim.

111. Court's rationale

Chief Justice Fletcher, writing for the majority, held that the Legislature intended to punish Dixon's conduct as misdemeanor statutory rape rather than felony child molestation; therefore, the court reversed Dixon's conviction for aggravated child molestation.³⁸ The decision consisted of three major parts. First, the court determined how the Legislature intended to treat the conduct that occurred in this case.³⁹ After concluding the Legislature intended to punish Dixon's conduct as a misdemeanor, the court used several canons of statutory interpretation to support its argument that only misdemeanor statutory rape applied.⁴⁰ Second, the court specifically responded to the State's contention⁴¹ that the statutory construction analysis was not applicable in this case.⁴² Finally, the court encouraged the Legislature to make a more recognizable distinction between statutory rape, child molestation, and other sexual crimes, especially with respect to teenage defendants.⁴³

A. Georgia Legislature's Intent and Canons of Statutory Construction

The majority's decision stated statutory rape and child molestation were part of a legislative framework and coordinated scheme aimed at "protecting children from sexual exploitation."⁴⁴ Using the statutory canon inpari materia, the court stated the statutes in question must be construed together to determine how the Legislature intended to punish Dixon's conduct.⁴⁵ To properly use the canon inpari materia, the court must determine that the statute is ambiguous.⁴⁶ According to the court, reading the two statutes together showed "a clear legislative intent to prosecute the conduct that the jury determined to have occurred in this case as misdemeanor statutory rape."⁴⁷ The majority used several canons of construction to support its position that the Legislature only intended to punish Dixon for misdemeanor statutory rape.⁴⁸

First, the 1996 amendment to the statutory rape law provided that if certain age factors were present, statutory rape was punishable only as a misdemeanor.⁴⁹ When a defendant was convicted of statutory rape, the trial judge is not able to choose whether to sentence the defendant to either a misdemeanor or a felony.⁵⁰ The majority stated "itwould be entirely incongruous with the intent of the Legislature" to mandate conduct under O.C.G.A. section 16-6-3 to be a misdemeanor if the exact same conduct could meet felony child molestation.⁵¹ Thus, the Legisla- ture intended for the misdemeanor statutory rape provision to have exclusive application to conduct falling within its parameters, and "[i]f the conduct at issue in this case also qualifies as child molestation, then . . . any instance of sex between teenagers would also constitute child molestation."⁵² This would be the case...