Caliphs of the Shadows: The Islamic State's Leaders Post-Mawla.

• Author: Al-Tamimi, Aymenn

On August 3, 2023, the Islamic State's al-Furqan Media publicized a teaser announcement of a forthcoming speech by one "Abu Hudhayfa al-Ansari," described as being the spokesman for the Islamic State. Considering that the previous spokesman was one Abu Omar al-Muhajir" and the group had said nothing until then about his fate, it was predictable that the speech was going to announce that something had befallen its spokesman, and possibly its caliph as well. (1) Sure enough, Abu Hudhayfa announced that the previous spokesman had been taken captive, and that the group's caliph Abu al-Husayn al-Husayni al-Qurashi had been killed. He also announced that a new caliph--Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi--had been appointed in Abu al-Husayn's place, continuing a line of faceless caliphs. Despite the fact that these caliphs are shrouded in a veil of obscurity, the group insists that its fighters and Muslims around the world declare allegiance to them.

What might now be called the 'dark age' of caliphs contrasts markedly with the public face of the group's first caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. When the Islamic State first rose to global prominence in June 2014 with its seizure of territory spanning the borders of Iraq and Syria and the declaration of the caliphate under then leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, there was understandably much interest in the person leading the organization. Indeed, the Islamic State was keen to highlight a public face for its caliph, who had released audio messages prior to being named caliph and continued to do so during his tenure as caliph up to the time of his death in 2019. He also made two visual appearances: Once in a video released in July 2014 showing al-Baghdadi in the al-Nouri mosque in Mosul, and then an appearance in a video released in April 2019 following the end of the group's territorial control in Iraq and Syria, showing him consulting with figures who were presumably part of the group's top leadership. (2)

Moreover, Turki al-Binali, who essentially served as the Islamic State's leading mufti in running the fatwa-issuing and research department that was created following the declaration of the caliphate, had written a pamphlet entitled "Stretch forth the hands to pledge allegiance to al-Baghdadi," (3) which included some biographical information about the would-be caliph, such as establishing his background in Islamic studies, his work as an imam and preacher in mosques in Iraq, his membership of the Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin (a predecessor group to the Islamic State of Iraq) and his leadership of the Shari'i committees and judiciary in the Islamic State of Iraq prior to his appointment as leader of the Islamic State of Iraq in 2010. (4)

Thus, thanks to the high public profile of the Islamic State and its leader, widespread interest in the group and the available variety of sources of information, a fairly detailed picture of al-Baghdadi's life and career inside the Islamic State emerged, despite some errors that gained prominence early on. (a)

Following al-Baghdadi's death in October 2019 in a U.S. raid on his hideout in the area of Barisha in northern Idlib countryside, the group announced the appointment of Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi as his successor, a move that was portrayed as being in accordance with al-Baghdadi's "counsel," implying that al-Baghdadi had recommended him to be his successor. (5) While Abu Ibrahim made no speeches or public appearances during his tenure of around 28 months as caliph and the group has never given its own account of who he was, testimonies that emerged from Islamic State dissidents and defectors and Islamic State leaders in Iraqi detention correctly suggested that he was to be identified with Hajji Abdullah (al-Hajj Abdullah Qardash), who had served as a top deputy of al-Baghdadi and was known to intelligence services tracking the organization. (6) As such, like al-Baghdadi, a good deal of information emerged as to who Abu Ibrahim was, including from interrogations while he had previously been in U.S. custody, (7) and the identification of him with one "Amir Muhammad Sa'id Abd al-Rahman al-Salbi" (b) was essentially confirmed when President Biden announced that he had been killed in a U.S. raid in February 2022 and the organization then announced his death the following month. (8)

The death of Abu Ibrahim, however, has essentially marked the end of the era of the group's 'known caliphs.' Since his death, two successors have already been appointed and killed: namely, Abu al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi and Abu al-Husayn al-Husayni al-Qurashi, both of whom only lasted several months each and similarly made no public appearances and released no audio messages of their own. Moreover, the U.S. government has not come forward to affirm the identity of either of these figures, and the organization has had little to say about who they were.

This article explores in more depth what is known about these two successors to Abu Ibrahim and the circumstances surrounding their deaths, and considers the future of the organization in light of the seeming rapid rate at which the group's caliphs are being eliminated.

Abu al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi

If there is one thing that can be ascertained with certainty regarding Abu al-Hasan's identity, it is who he was definitely not. Shortly after the killing of Abu Ibrahim and prior to the announcement of Abu al-Hasan's appointment, the journalist Hassan Hassan published an article for New Lines Magazine suggesting that the likely successor would be one Bashar Khattab Ghazal al-Sumaida'i. (9) According to Hassan, al-Sumaida'i joined the Islamic State in 2013 and had previously been a member of the Iraqi jihadi group Ansar al-Islam, which is now largely confined to northwest Syria where it operates as a small independent faction under the watch of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). In addition, Hassan said that al-Sumaida'i served in a judicial capacity and had been close to Abu Ibrahim, though he had beenbased in Turkey for some time before returning to Syria in 2021. (10)

While this account of Sumaida'i was interesting, his supposed identity as Abu Ibrahim's successor was never affirmed by U.S. intelligence, and doubts about the story began to emerge after Turkey arrested Sumaida'i in May 2022. Despite initial hype that Turkey had captured the Islamic State caliph, (d) Turkish authorities were subsequently unable to confirm that this figure was in fact Abu al-Hasan, but perhaps more importantly, the Islamic State released an editorial in its Al Naba newsletter in which the group mocked unspecified "analysts" for holding to fanciful wishes and hopes and trying to prove them to be true. (11) The editorial gave as an example those who hoped that the caliph had been taken prisoner, and then added after mention of the caliph: "may God protect him." (12)

The implication of these words was clear: Abu al-Hasan had not been taken prisoner by Turkey. If he had been taken prisoner, the group would likely have said so and either have launched a campaign to free him if it had believed that it was feasible to free him, or have simply appointed a successor, thus transferring the position of the caliph to another individual. This dual choice with regard to the fate of an imprisoned caliph derives from Islamic jurisprudence, (13) and there is no reason to suppose the Islamic State would deviate from these norms with regards to its own caliphs. (e)

Doubts about the identification of Abu al-Hasan with al-Sumaida'i were further solidified by the surprise announcement by the Islamic State on November 30, 2022, about the death of Abu al-Hasan and the appointment of his successor Abu al-Husayn. (14) The announcement came via an audio message of then spokesman Abu Omar al-Muhajir on al-Furqan Media, and said little about the precise circumstances of his death beyond the fact that Abu al-Hasan died a violent death through fighting the "enemies of God."

Hours later, however, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) released a statement claiming that Abu al-Hasan had been killed in mid-October 2022 in a clash with the "Free Syrian Army" in Syria's southern province of Dar'a, which is officially under Syrian government control. (15) The CENTCOM statement did not capture the full nuance in that it was not the "Free Syrian Army" that killed Abu al-Hasan but rather, as will be outlined below, local militiamen, some of whom may have previously been part of the "Free Syrian Army"-brand insurgent groups that received backing from the United States, some European states, Jordan, and Gulf countries. (16)

An analysis by this author of local reports from the time suggests that Abu al-Hasan was likely killed during an offensive launched by local militiamen against Islamic State cells in the north Dar'a countryside town of Jasim, (17) a...