A Bump in the Road to Confession

• Author: John L. Worrall
• Date: 01 February 2016
• Published date: 01 February 2016
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12177

POLICY ESSAY

TASER EXPOSURE AND COGNITIVE

IMPAIRMENT

A Bump in the Road to Confession

John L. Worrall

University of Texas at Dallas

InMiranda v. Arizona (1966), the U.S. Supreme Court decided that “the prosecution

may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial

interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards

effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” The “procedural safeguards” the

Court called for are the now-familiar Miranda warnings (“You have the right to remain

silent,” etc.). Now, failure on the part of law enforcement to provide Miranda warnings

when they are required will result in exclusion from criminal proceedings of any statements

made by a suspected criminal.

Critically, Miranda applies only in the context of custodial interrogation. If a suspect

is interrogated while not in custody, Miranda is irrelevant. Likewise, if custody occurs but

interrogation does not take place, the warnings are not required. The police can use this to

their advantage; suspects who are in custody but not interrogated sometimes confess simply

because they feel compelled to talk, and such statements are admissible at trial. There are

also exceptions to the Miranda rule. For example, the warnings can be delayed when public

safety is threatened (New York v. Quarles, 1984), and improperly obtained confessions can

be used for impeachment purposes (Harris v. New York, 1971).

The “custodial interrogation” requirement and exceptions to the Miranda decision

afford some latitude to the police, but important protections remain for the accused. First,

it is not sufficient for police to warn suspects of their Fifth Amendment privileges and

then commence with interrogation; suspects must “knowingly and intelligently” waive

their rights for their statements to be admissible into evidence (Berghuis v. Thompkins,

2010; Montejo v. Louisiana, 2009). Second, and perhaps more importantly, confessions,

if obtained via force and coercion, can violate due process regardless of whether custodial

interrogation occurs (Brown v. Mississippi, 1936; Fikes v. Alabama, 1957).

Direct correspondence to John L. Worrall, University of Texas at Dallas, 800 West Campbell Road, GR 31,

Richardson, TX 75080 (e-mail: worrall@utdallas.edu).

DOI:10.1111/1745-9133.12177 C2015 American Society of Criminology 109

Criminology & Public Policy rVolume 15 rIssue 1