Book Review: Payan, T. (2006). Cops, Soldiers, and Diplomats: Explaining Agency Behavior in the War on Drugs. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Pp. 220

• Published date: 01 December 2007
• Date: 01 December 2007
• DOI: 10.1177/1057567707310574
• Author: John S. Robey
• Subject Matter: Articles

Payan, T. (2006). Cops, Soldiers, and Diplomats: Explaining Agency Behavior in the War

on Drugs. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Pp. 220.

DOI: 10.1177/1057567707310574

Tony Payan teaches political science and international relations at the University of Texas-El

Paso. He specializes in U.S.–Mexico relations and addressed the issue of U.S.–Mexican relations

with the question of what policy is causing the most harm to our relationship with Mexico. His

answer is that few issues are doing more damage than the ongoing war on drugs. After decades of

effort and billions of dollars, the results of this war are “abysmal.” Drugs are cheaper, stronger, and

more readily available today than they were 34 years ago when President Nixon first inaugurated the

war. The goal of the war was to curtail drug use. It is noted that drug use might not have been the

proper concern, rather, drug abuse may have been a more logical target. At any rate, the war has been

a dismal failure so should we continue down the same futile direction that has not worked, or should

we search for more creative solutions to this vexing issue? It is surprising to note that Payan notes

that public opinion surveys continue to show wide support for the war despite the fact that it is

unwinable. So the “war on drugs grinds on and on in quasi-mechanical, monotonous, dehumanizing

routine” (n.p.). Most people who should criticize this failed waste of billions and billions of our tax

dollars do not because of the political costs involved. There are huge industries of prison systems,

defense lawyers, soldiers, police, bail bondsmen, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents,

Border Patrol agents, prison guards, and governmental administrators who have a vested interest in

seeing to it that the war continues regardless of costs or success.

Professor Payan enters this mess with the total goal of not so much documenting the failures of

the various agencies involved in the war but examining agency behavior and interagency behavior of

law enforcement, diplomatic, and military components of the government. The general conclusion

of the interagency efforts of the government show it to be “a poorly put together patchwork of efforts

that have not been well thought out, well coordinated or well implemented” (n.p.). The author then

sets out to explain some of the lessons we should learn from this failed effort. One such lesson is

that bureaucracies of the government are not equipped to deal with “post modern problems such as

psychoactive drugs.” Bureaucracies are seen as “inflexible” with “rigid” standards and operating

procedures, and an ineffective hierarchy of accountability. These characteristics make it impossible

for government agencies to adapt in a timely fashion to the ever-changing tactics of the mobile

dynamic drug cartels. Professor Payan warns us that if we do not learn from the failures of the war

on drugs, we run the risk of repeating those failures in our war on terrorism.

Those failed policies were the products of principally three groups (i.e., law enforcement, the

military, and the State Department). More specifically, Payan’s analysis examines the DEA,the Coast

Guard, the FBI, the Pentagon (especially the Southern Command), and the Department of State’s

Bureau of International Narcotics Matters. Within the law enforcement agencies, Payan found that

they were heavily engaged in politics, and they were highly competitive and viewed each other as

rivals although the U.S. Customs did not see the entrance of the military into the war as a threat. The

military only reluctantly accepted its role in the war on drugs. Some thought of the war as doomed

to failure and the military would then be blamed for the failure that was (in their eyes) a failure of the

law enforcement agencies. The State Department got into the drug war business out of a sense of

territoriality rather than genuine concern or interest. If they had not taken the reins some other agency

would have and the State Department considers this to be their “exclusive turf.” Like the military, the

State Department’s involvement in the war was reluctant, and it never became a focal point of the

agency. As Professor Payan notes, the objective of the U.S. State Department is to try and maintain

good relationships with foreign countries. “If the drug war was in the way of good relations, the drug

war took a back seat.”

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