Book Review: Experiencing Other Minds in the Courtroom

• DOI: 10.1177/1057567717732112
• Published date: 01 June 2018
• Date: 01 June 2018
• Author: Yvon Dandurand
• Subject Matter: Book Reviews

Book Review

Book Review

Feigenson, N. (2016).

Experiencing other minds in the courtroom. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 243 pp. $45.00, ISBN 978-0-

226-41373-0.

Reviewed by: Yvon Dandurand, School of Crimino logy and Criminal J ustice, Universi ty of the Fraser Valle y,

Abbotsford, British Columbia, Canada

DOI: 10.1177/1057567717732112

Our society increasingly relies on computer simulations. We depend more and more heavily on the

knowledge that computer simulations can provide. Neal Feigenson, associate dean and professor in

the Quinnipiac University School of Law, reflects on the legal life of simulations of subjective

experience, how they are created for use in litigation, how judges decide whether to admit them, and

how jurors are likely to think about them.

Feigenson accepts that subjectivity will always be central to the law. Whether in criminal or in

civil proceedings, the subjectivity of a person’s testimony and hence its credibility in establishing

the facts of a case is almost always an issue. The disputed facts may be a perceptual experience

known only to the person who experiences it. In Experiencing Other Minds in Court, Feigenson

reports that in a handful of cases in the United States, lawyers, litigants, and expert witnesses have

created photos, videos, animations, and sound files that purport to recreate the litigants’ sensations.

“Should the courts,” he asks, “ever admit visual or auditory evidence that purports to convey what

another person’s consciousness is like?” Should the “very audacity of attempting to simulate another

person’s private experience make judges suspicious?”

Simulations of subjectivity, although never flawless, are evidently possible. So far, they have

mostly but not exclusively been used in personal injury cases to support a plaintiff’s claim for

personal injury and damages. Feigenson predicts that more simulations of subjective perception

will be offered and admitted as evidence in legal proceedings. It is therefore important to understand

these simulations and their eff ects on legal decision-making. As sc ience and technology make

simulations of subjective experience increasing available and reliable, demand for them will only

increase and more resources will be invested in developing the technologies for producing them. In

other words, we are only beginning to witness the disruptive effects of these technologies on

evidentiary law and on legal proceedings. Place that question, if you will, in the broader context

of the limited ability of the law and the legal process to absorb and adjust to rapidly accumulating

scientific discoveries and evolving technologies.

In Chapter 2, “Knowing Other Minds, Simulating World,” Feigenson reviews the conflicting

philosophical and psychological views about the claim that people’s sensations can be digitally

recreated for others to share. In this, as in other chapters, the author submits current knowledge and

speculations to a meticulous examination.

In Chapter3, “Simulations as Evidence:Conceptual andLegal Overview,” the readeris introduced to

two frameworks,epistemological and doctrinal, for understanding how the law approaches simulation

of subjective experience. The author summarizes the law on demonstrative evidence and suggests

that it leaves judges and jurors much room to misconstrue the probative value of these exhibits.

International CriminalJustice Review

2018, Vol. 28(2) 183-184

ª2017 Georgia State University

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