Book Review: Beyond punishment? A normative account of the collateral legal consequences of conviction

• Published date: 01 September 2023
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0734016820913107
• Author: Samantha Luna
• Date: 01 September 2023
• Subject Matter: Book Reviews

ORCID iD

Michelle L. Malkin https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4055-9581

Hoskins, Z. (2019).

Beyond punishment? A normative account of the collateral legal consequences of conviction. Oxford University Press.

264 pp. $85.00, ISBN 9780199389230.

Reviewed by: Samantha Luna ,George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA

DOI: 10.1177/0734016820913107

In the United States, it is common practice for those with criminal records to be subjected to an exten-

sive array of collateral legal consequences that are often burdensome and detrimental to an individ-

ual’s successful reintegration back into society. In Beyond Punishment? A Normative Account of the

Collateral Legal Consequences of Conviction, Zachary Hoskins, an assistant professor of philosophy

at the University of Nottingham, draws on moral, legal, and political philosophy to critically examine

whether the use of collateral legal consequences is morally justif‌ied.

Hoskins begins with an overview of the variety and scope of burdensome legal measures faced by

offenders outside of their formal sentences. He then asks the question, “Are these measures ever

morally justif‌ied?”He asserts that while arguments can certainly be made that collateral legal con-

sequences may be unjustif‌ied in practice (e.g., racially disparate effects), our focus should f‌irst

begin with an examination of these measures in principle. He reasons that if measures are f‌irst

found to be unjustif‌ied in principle, they should be eliminated outright rather than reformed in prac-

tice. Hoskins argues that to evaluate the question of whether and when collateral legal consequences

are morally justif‌ied, it is necessary to f‌irst ask whether collateral legal consequences should be con-

sidered civil measures or, as some suggest, additional forms of punishment. He argues that this dis-

tinction is necessary because the justif‌ications for civil measures should differ from those of

punishment.

Hoskins discusses the answers to this question via two approaches. In the f‌irst, he identif‌ies the

practical consequences of treating collateral legal consequences as punishment. In the second, he crit-

ically examines whether these measures function as punishment. By drawing on legal and moral def-

initions of punishment, Hoskins concludes that collateral legal consequences function as punishment

only if they communicate condemnation of wrongdoing and are intended to be burdensome.

Therefore, the classif‌ication of a collateral legal consequence as punishment or civil measure

depends on the characteristics of the measure itself.

The book is then broken down into two main sections, where Hoskins evaluates the justif‌ications

for collateral legal consequences as punishment and civil measures. In the f‌irst section, Hoskins

examines whether collateral legal consequences are justif‌ied as forms of punishment by discussing

rationales and constraints on punishment. He f‌inds that punishment and collateral legal consequences

are not justif‌ied if they do not meet the standards of cardinal and ordinal proportionality; standards

that many burdensome measures (e.g., lifetime welfare bans) do not meet. Hoskins, however, argues

that these constraints only offer a limited evaluation of a measure’s justif‌ication. He asserts that the

treatment of offenders should not only be based on what they have done but also on who they are.

Using this approach, Hoskins concludes that any burdensome measures that treat offenders with con-

tempt by undermining their chances at reform (e.g., housing restrictions) fail to treat them as moral

persons and are therefore unjustif‌ied.

408 Criminal Justice Review 48(3)